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Abstract  
The spread of computer-based systems and the growing number of 
its applications in critical tasks has increased the dependence of modern 
societies on that kind of systems. As a consequence, dependability 
benchmarking of computer systems, as a way to assess and compare the 
dependability of components and systems, has caught the attention of 
researchers and practitioners in recent years. 
One crucial component of dependability benchmarks is the fault 
injector. Dependability benchmarks must include fault injectors with very 
specific features: (i) they should be very easy to install and use, without the 
need for any complex setup or installation procedure;(ii) have high level of 
portability; (iii) have very low intrusiveness, in order to mitigate the 
performance loss; (iv) be capable of injecting faults in both user and system 
spaces; (v) and in code and data segments of any process, irrespective of 
their complexity; (vi) be independent of the availability of the source code 
of any system component or user process; (vii) be dynamically linked into a 
target system; and (viii) be compatible with the latest and most advanced 
software fault models. Since existing fault injectors do not fulfill these 
requirements, this thesis presents a pioneering SWIFI tool named 
DBench-FI (Dependability Benchmarking Fault Injector), specially 
developed for dependability benchmarking. Their unique characteristics 
make it one of the most versatile fault injectors available. 
Among the main components of a dependability benchmark suite, 
the most critical one is undoubtedly the faultload. It should embody a 
repeatable, portable, representative and generally accepted fault set. 
Concerning software faults, the definition of that kind of faultloads is 
particularly difficult, as it requires a much more complex emulation 
x 
method than the traditional stuck-at or bit-flip used for hardware faults. 
Moreover, a faultload based on software faults requires a clear separation 
between the software components which are selected as fault injection 
target and the benchmark target (i.e., the system under evaluation), as the 
injection of software faults actually changes the code of the target 
component. This way, the faults should be injected in one component (the 
fault injection target) in order to evaluate their impact in the other 
components or in the overall system, guaranteeing the inviolability of the 
benchmark target and the credibility of the dependability benchmark. 
Although faultloads based on software faults had already been 
proposed, the choice of adequate fault injection targets (i.e., actual software 
components where the faults are injected) is still an open and crucial issue. 
Knowing that the number of possible software faults that can be injected in 
a given system is potentially very large (especially for large and complex 
systems), the problem of defining a faultload made of a small number of 
representative faults is of utmost importance. This thesis presents a 
comprehensive fault injection study and proposes a strategy to guide the 
fault injection target selection to reduce the number of faults required for 
the faultload. Furthermore, it exemplifies the proposed approach with a 
real web-server dependability benchmark and a large-scale integer vector 
sort application. 
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Resumo em Língua Portuguesa 
O aumento da utilização dos sistemas informáticos e o número 
crescente das suas aplicações em tarefas críticas das sociedades modernas 
tem aumentado a dependência desse tipo de sistemas. Em consequência, 
nos últimos anos, as benchmarks de confiabilidade têm sido objeto de 
enorme interesse, quer por parte de investigadores, quer por parte da 
indústria. 
Um dos elementos fundamentais que integram as benchmarks de 
confiabilidade é o injetor de falhas. As benchmarks de confiabilidade devem 
incluir injetores de falhas com características muito específicas: (i) devem 
ser fáceis de instalar e de utilizar, não exigindo qualquer procedimento 
especial de instalação ou execução; (ii) devem possuir um elevado nível de 
portabilidade; (iii) devem possuir um baixo nível de intrusividade no 
sistema alvo, de forma a minorar a perda de desempenho; (iv) devem 
oferecer a capacidade de injetar falhas em todo o sistema alvo (quer no 
espaço do utilizador, quer no espaço do sistema); (v) assim como nos 
segmentos de código e de dados de qualquer processo, independentemente 
da sua complexidade; (vi) devem ser independentes da disponibilidade ou 
conhecimento do código fonte de qualquer componente do sistema ou 
processo de utilizador; (vii) ser dinamicamente integrados no sistema alvo; 
e (viii) ser compatíveis com os mais avançados e recentes modelos de falhas 
de software. Uma vez que os atuais injetores de falhas não satisfazem todos 
os requisitos mencionados, esta tese apresenta uma ferramenta de injeção 
de falhas pioneira, implementada por software (Software Implemented Fault 
Injection - SWIFI), denominada DBench-FI, especialmente desenvolvida 
para benchmarks de confiabilidade. As suas características únicas fazem dele 
um dos mais versáteis injetores de falhas atualmente existentes. 
2 
De entre os componentes fundamentais das benchmarks de 
confiabilidade (workload, faultload, medidas, e configuração experimental e 
procedimentos), a faultload é, sem dúvida, um dos mais críticos. Ela deve 
incorporar um conjunto de falhas repetível, portável, representativo e 
aceite pela comunidade e pela indústria. No que concerne a falhas de 
software, a definição desse tipo de fautloads é particularmente difícil, uma 
vez que exige métodos bastante mais complexos do que o tradicional 
stuck-at ou bit-flip utilizado nas falhas de hardware. Adicionalmente, as 
faultload baseadas em falhas de software exigem uma clara separação entre 
os componentes de software que são selecionados como alvo da injeção de 
falhas e o alvo da benchmark (i.e., o sistema sob avaliação), uma vez que a 
injeção de falhas de software altera efetivamente o código do componente 
alvo. Desta forma, as falhas devem ser injetadas num componente (o alvo 
da injeção de falhas) a fim de se avaliar o seu impacto nos outros 
componentes ou no sistema como um todo, garantindo a inviolabilidade do 
alvo da benchmark e a credibilidade das benchmarks de confiabilidade. 
Apesar de terem já sido propostas faultloads baseadas em falhas de 
software, a escolha dos alvos da injeção de falhas (ou seja, os componentes 
de software onde as falhas são injetadas) continua a ser um tópico em 
aberto, apesar de fundamental. Sabendo-se que o número de falhas de 
software que podem ser injetadas num dado sistema é potencialmente 
muito grande, o problema da definição de uma faultload composta por um 
número pequeno de falhas representativas é de extrema importância. Esta 
tese apresenta igualmente um estudo exaustivo de injeção de falhas e 
propõe uma estratégia de orientação da seleção dos alvos da injeção de 
falhas para a redução o número de falhas necessárias numa faultload. Além 
disso, exemplifica a abordagem proposta com a utilização de uma 
benchmark de confiabilidade, real, para web-servers e de uma aplicação de 
ordenação de vetores de números inteiros de larga dimensão. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
This thesis is the result of several years of research in the field of dependability 
benchmarking at the Software and Systems Engineering Group of the Center for 
Informatics and Systems of the University of Coimbra. 
This opening chapter presents the motivation and the research goals for this work, 
providing a basis for the discussion that follows. The structure of the thesis is also 
presented in the final section of this chapter (Section 1.3).  
1.1 Goal and Motivation 
ith the spread of computing systems and the growing number 
of its applications in our everyday life, modern societies are 
becoming increasingly dependent on computer-based systems. 
System failures are a serious risk and cause more damages than ever 
before. Although more serious consequences arise from failures in safety 
critical applications, such as medical, aircraft, and nuclear power systems, 
there are other areas where such system failures cause important damage, 
like financial losses.  
W 
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There are many examples of system failures with consequent high 
costs in a wide range of areas. For example, in 1991, software problems in 
the Patriot missile-defense system used during the Gulf War prevented 
intercepting an Iraqi Scud missile killing 28 American soldiers and injuring 
around 100 other people [Blair et al. 1992]. Between June 1985 and January 
1987, a race condition bug led to what became tragically known as the 
Therac-25 accident - a computer controlled radiation therapy machine that 
massively overdosed six people, with resultant deaths and injuries 
[Leveson et al. 1995]. On 26th and 27th November 1992, design fatal flaws 
caused the failure of the London Ambulance Computer Aided Dispatch 
system [THRA 1993]. The economic impact that a bug can have in a nation-
wide money-critical system was fully shown in the credit card denial of 
authorization occurred in France, on 26th-27th June 1993 [Laprie 1995]. On 
4th June 1996, a software problem caused the maiden flight explosion of 
Ariane 5 [Lions 1996], resulting in a direct loss of at least 370 million dollars 
to the European Space Agency (ESA) [Dowson 1997]. On 7th August 1996, 
inadequate redundancy [Garber 1996] led to the blackout of America 
Online (AOL) computer network, preventing the service provider’s 
network for 19 hours, affecting 6 million users. On 14th August 2003, 
approximately 50 million people in the northeastern United States and 
southeastern Canada were impacted by the blackout of the General Electric 
energy management system [PSOTF 2004]. The outage was due to a 
software fault, triggered by a unique combination of events that led to a 
cascade of system failures and to an estimated total loss of 13 billion dollars 
[Wong et al. 2010]. On 7th March 2008, the reactor number 2 of the Edwin 
Irby Hatch nuclear power plant, in United States, was forced into an 
emergency shutdown for 48 hours after the installation of a software 
update on a computer operating on the plant’s business network 
[Krebs 2008]. The resulting loss was estimated in 5 million dollars [Wong et 
al. 2010]. More recently, on June 2012, a software fault originated by a bad 
software upgrade caused the collapse of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland/Natwest computer banking system. As a consequence, several 
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million of costumers were unable to access their accounts for several days 
[Masters et al. 2012, Scott 2012]. The cost of this system failure was 
estimated in more than 100 million pounds [Treanor 2012]. 
The use of formal methods for software validation is many times 
rejected [DeMillo et al. 1979], since they encompass a too complex and 
time-consuming process that cannot be managed and used, in practice, in 
software development. Instead, many software engineers and designers 
argue the use of more elaborate testing methods in order to ensure the 
correctness of software. However, a counter-argument to this view is the 
fact that, as stated by [Dijkstra 1972], testing could only prove the presence 
of bugs, but not their absence. 
In fact, it has been obvious over the last years that the high level of 
dependability, essential for modern computer systems, cannot generally be 
achieved using only a rigorous development process accepted by many of 
the actual certification schemes. The evaluation of dependability of 
computer systems is absolutely essential in an increasingly dependent 
society on that kind of systems. However, the intrinsic complexity of such 
an assessment is further aggravated by the growing complexity of both 
hardware and software [Silva et al. 2005]. Several research studies also 
show not only a clear predominance of software faults [Gray et al. 1991, 
Sullivan et al. 1992, Lee et al. 1995, Chou 1997, Kalyanakrishnam et al. 1999] 
when compared to other types of system faults, but also that its weight on 
the overall system dependability will tend to increase. As a consequence, it 
is nowadays generally accepted that most of the software components have 
residual faults, also known as software defects or bugs, which escape the 
traditional testing phases of software development process. Among the 
main causes for those circumstances, besides the well-known technical 
difficulties intrinsic to the software development and testing process 
[Lyu 1996, Musa 1996], one can mention the huge complexity of today’s 
software and the increasing pressure to reduce time to market. This 
scenario emphasizes the importance of system dependability assessment as 
6  Introduction 
 
a measure of confidence that can be relied on a given system. This includes 
the evaluation of attributes like availability, reliability, safety, integrity, 
among others. More than ever, practical approaches for the evaluation of 
the dependability of computer systems are very much needed, especially 
standardized dependability benchmarks that allow comparing 
dependability attributes of analogous and alternative software products or 
components. However, the experimental evaluation of the dependability of 
computer systems is very difficult [Carreira et al. 1995] as it depends on 
fault activation probability, which in turn depends on either internal or 
external system factors like the different layers of the software, the actual 
hardware where the software is running, environment issues, and human 
interaction. 
After the success of the performance benchmarking initiatives that 
caught the attention of the industry in the last decades and have driven the 
creation of organizations like TPC (Transaction Processing Performance 
Evaluation Corporation) [TPC] and SPEC (Standard Performance 
Evaluation Corporation) [SPEC], dependability benchmarking has been the 
focus of attention of researchers and practitioners in the recent years 
[Kanoun et al. 2008, Brown et al. 2000, Vieira et al. 2003, Zhu et al. 2003a, 
Lightstone et al. 2003, Kanoun et al. 2001, Christmansson et al. 1996a, 
Durães et al. 2002a]. To many business critical systems and applications, 
dependability attributes like availability, integrity and reliability, among 
others, are as important as performance. The goal of dependability 
benchmarking is thus to provide a standard procedure specification to 
characterize a computer system or component, providing the assessment of 
dependability related measures.  
The main components of a dependability benchmark suite are 
[Kanoun et al. 2008, Koopman et al. 1999a]: 
 Workload – representing the work to be done by the system 
during the benchmark run and used to create a realistic operating 
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scenario. It should represent a typical operational profile for a 
particular application area. 
 Faultload – representing a repeatable, portable, representative 
and generally accepted set of faults and stressful conditions that 
could lead to undependability, if not properly handled by the 
system.  
 Measures - characterizing the performance and dependability of a 
system executing the workload in the presence of the faultload.  
 Experimental setup and benchmark procedures - describing the 
setup required to run the benchmark and the set of procedures 
and rules that must be followed during the benchmark execution 
in order to ensure uniform conditions for measurement. 
Among these components, one of the most critical and difficult to define is, 
doubtlessly, the faultload [Durães et al. 2004a], since it should represent a 
repeatable, portable, representative and generally accepted fault set. That 
difficulty is even higher in what concerns software faults, since they 
required a much more complex emulation method than the usual bit-flip 
fault injection approach used to emulate real hardware faults [Voas et 
al. 1997a]. Furthermore, a faultload based on software faults requires a clear 
separation between the software components that are selected as fault 
injection target and the benchmark target (i.e., system under evaluation), as 
the injection of software faults actually changes the code of the target 
component. This way, the faults should be injected in one component (the 
target) in order to evaluate their impact in the other components or in the 
overall system. In fact, the software faults injected in the target component 
actually allow answering the question of what would happen to the system 
if a residual fault in such component became activated. 
A representative faultload must be one that contains faults that 
represents the common programming bugs that escape the traditional 
software testing phases and still persist in existent software products 
8  Introduction 
 
[Durães et al. 2004b]. Although the faultload definition of that kind of faults 
had already been proposed [Durães et al. 2006], a problem still persists 
when that model is applied in very large and complex systems. Commonly, 
there is a large number of possible targets components for fault injection 
and, consequently, that represents a huge number of possible software 
faults to be injected. 
In fact, the use of dependability benchmarks driven by software 
faultloads (e.g., such as the ones proposed in [Kanoun et al. 2008]) has a 
major problem: it could take years to inject the faultload, which means that, 
in practice, it is not possible to run such dependability benchmarks. This is 
the case when the target system is a large piece of software, such as an 
operating system. Reducing the size of the faultload (but keeping it 
representative enough to obtain valid results) is essential to show industry 
and the research community that it is possible to use dependability 
benchmarks in large-scale systems. It should be noticed that among the 
mentioned faultload properties (repeatability, portability and 
representativeness), the representativeness is the one that needs special 
attention when reducing the faultload. In fact, properties such as 
repeatability and portability of the faultload are either not affected by the 
reduction of the number of faults or it is even easier to satisfy those 
properties with a reduced faultload. 
This thesis presents the results of more than two years of continuous 
fault injection experiments in real systems and proposes a strategy to 
answer a still open and crucial question: how to choose adequate fault 
injection targets, and thus reducing the total software fault injection 
experiments, without restricting the benchmark scope and 
representativeness? 
This study is an attempt to answer this question. The presented work 
is based on an experimental study and incorporates the results of a 
three-year research effort focused on showing that it is possible to obtain 
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accurate fault injection using a faultload that contains only a small fraction 
of all the possible faults that can be injected in a target system.  
1.2 Contributions 
As mentioned, the aim of this thesis is to propose an approach to 
guide the fault injection target selection of dependability benchmarks, 
decreasing the execution time of the benchmark, maintaining, 
simultaneously, their usefulness and representativeness. This is especially 
useful in large and complex systems where the experimentation time can 
be highly reduced without compromising the dependability benchmark 
results. This method will open the possibility to extend the dependability 
benchmarks to those kinds of systems, making them feasible and applicable 
(such benchmarks usually take several months or even years to execute due 
to its large faultload size).  
Within this context, the main contributions of the thesis are the 
following: 
1. To provide a software fault injector compatible with the 
demanding requirements of dependability benchmarks. Namely, 
it should be very easy to install and use, have high level of 
portability and very low intrusiveness, be capable of injecting 
faults in both user and system spaces, and in code and data 
segments of any process, irrespective of their complexity, be 
independent of the availability of any source code of any system 
component or user process, be dynamically linked into a target 
system and be compatible with the latest and most advanced 
software fault models. Concerning this last requirement, it was 
considered essential the compatibility of the fault injector with the 
Generic Software Fault Injection Technique (G-SWFIT) 
[Durães et al. 2006] – the state-of-the-art in software faults model. 
10  Introduction 
 
G-SWFIT is based on a set of operators for software fault 
emulation through low-level code changes in the target 
executable code, mimicking the most common types of real 
software faults. These operators resulted from a field study based 
on the analysis and classification of more than 600 software faults 
found in real software applications. The developed tool is one of 
the most versatile software fault injectors currently available. 
2. To define and evaluate different hypothesis for the reduction of 
the number of software fault injection experiments. The 
evaluation is based on the analysis of the error obtained in 
consequence of the reduction of the fault injection experiments. 
This study uses the results obtained with a comprehensive 
faultload that includes all possible software target locations (the 
complete set of the kernel OS functions, referred in kernel 
symbols table), resulting in one of the most extensive fault 
injection studies ever reported. 
3. To present a strategy to guide the fault injection target selection of 
dependability benchmarks and to reduce the required number of 
software faults, thus decreasing the execution time of the 
benchmark, maintaining, simultaneously, their usefulness and 
representativeness. The proposed methodology is especially 
useful in large and complex systems, where the experimentation 
time can be severely reduced without compromising the 
dependability benchmark results. Conducted experiments 
showed that the fault injection experiments can be reduced by 
more than 75%, maintaining the induced error below 1%. This 
method will open the possibility to extend the dependability 
benchmarks to large and complex systems, making them feasible 
and practicably applied (such benchmarks would take several 
months or even years to execute due to its large faultload size). 
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1.3 Thesis organization 
The thesis is organized in seven chapters, as follows: 
 Chapter 1, this chapter, presents the motivation for the 
undergone investigation, the research objectives and the 
contributions of the thesis. 
 Chapter 2 contains some terminology and the state of the art in 
dependable computing area that are relevant to this study. More 
specifically, it surveys previous relevant work in the 
dependability benchmarking, fault injection and software faults to 
the assessment and improvement of dependable systems. This 
chapter is especially oriented to the reader who is not familiar 
with the dependable computing area, so it can be skipped by 
knowledgeable readers. 
 Chapter 3 provides an overview of dependability benchmarking 
of software systems, its goals, components, general framework 
and challenges currently raised in this area.  
 Chapter 4 presents a software fault injector specially developed 
for dependability benchmarking – the DBench-FI (Dependability 
Benchmarking Fault Injector). It describes in detail its architecture, 
the corresponding modules and the way they interact with each 
other and with the user, besides a detailed presentation of its 
implementation. 
 Chapter 5 describes the problem that arises in assessing the 
dependability of large and complex systems, particularly with 
regard to software faultloads. It also presents and provides an 
early assessment of the experimental strategy followed in this 
work for the definition of compact and representative faultloads 
based on software faults. 
12  Introduction 
 
 Chapter 6 describes the experimental setup used to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the proposed approach with two real and 
different systems: a web-server dependability benchmark and a 
large-scale integer vector sort application extended with 
performance and quality measures. 
 Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and indicates suggestions for 
future improvements and future research directions. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Background and Related Work 
This chapter introduces some basic concepts used in dependable computing systems 
and surveys the previous research works that are relevant to this study. This 
presentation of the pertinent terminology and of the state of the art includes the 
areas of dependability benchmarking and fault injection, with special emphasis to 
software systems, software fault injection and software faults. 
This chapter is especially oriented to the reader who is not familiar with the 
dependable computing area. As a consequence, it can be skipped by knowledgeable 
readers. 
2.1 Introduction 
he increasingly dependency of modern societies on computer 
systems has brought a greater awareness of the importance of the 
dependability concept. Several examples of computer failures, like 
the ones mentioned in the previous chapter, show the catastrophic 
consequences of that dependence. Computer systems may result in costs to 
the society, in addition to the expected benefits [CASDCST 1992], for which 
they were developed. In this context, a new role of questions is raised: Can 
T 
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we rely on computer systems? Are the computer systems dependable? 
What are the limits of that dependability? 
The accuracy of the computational results has preoccupied systems 
programmers and their users since the first generation of computers (from 
the late 1940’s to mid-1950). At that time, the use of unreliable components 
required the use of special techniques that allow the improvement of 
systems dependability. Among the used techniques, the error detection and 
correction, duplexing with comparison, triplication with voting and the 
diagnostics to locate failed components can be mentioned [Avizienis et 
al. 2000]. 
The growing use of computer systems in critical tasks of our society 
has increased the interest to develop systems that provide the expected 
service even in the presence of faults, known as fault tolerant systems. That 
need is even more obvious if we consider the adversity of the environment 
in which those systems sometimes operate and the fact that there are no 
perfect systems, that is, systems without any project or implementation 
defect. Moreover, the more complex a system is and the higher the number 
of its components, the higher is the probability of the occurrence of a failure 
in that system.  
The level of confidence that can be relied on a service of a system is a 
determining factor in the characterization of that system, being 
fundamental in systems where human lives or substantial economic values 
are at risk. Dependability, together with functionality, performance, cost 
and security establishes the fundamental properties of computing and 
communication systems [Avizienis et al. 2004].  
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2.2 Basic concepts and definitions 
2.2.1 Dependability 
Dependability is defined in [Laprie 1985, Laprie 1995] as that 
property of a computer system such that reliance can justifiably be placed 
on the service it delivers. In this context, the delivered service is the 
behavior of the system, as it is perceived by its user - another system that 
interacts with the provider and receives the service [Avizienis et al. 2004]. 
However, to assess whether a system satisfies the requirements of 
dependability is not an easy task, especially when complex and large 
systems are involved. Moreover, that assessment is further hampered by 
the fact that dependability is a global concept which embraces a set of 
different attributes, whose emphasis and importance depends on the 
characteristics of the system or application being analyzed. 
2.2.2 Attributes of dependability 
As mentioned, dependability is an integrating concept which 
embraces a number of different, but complementary, attributes [Laprie 
1995, Avizienis et al. 2004], that corresponds to different viewpoints of the system: 
 Availability – concerning the readiness for correct service; 
 Reliability – regarding the continuity of correct service; 
 Safety – related to the absence of catastrophic consequences on 
the user(s) and the environment: 
 Confidentiality – regarding to the non-occurrence of 
unauthorized disclosure of information; 
 Integrity – related to the absence of improper system alterations; 
16 Background and Related Work 
 
 Maintainability – concerning the ability to undergo modifications 
and repairs; 
Accordingly to the usual definitions, which consider it as a composite 
notion, security is not included as a single attribute of dependability 
[Avizienis et al. 2000]. Instead, security is considered as a combination of 
the mentioned attributes of confidentiality, integrity (concerning the 
absence of unauthorized system alterations) and availability (for 
authorized users only) [Avizienis et al. 2004]. Furthermore, dependability 
regarding to erroneous inputs is sometimes referred as robustness. 
2.2.3 Impairments to dependability 
According to [Jalote 1994, Clark et al. 1995], the first two attributes 
are, among all, the most relevant, given their importance on the fault 
tolerance capabilities of a system. However, the mentioned attributes of 
dependability may be emphasized in a greater or smaller extent, according 
to their importance on the application being analyzed. That importance 
should be considered in a relative or probabilistic rather than in an absolute 
or deterministic way, as the unavoidable presence or occurrence of faults 
prevents the existence of totally available, reliable, safe or secure systems 
[Avizienis et al. 2000]. 
In [Laprie 1995], faults, errors and failures are defined as the 
impairments to dependability. A fault is a defect that potentially causes an 
error. That is, the cause of an error is a fault. Although a fault has the 
potential to generate errors, those errors may not occur during the 
observation period. In other words, the presence of faults does not 
guarantee the occurrence of an error. However, the reverse is true: an error 
in a system state always involves the presence of a fault in that system. A 
fault that produces an error is said to be active. Otherwise, it is dormant. 
An Error is the part of the system state (altered by a fault) that is liable to 
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cause a subsequent failure. An error is a manifestation of a fault. 
Undetected errors in a system are said to be latent. A system failure occurs 
when the system does not comply with its specification, that is, when the 
system does not provide the expected service. Failures are caused by errors. 
If an error exists in a system state, then, unless some corrective measures 
are taken, there is a sequence of actions that can be performed and that 
could lead to a failure. A failure in a system does not always reveal the 
same way. Different forms of failures that can occur in a system are called 
types of failures or failure modes. The mentioned cause-effect relationship 
among these impairments, as described in [Jonhson 1989, Avizienis et al. 
2004], can be represented as depicted in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1 – Relationship between fault, error and failure. 
Faults can be classified according to several factors or viewpoints 
[Laprie 1992, Laprie 1995, Laprie 1998, Avizienis 2004]. In the context of 
this work, two viewpoints deserve a special emphasis, among all other: 
phenomenological cause and persistence. Concerning phenomenological 
cause, the faults can be classified in: 
 Physical faults – faults caused by physical phenomena, internal 
or external to the system. 
 Human-made faults – faults that result from human action, either 
design faults, when committed during the system design and 
development phases, or operational faults, when due to input or 
operating conditions violation. 
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Relating to persistence, a fault can be considered in one of the 
following categories [Carreira et al. 1999, Koren et al. 2007]: 
 Permanent Faults – occur in a continuous and stable mode in 
time. Concerning hardware, a permanent fault means an 
irreversible damage that can only be recovered through the repair 
or the replacement of the faulty component; 
 Intermittent Faults – faults whose presence is limited in time, 
caused by unstable hardware, or varying hardware or software 
states. This kind of faults can be repaired by replacement or 
redesign of the hardware or software; 
 Transient Faults – faults that are caused by temporal 
environmental conditions like, for example, electromagnetic 
interference, or radiations.  
The main difference between intermittent and transient faults1 is that 
the latter cannot be repaired, since neither the hardware nor the software is 
                                                     
 
 
1 In the literature, the transient and intermittent bugs are sometimes referred as Heisenbugs, 
because they disappear when reexamined (in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty 
Principle). By contrast, the permanent faults are referred to as Bohrbugs, as they represent 
good solid bugs, which are easy to diagnose upon detection (in analogy to the Bohr Atom 
Model). In recent taxonomies of software faults [Grottke et al. 2007], the Heisenbugs are 
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damaged [Siewiorek et al. 1992]. According to several studies, the transient 
faults occur much more frequently than the permanent faults and are also 
much more difficult to detect [Carreira et al. 1998a, Carreira et al. 1999, 
Clark et al. 1995]. 
2.2.4 Improving dependability 
The dependability of a system is defined by the dependability of 
hardware and software that constitutes it. The development of dependable 
systems requires, according to [Avizienis et al. 2000, Avizienis et al. 2004], 
the combined use of four techniques: fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault 
removal and fault forecasting.  
Fault prevention is the ability of avoiding the occurrence or 
introduction of faults in a system. Thus, it can be considered as the initial 
defensive mechanism towards dependability. It is attained by applying 
quality control techniques during the system design and development 
phases. General approaches include formal methods in requirement 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
classified as a type of Mandelbugs (alluding to Benoît Mandelbrot, a leading researcher in 
fractal geometry) - a more general class of bugs, characterized by having complex and 
obscure causes, making their behavior appear chaotic or even non-deterministic. 
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specifications and rigorous testing of all system components and their 
interactions. Regarding software, it consists in good programming 
principles and environments (structural programming, modularization and 
formal verification techniques), whereas for hardware, it involves rigorous 
design rules (design reviews, component screening and testing). External 
faults such as lightning or radiation can be prevented by shielding, 
radiation hardening, etc. User and operation faults can be reduced by 
training and regular maintenance procedures.  
Fault tolerance aims to provide the systems the capability to deliver 
the correct service in the presence of faults (as represented in Figure 2-2). 
Obviously, fault tolerance assumes that fault prevention is not enough to 
eliminate all the possible faults in a system and, consequently, any system 
has some probability to have or is likely to develop a fault. That probability 
is even increased if we consider that it is impossible to eliminate all the 
environment aspects susceptible to change the system proper operation. 
Fault tolerance mechanisms are implemented using redundancy, error 
detection and subsequent system recovery mechanisms. A redundant 
system can mask a failed component with a redundant one and continue to 
operate without any service interruption, or at least, with the minimal 
interference on the external behavior, since the recovery mechanisms may 
cause some performance degradation. It should be noticed that fault 
tolerance is a recursive concept. That is, it is essential that the mechanisms 
which implement fault tolerance are themself protected against the faults 
that may affect them. 
 
Figure 2-2 – Fault tolerance mechanisms. 
ErrorFault Failure
Activation
Fault 
Tolerance
Propagation
Background and Related Work 21 
The fault tolerant architectures are presently used in a wide range of 
applications, from safety critical to commercial ones. For example, 
concerning safety critical systems, fault tolerant architectures are used in 
the flight control computers of the fly-by-wire systems of the Boeing 777 
and AIRBUS A320/A330/A340 airplanes [Torres 2000].  
Fault removal aims to reduce the number or the severity of the faults 
and may be performed during both the development and operational 
phases of a system. During the development phase, fault removal consists 
in verification, diagnosis and correction [Avizienis et al. 2004], usually done 
by debugging, and/or simulation of hardware and software. Fault removal 
during the operational is conducted by maintenance techniques, corrective 
or preventive. At this phase, faults can be removed replacing the faulty 
system components or by software updates. 
Fault forecasting predicts possible faults in order to prevent or avoid 
them or to limit their effects. This is accomplished by performing an 
evaluation, qualitative and quantitative, of the system behavior, with 
respect to fault occurrence or activation. This evaluation is commonly 
achieved using modeling and simulation of the system and faults. 
Qualitatively, it comprises the probabilistic evaluation of some attributes of 
dependability, interpreted as dependability measures. Quantitatively, it 
consists on the identification, classification and ranking of failure modes or 
event combinations that are liable to lead to system failures.  
The inclusion of all these four techniques should be analyzed earlier 
in the project phase of the systems, since it is very difficult to apply them in 
systems where dependability issues were not taken into consideration. 
Moreover, depending on the emphasis assigned to each dependability 
attribute, according to the specificities of each application, there must be a 
balanced use of these techniques. This trade-off is even more difficult as 
conflicts may exist between some dependability attributes, such as 
availability and security [Avizienis et al. 2000]. 
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The relation between dependability, its attributes, impairments and 
means can be represented in a single schema as exposed in Figure 2-3. 
 
Figure 2-3 – The taxonomy of dependability. 
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However, very often, the systems and configurations are optimized in 
order to achieve the best performance and do not represent the real systems 
used in field [Vieira et al. 2009]. This way, these performance-oriented 
configurations tend to characterize unrealistic scenarios, as they disregard 
dependability-related aspects that are required by many modern computer 
systems. In fact, recently, factors like dependability and maintainability of 
systems are also seen as very important. However, unfortunately, while 
there are different ways to evaluate and compare different systems and 
components, regarding its performance and functionality, the evaluation of 
the dependability attributes of a system turns out to be much more 
difficult. One of the main difficulties is related to the existence of a wider 
spectrum of measures in dependability benchmarks, when compared to 
performance benchmarks. 
The need of tools to evaluate and compare the dependability of 
systems is nowadays reinforced by the current trend of using commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) components and of COTS-based systems with high 
dependability requirements, as a way to reduce costs and shorten the 
development and deployment times. In fact, it is important to note that the 
increase of confidence in the general dependability of COTS, induced by its 
large-scale use, may not constitute a sufficient condition for its use in 
critical applications. In addition to the faults that those components may 
have, the COTS software components are developed without the 
knowledge of the specific context in which they will be used and are 
usually provided as a black box, mostly without a rigorous written 
specification [Guerra et al. 2004]. The integration of such components into 
computer systems creates additional dependability challenges that 
demands tools capable of evaluating and comparing the dependability 
attributes between systems.  
According to [Madeira et al. 2001], dependability benchmarks should 
provide a generic, cost-effective and reproducible way for evaluating the 
behavior of components and computer systems in the presence of faults, 
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allowing the quantification of dependability attributes, seen as measures, or 
the characterization of systems into well-defined dependability classes. It is 
important to note that some fault tolerance mechanisms may inflict a 
performance overhead in the systems, which is also interesting to evaluate. 
Indeed, a timely and correct service delivery, concerning the system 
specification, is of utmost importance, mainly in hard real-time systems. 
Furthermore, in addition to the characteristics of the dependability 
evaluation and validation techniques, a dependability benchmark should 
represent an agreement that is accepted by the computer industry and/or 
by the user community. Dependability benchmarks are, obviously, of 
utmost importance to complex, mission critical systems and for high-end 
business-critical applications. Moreover, they may also play a broader key 
role in the computer systems area, driving the industry to produce better 
systems, similarly to what happened before, in the performance and 
database areas.  
2.3.1 Reference model 
Dependability benchmarks are generally based in modeling or 
experimentation, or both. The modeling approaches include analytical 
[Trivedi et al. 1994] and simulation models [Rimén et al. 1993], and are 
generally used to support architectural decisions at design phase. They 
require the knowledge of the system functions and architecture, in terms of 
system components and their interactions, namely in what concerns to the 
fault tolerance and recovery mechanisms used to increase the system 
dependability. This knowledge is used to build a representation of the 
system, in order to model the system behavior and to analyze events and 
activities like failure occurrences, error detection and propagation, system 
recovery, etc. Those events and activities, characterized by event rates and 
conditional probabilities of success or failure, known as model parameters, 
are then used to analyze the system dependability. Block diagrams, faults 
Background and Related Work 25 
trees, Markov chains or stochastic Petri nets are examples of modeling 
techniques used for dependability modeling of computing systems. The 
required allocation of numerical values to the model parameters, such as 
coverage factor and restart times, are usually based on experimental 
measurement, field data or past experience related to similar systems. It is 
worth noting that the modeling approach may be unfeasible for large and 
complex systems, since systems made of many components with several 
dependencies usually lead to high complex models [Kanoun et al. 1996]. 
However, for some COTS-based systems, in particular to those systems 
whose architecture is not known in detail, the modeling approach can be 
used to produce, with a reduced effort, simple high-level models. 
On the other hand, experimental approaches are used in computer 
prototypes or actual systems in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
fault tolerance mechanisms and to characterize the system in the presence 
of faults. They are usually obtained from observation of the system in real 
field operation [Gray 1990], also known as field measurement, or through 
the execution of benchmark controlled experiments, based on fault injection 
techniques [Hsueh et al. 1997, Carreira et al. 1995, Clark et al. 1995, Madeira et al. 
2000, Moraes et al. 2007]. Field measurement is based on data collected on the 
system and its environment, concerning failures, fault tolerance and 
maintenance processes: time to failure occurrences, nature of failures, 
impact on system services, recovery time, etc. This data allow the 
evaluation of measures such as mean time between failures (known as 
MTBF), failure rate, system availability, etc. Field measurement can also be 
used to feed data into the design of new systems, avoiding the weaknesses 
found in the previous systems and enhancing the dependability of the new 
ones. However, since fault occurrence constitutes rare events, the execution 
of fault injection based experiments is usually used as a practical way to 
accelerate the characterization of the system faulty behavior. It consists on 
the deliberate introduction of artificial faults in a system or component, 
through the use of a workload and a faultload, in order to assess its 
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behavior in the presence of faults, and to obtain the relevant dependability 
measures [Arlat et al. 2002, Vieira et al. 2003, [Durães et al. 2004b, Kanoun et al. 
2006] and characterize the system. 
A reference model for implementing dependability benchmarks is 
represented in Figure 2-4. 
 
 Figure 2-4 – Reference model for implementing dependability benchmarks 
[Kanoun et al. 2008]. 
Despite each one of the mentioned approaches (modeling or 
experimentation) has its advantages and limitations, results based on the 
observation in real field data are naturally more significant that those based 
on modeling or prototypes. Nevertheless, as mentioned, such kind of 
analysis is usually impracticable, as it requires the collection of data related 
to very specific and rare data events, and hence requiring a long period of 
system observation in order to get statistically significant results. As a 
result, the great majority of dependability benchmark proposals presented 
so far is experimental and based on fault injection techniques, allowing the 
execution of benchmark controlled experiments. 
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2.3.2 Dependability benchmark properties 
According to [DBENCH 2004], in order to be useful, cost-effective 
and accepted by the computer industry and user community, an 
experimentation based dependability benchmark should satisfy a set of 
properties: 
 Representativeness – important in all benchmarking dimensions, 
representativeness is of special relevance in measures, workload 
and faultload. Measures should be meaningful to the benchmark 
context in order to attain the expected usefulness of the 
benchmark. The workload should represent a typical and realistic 
set of activities found in real systems in the benchmark, being, 
therefore, dependent of it. The faultload should represent a set of 
real faults that may affect the target system in real use. The 
definition of the faultload should also consider the context of the 
application area and the operating environment. 
 Repeatability and Reproducibility – concerning the guarantee 
that statistically equivalent results are obtained when the 
benchmark is run more than once in the same environment,  i.e., 
the same System Under Benchmark (SUB), with the same 
workload and faultload and with the same prototype. 
Reproducibility assures that statistically equivalent results are 
obtained by different teams when the benchmark is implemented 
from the same specifications and is used in the same SUB. 
 Portability - concerning the ease of transfer among various target 
systems, within a particular application area. This property 
allows the benchmark to compare computer systems and 
components. The portability is very dependent on the 
specification of some key benchmark components like faultload 
and workload. For example, the lack of portability of the faultload 
can limit the portability of the benchmark. 
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 Non-intrusiveness – regarding the changes that the benchmark 
inflicts on the SUB, which should be as small as possible. In order 
to avoid intrusiveness on the Benchmark Target (BT), faults must 
be injected only in components of the SUB outside the target of 
the benchmark. Thus the non-intrusiveness is guaranteed with 
regard to the BT. 
 Scalability – concerning the capability of the benchmark to 
evaluate systems of different sizes. The scaling rules of the 
benchmark specification typically affect its workload and 
faultload.  It is worth noting that very large faultloads may also 
require, as large workloads do, a huge time to execute the 
benchmark process. This circumstance constitutes a major 
limitation to execute dependability benchmarks in very large 
systems. 
 Benchmarking time and cost – regarding the time and cost 
needed to obtain the result from the benchmark. This property 
embodies the usability that a benchmark should have. The 
benchmark time comprises not only the execution time of the 
benchmark, but also the time needed for the setup and 
preparations and for data analysis. A dependability benchmark 
should take the minimum time possible, preferably only a few 
hours per system (in very large systems may be acceptable to 
have a benchmark time of a few days). With regard to the cost, 
the user perceived value of the benchmark should be higher than 
the cost associated to its execution, as a key objective of 
dependability benchmarks is to provide a cost-effective way to 
characterize the dependability of components and computer 
systems. 
 All these properties should be considered not only in the 
specification phase, namely, in the definition of the measures and 
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experimental dimensions, but also in the implementation and validation 
phases of the benchmark development process.  
2.3.3 Dependability benchmark proposals 
Dependability benchmarking has caught researchers’ attention in the 
last years and many dependability benchmarks have been proposed for 
different application domains. 
With the aim of promoting the research, practice adoption of 
dependability benchmarks, the IFIP (International Federation for 
Information Processing,) and, particularly, the 10.4 Working Group on 
Dependable Computing and fault Tolerance, created, in 1999, the Special 
Interest Group on Dependability Benchmarking (SIGDeB). The resulting 
work, merging the contributions from both academia and industry, has 
identified a set of standardized classes to characterize the dependability of 
computer systems [Wilson et al. 2002]. The work carried out aimed to allow 
the comparison of computer systems concerning four dimensions: 
availability, data integrity, disaster recovery and security. Complementary 
work was developed in the context of the DBench project2 - a European 
                                                     
 
 
2 Dependability Benchmarking Project, IST-2000–25425 DBENCH [DBENCH]. 
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project on dependability benchmarking, partially supported by the 
European Commission. 
The work done in SIGDeB and in project DBENCH marked the 
beginning of several proposals of dependability benchmarks for various 
kinds of systems. Due to the huge diversity of applications and systems in 
the computer industry, several dependability benchmarks have been 
developed for different application areas and systems (e.g., general 
purpose operating systems, real-time kernels, engine control applications, 
on-line transaction processing systems). However, they all share the 
properties presented, at least at an abstract level, and constitute an 
instantiation of it to a specific domain or a particular computer system. 
A general methodology for benchmarking the availability of 
computer systems was introduced in [Brown et al. 2000]. This work uses 
fault injection to cause situations where software RAID (Redundant Array 
of Inexpensive Disks) systems availability may be compromised. It adopted 
the workload and performance measures from existing performance 
benchmarks.  
An attempt to incorporate human behavior in dependability 
benchmarks and system designs as a way to incorporate effects of a human 
operator in dependability measures is presented in [Brown et al. 2001]. In 
[Brown et al. 2002] is presented a methodology for developing dependability 
benchmarks that capture the impact of human operators on systems. The 
proposal adopts the workload and the performance measures of existing 
performance benchmarks. The systems dependability is characterized by 
the performance degradation induced by the injected faults and by the 
perturbations generated by human operators. Research work towards the 
development of a dependability benchmark for human assisted recovery 
processes and tools in server systems is presented in [Brown et al. 2004a]. The 
proposed methodology, developed at the University of California-Berkeley, 
aims to evaluate human-assisted failure recovery tools and processes and 
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can be used both to quantify the dependability of recovery systems and to 
compare different recovery approaches. 
A practical characterization and comparison of COTS operating 
systems behavior in the presence of faulty device drivers is presented in 
[Durães et al. 2002a, Durães et al. 2003a]. This work is based on the emulation 
of high level real software faults through the modification of the 
ready-to-run binary code of the target software module, and proposes the 
use of a multidimensional perspective to evaluate different views of the 
benchmark results. The used fault emulation technique, named G-SWFIT, 
requires the existence of a library containing the complete set of code 
mutations, previously defined for the target platform, formerly scanned. A 
similar study proposing a practical approach to characterize the robustness 
of operating systems with respect to faulty drivers is presented in [Albinet et 
al. 2004]. In this work a Software Implemented Fault Injection (SWIFI) 
technique is used to corrupt the parameters of the interface between the 
device drivers and the kernel of the OS. In order to characterize the faulty 
behaviors, both internal (kernel error codes) and external measurements 
(e.g., raised exceptions, kernel hangs, and workload behavior) were 
considered. 
A comparison of fifteen commercial OS POSIX (Portable Operating 
System Interface) implementations concerning their robustness was first 
presented in the context of the Ballista Project, from Carnegie Mellon 
University [Koopman et al. 1999b]. A dependability benchmark comparison 
of three operating systems (Windows NT4, 2000 and XP) focused on 
robustness and with respect to erroneous inputs provided by the 
application software to the Operating System via the Application 
Programming Interface (API) is proposed in [Kalakech et al. 2004]. The 
workload used in this dependability benchmark was the TPC-C 
performance benchmark for transactional systems [TPCC], an already 
well-established and agreed benchmark. A similar dependability 
benchmark and its application to six versions of Windows operating 
32 Background and Related Work 
 
system and four versions of Linux operating system is presented in 
[Kanoun et al. 2005]. The workload used in this study was the PostMark, a 
file system performance benchmark for operating systems [Katcher 1997]. 
Concerning the faultload, this work mainly considers corrupted parameters 
in the Operating System (OS) system calls. In [Kanoun et al. 2006], a 
dependability benchmark for general-purpose operating systems is 
proposed, considering analogous faultload, and presented its application in 
several versions of windows and Linux operating systems. The workload 
used in this study is the JVM (Java Virtual Machine) and the benchmark 
measures considered are the OS robustness and the OS system reaction and 
restart times in the presence of faults. 
At IBM, the Autonomic Computing Initiative [IBMACI] aims to 
develop a suite of benchmarks to quantify the autonomic capacity of a 
system, which is defined as the capability of the system to react 
autonomously to problems and changes in the environment. This 
self-managing capability should incorporate four fundamental 
features: self-configuration, self-healing, self-optimization, and 
self-protection [Ganek et al. 2003]. A first discussion on the requirements of 
those benchmarks and a proposal of a set of metrics for the evaluation of a 
systems autonomic level is presented in [Lightstone et al. 2003]. In 
[Brown et al. 2004b] are presented the main challenges and pitfalls about 
benchmarking the autonomic capabilities of a system. This work proposes 
that autonomic benchmarks must quantify four dimensions of a system 
autonomic response: (i) the level of response; (ii) the quality of the 
response; (iii) the impact of the response on the system user; and (iv) the 
cost of any extra resources needed to support the autonomic response. A 
configuration complexity benchmark, process-based, that generates metrics 
that reflect the level of human involvement in the systems configuration 
process is presented in [Brown et al. 2004c]. In [Brown et al. 2005] is 
presented a benchmark for assessing the self-healing dimension of the 
autonomic capability. In this work, the system self-healing capabilities were 
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quantified with two metrics: (i) a measure of how effectively the system 
under test heals itself in response to the injected disturbances; and (ii) a 
measure of how autonomic that healing response is. 
A preliminary proposal of a dependability benchmark for real time 
kernels for onboard space systems is presented in [Moreira et al. 2003]. This 
work focuses mainly on the assessment of the predictability of response 
time of service calls in a Real-Time Kernel (RTK) used in space domain 
systems. The benchmark, called DBench-RTK, uses an Onboard Scheduler 
(OBS) process as workload and its faultload consists of a set of faults that is 
injected into kernel functions calls at the parameter level by corrupting 
parameter values. 
A dependability benchmark for OLTP (On-Line Transaction 
Processing) application environments is proposed in [Vieira et al. 2003]. 
This benchmark uses the workload of the TPC-C benchmark [TPCC] and 
specifies the measures and all the steps required to evaluate both the 
performance and dependability features of OLTP systems, with emphasis 
on availability. This study uses as faultload, a set of operator faults that 
emulates real faults experienced by OLTP systems in the field. Another 
dependability benchmark for transactional systems is proposed in 
[Buchacker et al. 2003]. Although this study also adopted the workload 
from the TPC-C performance benchmark, it considers a faultload based on 
hardware faults. 
Research work at Sun Microsystems proposes a high-level framework 
specifically dedicated to availability benchmarking of computer systems 
[Zhu et al. 2003a]. The proposed approach decomposes availability in three 
key components: fault/maintenance rate, robustness, and recovery. Within 
the scope of that framework, two dependability benchmarks were 
developed: one that measures specific aspects of a system robustness on 
handling maintenance events, such as the replacement of a failed hardware 
component or the installation of a software patch [Zhu et al. 2003b]; and a 
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second benchmark for measuring system recovery on a non-clustered 
standalone system [Mauro et al. 2004]. 
A dependability benchmark for engine control applications to allow 
the characterization of the impact of faults in on the control software 
embedded in engine Electronic Control Units (ECUs) is presented in 
[Ruiz et al. 2004]. This benchmark, based on the injection of transient 
hardware faults in the ECU, provides a set of measures that allows a 
comparison of two different diesel engine control systems concerning its 
safety. The workload used is based on the Europe standards for the 
emission certification of light duty vehicle. 
A dependability benchmark based on the injection of software faults 
was first proposed in [Durães et al. 2004a]. This benchmark uses the 
G-SWFIT technique (Generic Software Fault Injection Technique) in order 
to directly inject mutations at machine-code level that emulate high-level 
software faults [Durães et al. 2002b]. The inserted modifications reproduce 
the code that would have been generated by the compiler if the intended 
software faults were in the high level source code. A complete 
dependability benchmark for web-servers that also uses the G-SWFIT 
technique is proposed in [Durães et al. 2004b]. Adopting the workload and 
the performance measures of SPECWeb99 performance benchmark [SPEC], 
the benchmark uses a faultload that emulates both a realistic software 
defects and the effects of hardware and operator faults. 
A study at Intel Corporation has focused on benchmarking 
semiconductor technology [Constantinescu 2005a]. The work discusses the 
impact of semiconductor technology scaling on neutron induced Soft Error 
Rate (SER) and presents an experimental methodology and results of 
accelerated measurements carried out on Intel Itanium microprocessors. 
The work can be used as a dependability benchmark, as the used approach 
does not require any proprietary data about the microprocessor under 
evaluation. Relying on environmental test tools, Intel Corporation has also 
developed a set of benchmarks that allow the benchmarking of undetected 
Background and Related Work 35 
computational errors, also known as Silent Data Corruption (SDC) 
[Constantinescu 2005b]. This study performs a temperature and voltage 
operating test (the so-called Four Corners Test) on several prototype 
systems. 
Three analytical dependability benchmarks that examine the 
Reliability, Availability, and Serviceability (RAS) characteristics of 
computer systems were developed at Sun Microsystems [Elling et al. 2008]: 
the Fault Robustness Benchmark (FRB-A) allows the evaluation of the 
robustness techniques used to enhance systems resiliency, including 
redundancy and automatic fault correction; the Maintenance Robustness 
Benchmark (MRB-A) allows the evaluation of how the maintenance 
activities affect the ability of the system to provide a continuous service; 
and the Service Complexity Benchmark (SCB-A) allows the evaluation of 
the complexity of servicing mechanical components of computer systems. 
A dependability benchmark intended to evaluate the robustness of 
partitioning mechanisms of real-time operating systems is proposed in 
[Barbosa et al. 2010]. The benchmark includes both hardware-based and 
software-based faultloads and measures the spatial and temporal isolation 
among tasks. 
A software framework for assuring system dependability based on 
benchmark scenarios and quantitative measures is presented in [Fujita et al. 
2012]. The DS-Bench toolset performs benchmark test on the target system 
and obtains dependability metrics using various benchmarks programs and 
anomaly generators. 
Two different approaches for extending TPC benchmarks with 
dependability measures are presented and discussed in [Almeida et al. 
2010]: extending each TPC specification in a customized way; and, a more 
unified approach, defining a generic and independent specification that 
could be applied to any TPC benchmark. The advantages and 
disadvantages of each approach are also presented.  
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A proposal for the integration of dependability benchmarks into the 
recent ISO/IEC 25045 standard [ISOIEC 2010]3 is presented in [Friginal et 
al. 2011]. The approach provides the standard with the ability to assess the 
eventual impact of faults (referred as disturbances in the standard) on the 
quality of software components. The effectiveness and usefulness of the 
approach is demonstrated using three distinct different versions of 
Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) as software components. 
However, despite the great efforts in the last decade in developing a 
vast variety of dependability evaluation methods and techniques, 
dependability benchmarks do not benefit yet from the level of maturity, 
recognition and consensus of the well-established area of performance 
benchmarks, which is supported by major companies in the computer 
industry and where TPC and SPEC play a key role. 
                                                     
 
 
3 The ISO/IEC 25045 is an extension of the ISO/IEC Systems and software Quality 
Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE) standard [ISOIEC 2005] in order to incorporate the 
viewpoint of recoverability into the procedures for evaluating the quality of software 
components. 
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2.4 Fault injection 
As mentioned in the previous section, one of the experimental 
methods used for dependability evaluation consists of analyzing the 
behavior of a system from the real field operation and collecting the 
information about its dependability, known as measurement-based 
analysis. Despite the advantage of allowing the identification of the failures 
and faults that more frequently occur in a system, this method requires the 
collecting of data over a long period of time, due to the infrequent 
occurrence of errors and failures observed in systems with high 
dependability levels. Factors such as the mentioned long time between 
failures, the destructive nature of a crash or the long error latency, make it 
difficult to identify the causes of failures in the system operational 
environment. Moreover, it is particularly difficult to recreate a scenario of 
failures in large and complex systems. 
The fault injection technique, also using an experimental approach, 
allows to overcome these drawbacks, by carrying out controlled 
experiments where the observation of the behavior of the system in the 
presence of faults is explicitly induced by the deliberate introduction 
(injection) of faults in the system [Arlat et al. 1990a]. Its recommendation by 
leading safety standards like NASA standard 8719.13B for software safety 
[Nasa 2004] and the ISO/DIS 26262 standard for automotive safety 
[ISODIS 2009], and its wide use over the last decades by many providers 
(e.g., ESA, IBM, Intel, Siemens, Sun, Volvo, etc.) and by the practitioners of 
dependable computer systems demonstrates the relevance of the method. 
Recently, reinforcing that pertinence, the fault injection technique was also 
included in the ISO/IEC Systems and software Quality Requirements and 
Evaluation (SQuaRE) standard [ISOIEC 2005] as a disturbance injection 
methodology for the assessment of the recoverability of software systems, 
through the evaluation module ISO/IEC 25045 [ISOIEC 2010]. 
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According to [Hsueh et al. 1997], a typical fault injection environment 
consists of the following components, as shown in Figure 2-5: 
 Target system – system in which the faults are injected, as it 
executes the tasks submitted by the workload generator. 
 Fault Injector – component responsible for the injection of faults 
in the target system. It could be implemented by hardware 
(HWIFI) or software (SWIFI) and it can support different fault 
types, fault locations and fault injection triggers. 
 Fault Library – Contains information about the type, location and 
number of faults, as well as of hardware semantic or software 
structure used by the fault injector. It should be considered a 
separate component in order to attain greater levels of flexibility 
and portability. 
 Workload Generator – Component responsible for the workload 
generation that is executed by the target system. 
 Workload Library – Contains information about the workload 
executed by the target system. May contain applications, 
benchmarks or synthetic workloads. Like the fault library, and for 
analogous reasons, it should be considered separated from the 
workload generator. 
 Controller – program that controls the fault injection 
experiments. It can be executed either on the target system or on a 
separate computer. 
 Monitor – Tracks the execution of the commands and initiates the 
data collection whenever necessary. 
 Data Collector – Performs the online collection of the experiments 
data. 
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 Data Analyzer – Performs, eventually offline, the processing and 
analysis of the collected data. 
 
Figure 2-5 – Typical components of a fault injection environment  
[Hsueh et al. 1997]. 
2.4.1 Goals of fault injection 
In [Arlat et al. 1990b] the two complementary main goals of fault 
injection are identified and characterized: validation and design-aid. The 
first is related to the fact that fault injection can be viewed as a means to 
testing the methods and mechanisms used to obtain the confidence in the 
system, with respect to the inputs they have been designed to cope 
with - the faults. In this context, two key aspects should be 
considered:  (i) the validation of the verification procedures, used to reveal 
faults during all the phases of the development process, and (ii) the 
validation of the fault tolerance mechanisms, aimed to achieving the 
dependability of the system in the operational phase. Therefore, the fault 
injection participates in two of the techniques used to attain the 
Target System
Fault Injector Workload Generator Monitor
Controller
Fault 
Library
Workload 
Library
Data Collector
Data Analyzer
Fault Injection 
System
40 Background and Related Work 
 
dependability of a system, as refereed in section 2.2.4: fault removal, 
through the reduction, by verification, of the presence of faults in the 
design/implementation of the fault tolerance mechanisms; and fault 
forecasting, through the rating, by evaluation, of the efficiency of the 
operational behavior of such mechanisms [Arlat et al. 1990b, Avresky et al. 
1996, Christmansson et al. 1996a, Voas et al. 1997b]. Concerning the design-aid, 
the fault injection can be applied at the various stages of the development 
process. Their results are mainly used to measure the quality of the selected 
solutions and to change them, if necessary. 
It must be noticed that, due to the fact that faults are introduced in 
the target system, which causes the system to run in an altered state, the 
fault injection is generally unable to determine the accuracy of the results. 
That is, the fault injection is inadequate to ensure that an application, for 
example, produces the correct results, according to its specification. 
Instead, fault injection is very useful to prove that an application produces 
incorrect results under abnormal operating conditions [Voas et al. 1998]. 
Fault injection is thus appropriate for evaluating the behavior of the 
systems in the presence of faults and validating their fault tolerance 
mechanisms [Powell et al. 1995, Christmansson et al. 1996a, Rela et al. 1996, 
Voas et al. 1997b, Cukier et al. 1999]. 
2.4.2 Fault injection in software development cycle 
 Depending on the phase of the software development cycle in which 
the system is, different fault injection techniques can be applied, as 
summarized on Table 2-1: (i) Simulation-based fault injection and (ii) 
Prototype-based fault injection [Hsueh et al. 1997]. 
The simulation-based fault injection technique is used to evaluate the 
dependability of a system that is represented by a series of high-level 
abstractions, allowing early detection of design faults, before the system is 
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started to be built. The early stage of development, characterized by the 
absence of any implementation details, imposes a simulation based on 
simplified assumptions, like the occurrence of errors and failures according 
a predetermined distribution, such as the exponential distribution. With 
this technique, the faults are injected by directly modifying the 
computational state of the simulation [Carreira et al. 1999]. Among the most 
known simulation-based fault injectors, one can mention the FOCUS [Choi 
et al. 1992], the MEFISTO [Jenn et al. 1995] and the DEPEND [Goswami et al. 
1997] tools. Although this method is suitable for the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of fault tolerant mechanisms and a system dependability in 
the early phases of its development (conception and design), known as its 
main advantage, it requires accurate input parameters that are difficult to 
supply [Hsueh et al. 1997]. It should be noticed that parameters from 
previous experiments could not be adequate due to design and 
technological changes. This technique is also highly appropriate for the 
evaluation of dependability of critical systems where the injection of faults 
in the actual prototype or operational system would be dangerous, as 
happens in nuclear power systems and avionics. Despite these advantages, 
accurate results demand very detailed models, whose development can be 
very expensive. Moreover, manufacturers might not reveal the information 
needed and the simulation can take a long time to complete. 
 
Phase in Software 
Development Cycle 
Technique 
Conceptual and 
Design Simulation-based fault injection 
Prototype and 
Operational System 
Prototype-based fault injection 
Operational System Measurement-based analysis 
Table 2-1 - Experimental techniques for dependability evaluation and their 
suitability for the different phases of software development cycles. 
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On the other hand, Prototype-based fault injection allows the 
evaluation of the system without any assumptions about the system design, 
and thus, allows more accurate and realistic results, compared to 
simulation-based analysis. This technique consists on the injection of faults 
on the target system and on the observation of the corresponding effects. 
The prototype-based fault injection is useful to: 
 Identify system weaknesses, regarding components causing 
dependability bottlenecks.  
 Analyze the system behavior in the presence of faults: (i) 
determine the coverage of error detection and recovery 
mechanisms, and (ii) evaluate the effectiveness of the fault 
tolerance mechanisms and the corresponding performance loss. 
In this context, most of the approaches fall into two main 
categories [Hsueh et al. 1997]: 
 Hardware Implemented Fault Injection (HWIFI) – The faults are 
injected on hardware level, through logical or electrical faults. 
This category can further be subdivided into HWIFI with contact, 
when there is physical contact with the circuit pins of the target 
system (e.g, methods that use pin level active probes and socket 
insertion), and HWIFI without contact, in the cases where the 
injector has no direct contact with the target system (e.g., faults 
are injected through heavy ion radiation and electromagnetic 
interferences). 
 Software Implemented Fault Injection (SWIFI) – The faults are 
injected at software level (through the corruption of code or data), 
reproducing errors that would have been produced by faults 
occurring in hardware of software. SWIFI techniques can also be 
further categorized into two new classes, depending on the time 
at which the faults are injected: (i) compile-time injection, 
corresponding to the case when the faults are injected into the 
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source code of the target program, and (ii) run-time injection, 
when the faults are injected during system run-time. 
Contrasting with SWIFI, HWIFI techniques require the use of 
additional and specific hardware to introduce physical faults on the target 
system, which increase the cost of its use. Moreover, the increasing 
complexity of hardware makes it harder to inject physical faults as well as 
to define the corresponding simulation models that effectively represent 
the systems. Thus, due to its greater flexibility, portability, lower cost and 
ease of development, the SWIFI tools have become a clear and popular 
choice in the last decades. However, despite these advantages, the SWIFI 
tools have some intrinsic drawbacks that should be mentioned: 
 Inaccessibility of some locations, when compared to HWIFI tools 
(e.g. some processor and system resources cannot be reached) 
[Carreira et al. 1998b]; 
 Difficulty in injecting permanent faults, except for very particular 
circumstances; 
 Disturbance of the execution and, consequently, on the 
performance of the system under test. This problem, known as 
intrusiveness, is a consequence of the instrumentation necessary 
to inject faults and monitor the corresponding effects in the target 
system. Special care should be taken in order to minimize its 
effects. 
 Poor time resolution due to the possible inability to follow some 
error propagation, particularly, for errors with very short latency 
like CPU and bus faults. 
Generically, as major drawbacks to the use of the prototype-based 
fault injection, one can mention the restriction of the study to the set of 
faults that can actually be emulated and the impossibility to obtain 
measures like availability and the mean time between failures. 
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Although all of the experimental techniques have their limitations, 
they should be used in their appropriate phases and, given their 
complementarity, their combination can result in a more complete study of 
the dependability of systems. 
As stated in section 2.3, fault injectors are a crucial part of 
dependability benchmarks. The next section briefly presents the most 
relevant fault injection tools developed in the last decades. For the purpose 
of this thesis, only those belonging to the SWIFI family are mentioned. 
2.4.3 SWIFI tools 
Many fault injection tools have been developed in the last decades. 
One of the early SWIFI fault injectors is FIAT (Fault Injection-Based 
Automated Testing Environment) [Segall et al. 1988]. This tool adds fault 
injection and monitoring capabilities to application code and operating 
system, by changing the code and data that is copied into memory at load 
time. Faults are triggered when target system execution reaches the 
locations where special instructions have been inserted in the code. 
Although this tool could inject memory faults at runtime, it was not able to 
inject most transient faults. A similar pre-runtime approach of changing the 
file image generated by the compiler was taken by DOCTOR, a tool 
developed for the HARTS real-time distributed system [Han et al. 1993]. 
The FINE tool (Fault Injection and moNitoring Environment) [Kao et 
al. 1993] uses a software monitor to trace the control flow and inject faults. 
Despite its large overhead and the need of the source code of the target 
application to inject faults, it is significantly more powerful than its 
predecessors, particularly, in the type of faults that could be injected. 
DEFINE [Kao et al. 1994], an extension of FINE, was developed to include 
distributed capabilities, introducing a modified hardware clock interrupt 
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handler to inject CPU and bus faults with time triggers and inject some 
kind of software faults. 
A tool called FERRARI (Fault and ERRor Automatic Real-time 
Injector), developed for injecting faults using the UNIX ptrace function is 
presented in [Kanawati et al. 1995]. The fault injection process initiates and 
executes the target process in a special trace mode, enabling the injection of 
transient and permanent faults. It is able to inject a very wide set of fault 
types, but was restricted to injection in user space. 
FTAPE (Fault Tolerant and Performance Evaluator) [Tsai et al. 1996] is 
part of a fault tolerant benchmark, which measures system failures and the 
system performance degradation during faulty conditions. It also includes 
a synthetic program for generating CPU, memory and I/O (Input/Output) 
activity. FTAPE is able to inject fault in CPU registers, memory and disk 
subsystem. It is capable to select the time and location of faults either based 
on the workload activity or randomly. 
The Xception tool, which uses the debugging and monitoring 
capabilities of the modern processors, is presented in [Carreira et al. 1998b]. 
It provides a set of spatial, temporal and data manipulation fault triggers 
like FERRARI or FTAPE, but with a minimal intrusion on the target system, 
apart from being able to also target system space. Xception was originally 
implemented on a PowerPC based machine, and has been ported to other 
processors since then, having originated the unique commercial fault 
injector available today. Another fault injector, called MAFALDA, 
presented in [Rodríguez et al. 1999], uses principles very similar to 
Xception, adding mechanisms to intersect and inject system calls in 
micro-kernels. 
The GOOFI (Generic Object-Oriented Fault Injection) tool, presented 
in [Aidemark et al. 2001], is designed to inject faults in various target 
systems, using different fault injection techniques. The generic architecture 
of GOOFI assists the user to adapt the tool for new target systems and new 
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fault injection techniques. The version presented in [Aidemark et al. 2001] 
supports pre-runtime SWIFI, to inject faults into the program and data 
areas of the target system before it starts to execute, and Scan-Chain 
Implemented Fault Injection (SCIFI). The SCIFI injects faults via the built-in 
test logic, such as boundary scan-chains and internal scan-chains, existent 
in many modern VLSI (Very Large Scale Integration) circuits. An extended 
and improved version of GOOFI is presented in [Skarin et al. 2010]. This 
new version of the fault injector, named as GOOFI-2, extends the 
predecessor version with one test port-based technique, which provides the 
ability to inject errors into some microprocessors, and two SWIFI 
techniques, which include the ability to use the debugging and monitoring 
functions available in advanced processors, and to inject faults into 
registers and memory without any specific hardware. 
An improved ptrace-based SWIFI tool is presented in [Xu et al. 2002]. 
HiPerFI (High-Performance Fault Injector) reduces very significantly the 
intrusiveness and overhead caused by the context switch between the 
injector process and the target application. It also integrates a method, 
similar to the approach used by Xception, which enables the fault injection 
mechanism to intersect the kernel exception handlers and thus extends 
significantly the tools triggering and injection capabilities. 
A SWIFI tool also capable of executing hardware-based and 
simulation-based fault injections is presented in [Stott et al. 2000]. NFTAPE 
(Networked Fault Tolerance and Performance Evaluator) is able to inject 
multiple fault models (bit-flips in registers and memory, communication 
errors and I/O faults) with multiple fault triggers, and is especially 
adequate for distributed systems. 
A pioneering fault injector tool, specifically developed for 
dependability benchmarking, is presented in [Costa et al. 2003]. The 
DBench-FI uses a flexible runtime kernel upgrading algorithm to provide a 
unique set of characteristics: (i) great simplicity of installation and use, 
since it can be downloadable from the web and executed on-the-fly, without 
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any special installation procedure; (ii) capable to inject faults/errors in the 
whole target system, and not just in the user space as some ptrace-based 
tools do, nor requiring a special launching procedure like the one requires 
by many debugging mechanisms; (iii) does not require the availability of 
source code of any system component or process; (iv) capable to inject 
faults even in tasks that are already running when it is installed, 
irrespectively of their complexity; (v) very low intrusiveness, since it is 
essentially undetectable; (vi) can be dynamically loaded into the system. 
It should be noticed that none of the previous tools satisfied the 
requirements of web distributable dependability benchmarking, either 
because the overhead caused would be too high; or only user space could 
be targeted; or the source code of the target applications was required; or a 
special debug mode imposing a particularly launch mode was required. 
Moreover, all of the previous tools have been proposed for the emulation of 
hardware faults and they are not adequate for the emulation of more 
complex faults such as software faults [Madeira et al. 2000, Jarboui et al. 
2002]. 
Despite the version presented in [Costa et al. 2003] is only able to inject 
memory faults, the DBench-FI fault injector is, as shown in [Costa et al. 
2009] and in the present work, actually compatible with G-SWFIT [Durães 
et al. 2006], the state-of-the-art in software faults model being one of the 
most versatile fault injector available. A detailed description of DBench-FI 
is presented in chapter 4, as it constitutes a central tool of the present 
research work. 
2.4.4 Software fault injection 
Despite the innumerous works on physical hardware fault injection 
and emulation, the problem of injecting software faults have barely been 
addressed. In fact, the potential of the mentioned tools for the emulation of 
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more complex faults such as software faults is very limited [Madeira et al. 
2000, Jarboui et al. 2002]. This gap can be explained by the limited knowledge 
about software faults in the real operational environment of systems and, 
consequently, by the difficulty of defining meaningful and representative 
sets of software faults. Nevertheless, several studies [Gray 1990, Sullivan et 
al. 1992, Lee et al. 1995, Chou 1997, Kalyanakrishnam et al. 1999, Li et al. 
2006] showed that software faults are actually predominant, when 
compared to other types of system faults, and, considering the huge and 
growing complexity of today’s software, its weight on the overall system 
dependability will tend to increase. In fact, nowadays it is generally 
accepted that most of the existing software components have residual 
defects or bugs, which escape the traditional testing phases of the software 
development process. Consequently, complex software systems, in which 
our society increasingly relies, are being executed under potential faulty 
conditions that have been neither detected nor foreseen [Gray 1985, 
Chillarege et al. 1992, Musa 1996, Weyuker 1998, Knight 2002]. 
Despite the permanent nature of the software faults [Avizienis et al. 
2004], practice shows that their behavior is transient. That is, when a failure 
is observed, it is very difficult to repeat all the precise conditions that 
trigger it, like particular timing relationships between several system 
components or other rare and somewhat irreproducible circumstances. 
Software faults typically manifest only during operations in real field, and 
usually under heavy or unusual workloads and timing contexts. In fact, 
studies on field data analysis show that most of software faults are due to 
overloads, race conditions or timing and exception errors [Sullivan et al. 1991, 
Chillarege et al. 1995]. 
The huge complexity of today’s software and the increasing pressure 
to reduce time to market, together with the recognized and well-known 
technical difficulties associated to the software development and testing 
processes [Lyu 1996, Musa 1996], have contributed to the actual scenario. 
The emulation of software faults and the assessment of the impact of 
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residual bugs on the validation of software fault tolerance mechanisms is 
thus of crucial importance as a measure of confidence that can be relied on 
a given system.  
The majority of the studies on software faults have addressed the 
software development process since that is their decisive origin. Software 
faults are always a consequence of an incorrect development process, 
revealing flaws introduced in any of its phases (requirement, specification, 
design, coding, testing, etc.). 
Contributions to the improvement of software development 
methodologies, namely on software testing, software reliability modeling 
and risk assessment were presented in [Lyu 1996, Musa 1996]. 
Mutation testing, sometimes considered the first form of software 
fault injection, is used for evaluating the adequacy of test data, while 
minimizing testing times [Budd 1981, DeMillo 1988, King et al. 1991]. 
Originally proposed in [Hamlet 1977], mutation testing consists of a 
software testing technique based on the automatic4 creation of different 
                                                     
 
 
4 Within the scope of mutation testing, the introduction of changes can also be done 
through manual insertions, usually by experienced engineers, known as hand-seeded faults. 
However, while hand-introduced faults have argued to be more realistic [Hutchins et al. 
1994], more recent empirical studies show that automatically generated faulty versions 
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versions of a program (called mutants), each one with a single and simple 
fault (based on a mutation operator), and on the definition of test cases 
capable to detect the largest number of the injected faults. The mutation 
testing technique determines the adequacy of the set of test cases by 
measuring the ratio of faulty versions that have been detected (in which 
case that mutant is considered “killed”), based on the comparison of the its 
output with the one produced by the original program, and hence it can be 
used to estimate and improve the reliability of software [Geist et al. 1992, 
Lyu et al. 2003, Dimov et al. 2010]. However, in spite of having been widely 
studied and used over three decades, some problems5 such as the high 
computational cost of executing the huge number of mutants against a test 
set, has preventing mutation testing from being a practical testing 
technique [Jia et al. 2011].  
Mutation testing can be considered a case of static or compile-time 
fault injection, as the source code of the original program is changed before 
its image is recompiled, loaded and executed, as opposed to the classical 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
(mutants) provide a less costly, more practical and accurate method to estimate the fault 
detection ability of test cases [Andrews et al. 2005, Do et al. 2006]. 
5 Other difficulties related to the oracle cost [Budd et al. 1982, Weyuker 1982], i.e. the 
process of comparing the output of mutated programs with the original one, in each test 
case, have also been reported. 
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and dynamic fault injection, characterized by the change in the state of the 
program/system, during runtime. Regardless the similarities, it is 
important to highlight the difference of goals between the mutation testing 
and the fault injection techniques. While the first uses program mutations 
to identify an adequate test suite during the software development phase, 
fault injection aims to validate the fault tolerance mechanisms of a system 
at runtime, and evaluate the behavior of the system in the presence of 
faults. It is also worth noting that, despite its wide use in software testing, 
the mutation testing technique is not applicable in the context of COTS, 
since in this case the source code is typically not available. 
Some other studies collect the system operational data from field in 
order to improve the software development process. In [Gray 1990, Lee et al. 
1995] are presented the results of the analysis of the software dependability 
of Tandem systems, based on a census of costumer system outages. The 
impact of software defects on the availability of a large IBM system is 
presented in [Sullivan et al. 1991]. Also based on field data, [Iyer 1995] 
presents a study of the effect of the workload on the reliability of an IBM 
operating system. 
In [Voas et al. 1997b] the injection of artificial faults, both software 
and hardware, is proposed for the assessment of software components 
behavioral quality. Although the fault injection was initially developed in 
the context of hardware faults, namely with the emulation of transient and 
permanent faults using the simple bit-flip and stuck-at models, the need for 
software fault injection has arisen with the emergence of software faults as 
a major cause of system outages.  
With the recognition that the emulation of the most frequent types of 
programmer mistakes is a good approach for the emulation of software 
faults, like primarily stated in [Ng et al. 1996, Ng et al. 1999], some studies 
on the emulation of software faults by software fault injection and their 
representativeness have been made. The first studies about the problem of 
the accurate emulation of software faults by fault injection were presented 
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in [Christmansson et al. 1996a, Christmansson et al. 1996b].  Both works 
propose a general procedure to generate injectable errors and accelerate the 
failure process, based on the analysis of field data about discovered 
software faults that have been classified according to the Orthogonal Defect 
Classification (ODC) - a classification framework for software faults. In the 
first proposal, [Christmansson et al. 1996a] addresses the fault forecast 
issue, while in [Christmansson et al. 1996b] the procedure to generate 
injectable errors is proposed for fault removal.  
An experimental study on the accurate emulation of software faults 
by fault injection is presented in [Madeira et al. 2000]. In a first experiment, 
a set of real software faults has been compared with faults injected by the 
Xception SWIFI tool in order to evaluate the accuracy of the injected faults. 
Results showed the limitations of the usual SWIFI tools in the emulation of 
different classes of software faults, either because the right error patterns 
cannot be injected or the tool is too intrusive. This study also discusses the 
use of field data about real faults and suggests the use of software metrics 
as an alternative way to guide the injection process when field data is not 
available. A second experiment evaluates a set of rules for the injection of 
errors intended to emulate classes of faults. 
In [Ng et al. 2001] software faults (as well as low-level hardware 
faults) are injected into an operating system with the aim to improve and 
validate the robustness of a write-back file cache designed to be as reliable 
as a write-through file cache. Although the used fault model imitates some 
specific programming errors in the OS, it is not necessarily applicable to 
other software systems. 
An innovative technique for the injection of software faults is 
primarily proposed in [Durães et al. 2002b] and further developed and 
extended in [Durães et al. 2006]. The G-SWFIT (Generic Software Fault 
Injection) technique consists of finding key programming structures or 
patterns at the machine code level in order to emulate high level software 
faults through the modification of the ready-to-run binary code of the 
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target software component or module. It uses a set of operators for 
software fault emulation through low-level code mutations based on an 
extensive collection of real software faults, as represented in Figure 2-6. 
 
Figure 2-6 – Automated low-level code mutations [Durães et al. 2002b]. 
In fact, the idea that mutations and actual software faults produce 
identical error patterns and program behavior is supported by the results 
presented in [Daran et al. 1996]. One central advantage of the G-SWFIT 
method is that software faults can be emulated even when the source code 
of the target application is not available, as usually happens with COTS. 
This characteristic is essential for the evaluation of COTS or for the 
validation of fault tolerance mechanisms in COTS based systems. It should 
be emphasized that this technique presents an important advantage over 
the previously mentioned proposal of [Kalakech et al. 2004], based on the 
corruption in the API calls, as the later tries to emulate the effects of real 
software faults (i.e., errors [Avizienis et al. 2004]) instead of emulating the 
existence of the fault itself. Despite this work was based on the C language, 
the study also concludes that the considered fault types are independent on 
specific features of the C language and only minor differences should exist 
in the fault emulation operators for other languages, such as C++ and 
Pascal.  
D
is
a
s
s
e
m
b
le
r
A
s
s
e
m
b
le
r 01011
0X010
01001
01011
00010
0X001
01011
00010
01001
01X11
00010
01001
01011
0001X
01001
Target 
application
Low-level code 
mutation Mutated versions
Low level 
mutations library
54 Background and Related Work 
 
Furthermore, some studies show that it is unlikely that software 
faults could be easily emulated only by API level fault injection [Jarboui et 
al. 2002, Jarboui et al. 2003], or even provide empirical evidences that 
interface faults and software component faults cause substantial different 
impact in the system [Moraes et al. 2006b]. 
Besides the emulation accuracy, the injection of software faults 
encompasses two additional challenges: 
 The representativeness of the faultload; 
 The way of distributing the faults among different components in 
the target system. 
The first issue is related to the fact that the software faults should 
emulate a set of real software faults that may occur in the system, i.e., they 
should represent realistic faults that escape the software testing phases of 
the software development process and still persist in the system. Several 
recent research works, such as [Durães et al. 2006, Moraes et al. 2006a , Natella et 
al. 2013], address this subject and present several notable proposals for the 
definition of representative faultloads based on software faults, as 
explained later in section 3.4 - Representativeness of Software Faults. 
The second challenge concerns the practical difficulty of carrying out 
a software fault injection campaign using such representative, but huge, 
faultloads, induced by the vast number of possible fault types and target 
locations. This problem is even more evident and dramatic in large and 
complex systems, where the execution time of those campaigns can take 
several months or even years due to the faultload dimension. This issue is a 
central topic of the study presented on this thesis. It is fully presented in 
chapter 4 and discussed in depth in chapters 6 and following.  
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2.5 Summary 
This chapter described the terminology related to the dependability, 
their attributes, impairments and the mechanisms used to increase the level 
of confidence that can be relied on a given system. 
The state of the art of the area of dependable computing was also 
presented, through a survey on the relevant work in the areas of 
dependability benchmarking, fault injection and software faults. 
 

 57 
Chapter 3  
3 Dependability Benchmarking of 
Software Systems 
This chapter shows the importance of dependability benchmarking focusing on 
software systems as well as the challenges that arise in this area. It starts to present 
a conceptual framework for dependability benchmark, as well as its key dimensions, 
and highlights the difficulties concerning the experimentation issues of the 
dependability evaluation of software systems. Finally, the problem of the 
representativeness of software faults is presented, and the relevant studies that 
have been carried out with the aim to solve this problematic are discussed in detail. 
3.1 Introduction 
espite the substantial improvements in the design and 
implementation processes of software systems over the last years, 
it is obvious that the complete elimination of software defects 
during software development process is very difficult to attain in practice. 
As a consequence, our society is increasingly dependent on complex 
software systems that are executed under potential and unforeseen faulty 
conditions. Due to this difficulty in producing software without defects or 
D 
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bugs, software developers adopted fault tolerant mechanisms to prevent 
the consequences of potential failures, which can range from minor 
inconveniences to real catastrophes [Weinstock et al. 1997]. Modern software 
systems must be fault tolerant (at least to a certain extent), that is, they 
should be able to provide the expected service even in the presence of 
faults. In fact, fault tolerance is even recommended by leading safety 
standards like NASA standard 8719.13B for software safety [Nasa 2004] and 
the ISO/DIS 26262 standard for automotive safety [ISODIS 2009].  
The importance of fault tolerance mechanisms has been reinforced by 
the current trend of using COTS and COTS-based systems to build larger 
and more complex systems [Durães et al. 2002b, Madeira et al. 2003], in 
application areas that require high dependability. In this context, residual 
software faults represent a growing risk of unpredictability consequences. 
According to [Lyu 1995], software fault tolerance techniques are divided 
into two groups: (i) single version and, (ii) multi-version software 
techniques. Single version techniques focus on the addition of design 
mechanisms into a single piece of software, aiming the detection, 
containment and handling of errors caused by the activation of design 
faults. Examples are concurrent error detection, checkpointing and 
recovery, and exception handling [Gray 1985, Cristian 1982]. Multi-version 
techniques consist on the structured use of multiple versions (or variants) 
of a piece of software in order to ensure that design faults in one version do 
not cause system failures. Examples of such techniques include N-version 
programming (NVP), recovery blocks (RcB), and N self-checking 
programming (NSCP) [Avizienis 1985, Lyu 1995]. 
Despite several studies have shown the pertinence and the efficiency 
of fault tolerance mechanisms on the dependability of systems [Arlat et al. 
1993], its validation and evaluation are complex and challenging tasks. 
Dependability benchmarks allow the answer to that challenge: they 
should provide generic ways of characterizing the behavior of components 
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and computer systems in the presence of faults, allowing the quantification 
of dependability measures. 
3.2 General framework 
The goal of dependability benchmarks is to provide a cost-effective 
and reproducible way to evaluate the behavior of components and 
computer systems in the presence of faults, allowing the quantification of 
dependability attributes or the characterization of system into well-defined 
dependability classes. Furthermore, dependability benchmarks should 
provide a uniform, repeatable and comparable way of performing that 
evaluation and compare alternative solutions. As these properties represent 
fundamental goals of a dependability benchmark, they should be taken in 
consideration right from the earliest phases of the benchmark definition. 
A general framework for defining dependability benchmark for 
computer systems was presented in the context of the DBench Project 
[DBENCH 2004]. The work carried out presents a conceptual framework 
and an experimental environment for dependability benchmarking of 
COTS and COTS-based systems and identifies the following three main 
classes of impacting dimensions: 
 Categorization – This dimension describes the considered target 
system, as well as the dependability benchmark context. It 
impacts the selection of meaningful benchmark measures, as well 
as all aspects related to experimentation on the target system. 
 Measure – This dimension specifies the dependability benchmark 
measures to be assessed, considering the choices made for the 
categorization dimension. 
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 Experimentation – This dimension includes all the aspects related 
to the execution of the experiments on the target system in order 
to get all the measures selected in the measure dimension. 
Figure 3-1 outlines the classification dimensions, as well as their 
relationships. 
 
Figure 3-1 – Dependability benchmarking dimensions [DBENCH 2004]. 
The following subsections detail the mentioned dimensions. 
3.2.1 Categorization dimension 
This dimension aims to unambiguously identify and specify the 
Benchmark Target (BT), with respect to its nature, application area and 
operating environment. It is worth noting that the application area is a key 
dimension, as it impacts the system execution profile, the operating 
environment and the benchmark measures. Different application areas 
require different dependability benchmarks. It should also be noticed that 
the operating environment may affect both the workload and the faultload, 
as it encompasses not only functional activity, but also faults, induced by 
external sources or human-related interaction ones [Voas et al. 1997a]. 
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This dimension also describes the benchmark context, which depends 
from the perspective of its execution and use of results and determines the 
requirements and the objectives of the benchmark. The benchmarking 
context is considered a composite dimension, since it includes: (i) the life 
cycle phase of the BT, in which the dependability benchmark is executed 
(the benchmark measures greatly depends on the specific phase in which 
they are obtained); (ii) the benchmark user, concerning the person or entity 
which is using the benchmark results; (iii) the benchmark scope, related to 
the possibility of the benchmark results to be used either internally, for 
system validation and tuning, or externally, for public distribution; (iv) the 
benchmark purpose, concerning the characterization of the dependability 
of the target system either in a qualitative or quantitative manner; and 
(v) the benchmark performer, regarding the person or entity that actually 
executes the benchmark (manufacturer, integrator, third-party or end-user). 
3.2.2 Measure dimension 
This dimension encompasses the measures that are relevant for the 
dependability benchmark, allowing a quantitative or qualitative 
characterization of the BT. It includes: (i) performance related measures, 
concerning the evaluation of system performance under faulty conditions; 
(ii) comprehensive measures, which characterize the system at the service 
delivery level (expected service), such as transactions per minute, 
availability or safety; and (iii) specific measures, associated to particular 
system features, such as the coverage factor or the latency time of fault 
tolerance mechanisms. 
Usual measures include the identification of system failure modes 
and the system performance evaluation, such as system time response and 
system throughput (as the injected faults may lead to performance 
degradation without leading to system failure). It is worth pointing out 
that, more than the absolute value of the workload execution time, what is 
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really important in dependability benchmarks is the identification of the 
impact of the faultload on that execution time. Moreover, dependability 
benchmarks usually also measure the time needed for the restoration of the 
expected service, after the occurrence of a faulty situation. 
3.2.3 Experimentation dimension 
The experimentation dimension includes all aspects related to the 
experiments executed on BT, according to the categorization and measure 
dimensions. They include: (i) the System Under Benchmark (SUB), a wider 
system which includes the Benchmark Target (BT); (ii) the workload, which 
should represent a typical operational profile for a specific application area; 
(iii) the faultload, which should also be representative of the real threats 
that may occur in the system; and (iv) the measurements to be performed, 
that allows the observation of the behavior of the BT under the applied 
execution profile, composed by the workload and the faultload. 
This dimension should identify and specify the System 
Under Benchmark (SUB), which consists in a setup (hardware and software 
resources) that hosts and runs the BT, and performs the experiments 
defined by the benchmark. The SUB is also used to apply both the 
workload and the faultload, and to collect the measurements relevant to the 
dependability benchmark. 
It is worth mentioning that the definition of a faultload is a practical 
process, based on observations, knowledge and reasoning. Information 
about failure data reported in the field [Kanoun et al. 1997], knowledge 
about the most frequent residual software defects found in deployed 
software systems [Durães et al. 2003b], characteristics of the operating 
environment, like the most frequent common administrator mistakes 
[Vieira et al. 2003], or even information from experimental and simulation 
studies, are examples of inputs used for the proper definition of faultloads. 
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3.2.4 Benchmark scenarios 
All the steps, and their interactions, needed to achieve a 
dependability benchmark form a benchmark scenario. According to 
[Kanoun et al. 2002, Madeira et al. 2002], there are three different key steps for 
system dependability benchmarking: analysis, experimentation, and modeling. 
Figure 3-2 shows a high-level scheme that depicts these stages and their 
relations. 
A benchmark starts by an analysis step, in which specific choices are 
made concerning the categorization and measure dimensions of the target 
system. Depending on the measure assessment method, the output of this 
step can consist in two different types: (i) the workload, faultload and 
measurements, for experimental measures, (output represented by link A), 
and (ii) a deeply analysis of the system behavior (output represented by 
link B) in order to prepare a system modeling, in case it is required. 
According to the choices made in the analysis step, the selection of the 
elements concerning the experimentation dimension is then achieved in the 
experimentation step (link A), which allows the characterization and 
assessment of the target system dependability. This step includes the 
execution of the workload and faultload, and the collecting of the 
measurements under the applied execution profile. As a consequence of the 
strong relationship between the experimentation process and the target 
system, all the components already defined at a high level during the 
previous steps (workload, faultload and measurements), should be refined 
in order to incorporate all the target system specificities. The correct 
implementation of these components at system level should be carefully 
addressed according to the procedures and rules defined in the benchmark, 
which usually include configuration disclosures and rules related to the 
scalability and to the benchmark measurements. 
A modeling step is also required when comprehensive measures of the 
target system are likewise deemed of interest (link B). It is used to build a 
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representation of the system, in order to model the system behavior 
considering failure occurrences, errors detection and propagation, system 
recovery, and other similar events or activities. It is worth recalling that 
these analytical models require the allocation of numerical values to the 
model parameters, which is usually done through experimental 
measurement, field data or past experience related to similar systems. 
 
Figure 3-2 – Dependability benchmarking scenarios [Kanoun et al. 2002]. 
The modeling and the experimentation steps are usually used in a 
complementary way, as depicted in Figure 3-2. Modeling can be used to 
improve both the workload and the faultload, by assisting in the selection 
of their most significant classes (link C), and also to guide the selection of 
most relevant experimental measures and features that need to be assessed 
by the benchmark experimentation (link D). This is the case of 
dependability benchmarks in which the experimentation is supported by 
modeling (scenario 1: represented by all the three steps and the links A, B, 
C and D). On the other hand, in some benchmarks the experimentation 
may also help in the improvement and validation (or even in the 
correction) of the analytical model produced in the modeling step (link E). 
This occurs in benchmarks in which the modeling is supported by 
experimentation (scenario 2: represented by all the three steps and the links 
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A, B, and E), such as when some experimental measures are used by the 
analytical models. 
There are also dependability benchmarks in which modeling and 
experimentation are supported by each other (a combination of the 
previous scenarios 1 and 2), and where outputs are simultaneously 
constituted by experimental measures and features, as well as of 
comprehensive measures based on modeling (scenario 3: represented by 
the full steps and links of Figure 3-2). 
In addition to these three types of benchmark scenarios, there are also 
dependability benchmarks based only in experimentation (scenario 4: 
represented by the analysis and experimentation steps and by the link A). 
This is the case of the well-known performance benchmarks extended with 
dependability measures, as the ones used in this thesis. 
3.3 Performing the experiments 
The benchmark experiments aim to execute the workload and 
evaluate the behavior of the BT in the presence of faults, as a result of 
measurements. In practice, the SUB is often a wider system that includes 
the BT, such as when the BT is a software component like an operating 
system or a database management system (DBMS). It is also very important 
to note that the SUB should be carefully and explicitly documented, as the 
benchmark must be properly interpreted and reproducible. 
Furthermore, as already mentioned, in the case of benchmarking of 
software systems using software fault injection, it is fundamental the 
existence of a clear separation between the BT and the software 
components that are selected as Fault Injection Target (FIT). The BT should 
not be modified by the faultload in order to guarantee the inviolability of 
the BT and the credibility of the dependability benchmark, especially from 
the point of view of the BT provider. Instead, the software faults should be 
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injected in one component (the FIT) in order to evaluate their impact in the 
other components (the BT) or in the overall system.  
Figure 3-3 depicts the relation between the SUB, the BT and the FIT, 
in the case when the FIT is an operating system and the BT is an application 
program, such as, for example, a web-server.  
 
Figure 3-3 – Relation between System Under Benchmark (SUB), Benchmark 
target (BT) and Fault Injection Target (FIT). 
To perform the dependability benchmark, concerning the benchmark 
experimentation dimension, another element is needed in order to manage 
and automate the experiments. This key component, known as the 
Benchmark Management System (BMS), is responsible for the control of all 
the aspects of the benchmark experiments, namely: the workload 
submission, the injection of faults, the coordination and synchronization of 
the several components involved in the experiments and collecting the 
information needed to process measurements. The BMS usually includes 
several resources and instrumentation modules in order to fulfill its 
functions. Moreover, the specific tasks assigned to the BMS should be 
clearly defined in the benchmark specification, since they are very 
dependent on the benchmark characteristics. 
Beyond a description of the setup required to run the benchmark, in 
order to control the way a dependability benchmark is applied and used, 
and to ensure uniform conditions for measurements, dependability 
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benchmarks should also describe a set of procedures and rules. These 
procedures and rules are, naturally, dependent on the specificities of the 
benchmark itself and usually include system configuration disclosures, 
rules related to the scalability of the benchmark and rules related to the 
benchmark measurements. This latter kind of rules encompasses: (i) a 
precise specification of the benchmark measures; (ii) information about the 
domain in which those measures are valid and meaningful; and (iii) a 
detailed specification of all the procedures and steps required to obtain 
those measures (usually programs source code, language specification 
texts, etc.). 
3.4 Representativeness of Software Faults 
The acceptability of dependability benchmarks is mainly supported 
on two fundamental and complementary characteristics: reproducibility 
and generalization. The former requires the existence of well-defined 
procedures that allow repeating the benchmark in the same environment, 
possibly by a different team, and obtaining statistically equivalent results. 
The latter consists of the ability to generalize the experimental results 
through some kind of inductive and logical reasoning, making the results 
useful and meaningful in broader context than the one used in the 
experimental setup. 
Reproducibility is sometimes referred as normalization and 
encompasses the ability to reproduce the observations and the 
measurements, either in a deterministic or in a statistical way, providing 
confidence in the experimental results.  
Unfortunately, the reproducibility and the generalization are, in 
practice, very difficult to attain. The lack of portability of the tools used in 
the experiments, together with the difficulty to reproduce the experimental 
conditions, limits the reproduction of the results to a merely statistical 
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basis. On the other hand, the absence of the necessary representativeness of 
the experiments can also prevent the desired level of generalization. 
Representativeness concerns the ability of a dependability 
benchmark, its measures and experimental conditions, to represent real 
world scenarios in a realistic way. It determines the validity and the 
usefulness of the benchmark results. Representativeness concerns not only 
the statistical perspective of the results, but also the representativeness of 
almost all elements of the benchmark. For example, it is of crucial 
importance regarding the techniques used for fault injection, since it is 
fundamental to guarantee that the injected faults do represent the real 
faults experienced in the field. However, that is not an easy task. Several 
studies on fault representativeness, accuracy and equivalence of fault 
injection techniques [Daran et al. 1996, Folkesson et al. 1998, Madeira et al. 
2000] showed that not all injection techniques can accurately emulate all 
types of faults. 
The representativeness issue also assumes a special importance for 
the workload and faultload components of the benchmark. Concerning the 
workload, it is essential that execution profile simulates the activities found 
in real systems. Regarding the faultload, it must be ensured that the 
injected faults do represent real faults that may affect the systems in the 
field. However, unlike the definition of adequate workloads, which is an 
already resolved issue, with large use in performance benchmarks, the 
definition of representative faultloads is still an open issue. In fact, it is one 
of the most critical and difficult tasks in a dependability benchmark 
definition.  
Random fault distributions based on the size of the physical devices 
have been commonly accepted and used for the injection of hardware 
transient faults. However more sophisticated distributions are necessary for 
the injection of software faults. In fact, regarding software faults, the 
representativeness of the faultload is a special and central property, as the 
injected faults should represent realistic faults experienced in the field 
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[Vieira et al. 2003, Durães et al. 2004a], i.e., software faults that escape the usual 
software testing phases of software development process and still persist in 
the system. Only a faultload that is representative of these residual 
software faults can assure an accurate evaluation of dependability 
attributes, seen as measures, and an efficient validation of the fault tolerant 
mechanisms. Unfortunately, the representativeness of software faultloads 
is very difficult to attain. Information about real software faults found in 
field is fundamental to understand software faults and help in the 
characterization of significant fault attributes, such as fault locations and 
types, as well as their respective frequency of occurrence. However, field 
data and research works concerning software faults are rare and only in 
recent years they have been the focus of attention of researchers [Gray 1990, 
Lee et al. 1995, Chillarege et al. 1995, Christmansson et al. 1996a, Madeira et al. 
2000, Durães et al. 2006, Moraes et al. 2006a, Basso et al. 2009, Sanches et al. 2011, 
Natella et al. 2013]. 
The gathering and study of software faults have been widely used for 
the analysis and improvement of the software development and 
maintenance processes – the main goal of leading software quality 
standards and frameworks, such as the Capability Maturity Model 
Integrated (CMMI) [Chrissis et al. 2003].  
A uniform approach for the classification of software anomalies is 
provided in the IEEE Standard Classification for Software Anomalies [IEEE 
1994], which was further revised in 2010 [IEEE 2010]. This standard, sponsored 
by the Software & Systems Engineering Standards Committee of the IEEE 
Computer Society, states that software anomalies, seen as problems or 
defects, may be found during any stage of the software development life 
cycle (review, test, analysis, compilation, use of software products, use of 
documentation, etc.) In its initial version [IEEE 1994], the standard presents 
a comprehensive categorization of the potential defects into a set of defect 
types: logic problem, computation problem, interface/timing problem, data 
handling problem, data problem, documentation problem, document 
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quality problem, and enhancement. The finite nature and the specificity of 
the categories considered in this classification forced a redefinition of the 
standard. The latest version of the standard [IEEE 2010] replaced the list of 
defect types by a set of defect and failure attributes (Table 3-1 and Table 
3-2, respectively), aimed to help the identification and tracking of software 
anomalies and to improve the software development process. 
A significant contribution on collecting and analyzing observed 
software faults is presented in [Chillarege et al. 1992, Chillarege 1996]. This 
work presents the Orthogonal Defect Classification (ODC), a classification 
framework for the classification of software faults (i.e., defects) into 
mutually exclusive classes, in which signatures are extracted from defects 
that occur through development and field use, in order to improve the 
software product and the software development process. The usefulness of 
the ODC methodology in providing this feedback was confirmed by 
several pilot projects [Chillarege et al. 1992]. 
Though the intended primary goal of ODC is to provide a feedback 
on to the software development process at IBM, it ends up to be a useful 
defect classification regarding the problem of software fault emulation by 
fault injection. ODC is based on the previous observation that there is a 
case-effect relationship between the semantics of the software defects and 
the activities of the software development process [Chillarege et al. 1991]. 
According to ODC, a software fault is classified based on the modification 
that is necessary to undertake in the code in order to correct the defect. It is 
worth noting that this classification considers that mistakes may occur in 
every stage of the software development process (specification, design, 
coding, testing, documentation, etc.). Table 3-3 shows the ODC defect types 
directly related to code, and, therefore, relevant to the present work.  
Besides this fault classification has been built and used for the 
improvement of the software designing process at IBM, it also constitutes a 
central basis to understand and classify software faults from the injection 
point of view.  
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Attribute Definition 
Defect ID  Unique identifier for the defect. 
Description  Description of what is missing, wrong, or unnecessary. 
Status  Current state within defect report life cycle. 
Asset  
The software asset (product, component, module, etc.) 
containing the defect. 
Artifact  The specific software work product containing the defect. 
Version detected  
Identification of the software version in which the defect was 
detected. 
Version corrected  
Identification of the software version in which the defect was 
corrected. 
Priority  
Ranking for processing assigned by the organization 
responsible for the evaluation, resolution, and closure of the 
defect relative to other reported defects. 
Severity 
The highest failure impact that the defect could (or did) 
cause, as determined by (from the perspective of) the 
organization responsible for software engineering. 
Probability  Probability of recurring failure caused by this defect. 
Effect  
The class of requirement that is impacted by a failure caused 
by a defect. 
Type  
A categorization based on the class of code within which the 
defect is found or the work product within which the defect 
is found. 
Mode  
A categorization based on whether the defect is due to 
incorrect implementation or representation, the addition of 
something that is not needed, or an omission. 
Insertion activity  
The activity during which the defect was injected/inserted 
(i.e., during which the artifact containing the defect 
originated). 
Detection activity  
The activity during which the defect was detected (i.e., 
inspection or testing). 
Failure 
reference(s) 
Identifier of the failure(s) caused by the defect. 
Change reference  
Identifier of the corrective change request initiated to correct 
the defect. 
Disposition  Final disposition of defect report upon closure. 
Table 3-1 –Defect attributes [IEEE 2010]. 
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Attribute Definition 
Failure ID  Unique identifier for the failure. 
Status  Current state within failure report life cycle. See Table B.1. 
Title  
Brief description of the failure for summary reporting 
purposes. 
Description  
Full description of the anomalous behavior and the conditions 
under which it occurred, including the sequence of events 
and/or user actions that preceded the failure. 
Environment  
Identification of the operating environment in which the 
failure was observed. 
Configuration  
Configuration details including relevant product and version 
identifiers. 
Severity  
As determined by (from the perspective of) the organization 
responsible for software engineering. See Table B.1. 
Analysis  
Final results of causal analysis on conclusion of failure 
investigation. 
Disposition  Final disposition of the failure report. See Table B.1. 
Observed by  
Person who observed the failure (and from whom additional 
detail can be obtained). 
Opened by  Person who opened (submitted) the failure report. 
Assigned to  
Person or organization assigned to investigate the cause of the 
failure. 
Closed by  Person who closed the failure report. 
Date observed  Date/time the failure was observed. 
Date opened  Date/time the failure report is opened (submitted). 
Date closed  
Date/time the failure report is closed and the final disposition 
is assigned. 
Test reference  
Identification of the specific test being conducted (if any) when 
the failure occurred. 
Incident 
reference  
Identification of the associated incident if the failure report 
was precipitated by a service desk or help desk call/contact. 
Defect reference  
Identification of the defect asserted to be the cause of the 
failure. 
Failure reference  Identification of a related failure report. 
Table 3-2 – Failure attributes [IEEE 2010]. 
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The characteristics of the ODC classification, namely the fact that the 
considered classes are unambiguously close to the code and to the 
programmer, showed to be fundamental to a new perspective on the 
problem of the accurate emulation of software faults by fault injection. This 
problematic, fundamental in dependability benchmarks of software 
systems, was first addressed in [Christmansson et al. 1996a]. The study 
proposes a framework for the generation of errors that emulate real 
software faults, based on field data of the system under analysis, about 
discovered software faults that have been classified using ODC. Despite the 
innovative character of this work, its interest is, in practice, strongly 
restricted by the existence of field data on real software faults found in the 
target system, which makes the technique very difficult, or even 
impossible, to apply in practice. 
 
Defect type Description 
Assignment Value(s) assigned incorrectly or not assigned at all 
Checking 
Missing or incorrect validation of data or incorrect 
loop or conditional statements 
Interface 
Errors in the interaction among components, 
modules, device drivers, call statements, or 
parameters lists 
Timing/Serialization Missing or incorrect serialization of shared resources 
Algorithm 
Missing or Incorrect implementation that can be fixed 
by (re)implementing an algorithm or data structure 
without the need for requesting a design change 
Function 
Affects a sizeable amount of code and refers to the 
capability that is either implemented incorrectly or 
not implemented at all 
Table 3-3 – ODC defect types. 
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A subsequent study [Madeira et al. 2000] also showed that typical 
SWIFI tools were not adequate for the emulation of software faults through 
the use of error patterns like the ones proposed in [Christmansson et al. 
1996a], as only some types of those error patterns could be injected. One of 
the reasons relies on the fact that, in its genesis, the ODC classification does 
not take in account the fault emulation point of view, regardless the fact 
that the considered classes are unambiguously close to the code and to the 
programmer, once they are based on the correction of the software defects. 
With the aim bridging this gap, an ODC classification extension, built 
under the fault emulation perspective, is presented in [Durães et al. 2003b, 
Durães et al. 2006]. This proposal resulted from an exhaustive field study of 
real software bugs found in well-known open source software written in 
the C language (including user applications and system code)  and is based 
on the observation that a software defect consists of one or more missing, 
wrong or superfluous programming language constructs (such as program 
statements, functions, expressions, etc.). Accordingly, this study classifies 
each one of the ODC defect types into three new additional types, 
according to the corresponding erroneous program construct: Missing 
construct, Wrong construct or Extraneous construct. Table 3-4 shows the 
extended ODC classification, with concrete examples of each class of defect 
types, as well as the corresponding percentage of faults found in the field. 
It should be noticed that, as the analyzed field data does not include any 
information about the timing or serialization properties, the 
Timing/Serialization defect type was not considered. 
It is worth pointing out that both of the distributions, the one 
presented in [Durães et al. 2003b, Durães et al. 2006] and that presented in 
[Christmansson et al. 1996a], follow the same trend in the fault distribution 
across the ODC fault types (see Table 3-5). 
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Defect type Nature Examples of code mistake 
% of 
Faults 
Assignment 
Missing 
A variable was not assigned a value, a 
variable was not initialized, etc. 
9.3% 
Wrong 
A wrong value (or expression result, etc.) 
was assigned to a variable 
10.5% 
Extraneous 
A variable should not have been subject of 
an assignment (value, expression result 
etc.) 
1.6% 
Checking 
Missing 
An “if” construct is missing, part of a 
logical condition is missing, etc. 
16.9% 
Wrong 
Wrong “if” condition, wrong iteration 
condition, etc. 
7.9% 
Extraneous 
An "if" condition is superfluous and 
should not be present 
0.1% 
Interface 
Missing 
A parameter in a function call was 
missing; incomplete expression was used 
as parameter 
1.6% 
Wrong 
Wrong information was passed to a 
function call (value, expression result etc.) 
5,7% 
Extraneous 
Surplus data is passed to a function (e.g. 
one parameter too many in function call) 
0.0% 
Algorithm 
Missing 
Some part of the algorithm is missing (e.g. 
function call, an iteration construct, etc.) 
33.2% 
Wrong Algorithm is wrongly coded or ill-formed 6.0% 
Extraneous 
The algorithm has surplus steps or a 
unnecessary function is called 
0.9% 
Function 
Missing New program modules were required 3.1% 
Wrong 
The code structure has to be redefined to 
correct functionality 
3.0% 
Extraneous 
Portions of code were completely 
superfluous 
0.0% 
Table 3-4 – Fault nature totals across ODC types [Durães et al. 2006]. 
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In fact, it can be observed from Table 3-5 that, for both 
distributions: Algorithm defects are the dominant fault type; Assignment 
and Checking defects have similar frequency; and the Interface and 
Function defects are clearly the less frequent type of faults found in field, 
according to both works. Moreover, both works show similar values for all 
ODC types. 
 
ODC Defect type 
ODC Defect type distribution 
[Durães et al. 2006] [Christmansson et al. 1996a] 
Assignment 21.98% 21.4% 
Checking 17.48% 24.9% 
Interface 8.17% 1.6% 
Algorithm 43.41% 40.1% 
Function 8.74% 6.1% 
Table 3-5 – Comparison of Fault distribution across ODC defect types. 
The independency of both research works and the fact that they 
analyzed quite different program types, suggest that this fault distribution 
is reasonably independent from the nature of the program and, thus, it 
seems to confirm the representativeness of the respective software defects 
distribution for programs in general. 
The work presented in [Durães et al. 2006] used the new classification 
scheme to classify 668 faults from the field, through the analysis of 12 
widely deployed software systems. Results show that most of the software 
faults found belong to a small set of fault types, and that the remaining 
fault types encompass a small number of faults. Table 3-6 presents the most 
common set of fault types found. It is worth noting that this set of fault 
types represent a total of approximately 68% of all faults collected in field. 
The study shows that these types of software faults can be considered 
representative of the most common types of software faults and, 
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consequently, they should be considered in software faults emulation 
experiments. The paper [Durães et al. 2006] argues that, although other 
fault types may occur in the field with the analysis of more field data on 
real software faults, they are probably very rare, since they were not found 
among the analyzed faults. Moreover, they would not change the analysis 
of the most frequent types. 
The research work carried out in [Durães et al. 2006] presents 
important results towards the characterization of software faults. The 
proposed methodology allows a greater adaptability to software fault 
injection, as it contains clear indications of how to manipulate the target 
program code in order to inject a fault. In fact, it also proposes a library of 
fault emulation operators for software fault injection, as explained in 
section 2.4.4. These operators guide the mutation of the ready-to-run binary 
code of software modules in order to mimic real software faults, 
reproducing the code that would be generated by the compiler if the 
intended software faults were in the high-level source code. The technique, 
named G-SWFIT, consists in the scanning of the target code application for 
specific low-level instruction patterns (sequence of machine code 
instructions) and in applying the mutation to emulate the intended 
software fault. It is worth pointing out that, unlike [Christmansson et al. 
1996a], this work presents a technique for the emulation of real software 
faults, even when field data is not available for the target system, as it 
usually happens for third-party software components. 
Moreover, despite the full work was based on the C language, other 
languages like C++ and Pascal were also analyzed in this study. Results 
show that the considered fault types are not dependent on specific features 
of the C language and only minor differences should exist in the fault 
emulation operators. It should also be noticed that, as the G-SWFIT 
operators reproduce faults that escape the traditional testing phases of 
software development process, they only encompasses 12 software fault 
types of the total of 71 mutation operators proposed in [Delamaro et al. 
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1996] for the assessment of the exhaustiveness of test cases (regarding the C 
language). 
 
Fault Types 
# 
Faults 
ODC Type 
Ass. Chk. Int. Alg. Fun. 
Missing 
if construct plus statements 71 
   
 
 
AND sub-expr in expression used as 
branch condition 
47 
 
 
   
function call 46 
   
 
 
if construct around statements 34 
 
 
   
OR sub-expr in expression used as 
branch condition 
32 
 
 
   
small and localized part of the 
algorithm 
23 
   
 
 
variable assignment using an 
expression 
21  
    
functionality 21 
    
 
variable assignment using a value 20  
    
if construct plus statements plus else 
before statements 
18 
   
 
 
variable initialization 15  
    
Wrong 
logical expression used as branch 
condition 
22 
 
 
   
algorithm - large modifications 20 
    
 
value assigned to variable 16  
    
arithmetic expression in parameter 
of function call 
14 
  
 
  
data types or conversion used 12  
    
variable used in parameter of 
function call 
11 
  
 
  
Extraneous 
variable assignment using another 
variable 
9  
    
Total Faults for these types in each ODC type 452 93 135 25 192 41 
Coverage relative to each ODC type (%) 68 65 81 51 72 100 
Table 3-6 – Most common faults found in field for several software systems 
[Durães et al. 2006]. 
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In order to extend this fault model to different high level languages, 
with different programing paradigms, some subsequent studies were 
presented. The works presented in [Basso et al. 2009, Sanches et al. 2011] use 
the Java language to show that, when and object-oriented languages are 
considered, the set of the most common software fault types presented in 
Table 3-6 can be extended with new object-oriented fault types, according 
to the Java language specific characteristics and the object-oriented 
paradigm. 
An approach for improving software fault representativeness and, at 
the same time, reducing the size of the faultload produced by the G-SWFIT 
technique is presented in [Natella et al. 2013]. This study analyzed the 
representativeness of a large set of injected faults, representing the most 
frequent software fault types (as summarized on Table 3-7) found in field 
(according to [Durães et al. 2006]), with respect to its ability to escape actual 
test suites adopted by software developers for detecting faults before 
software release: the study argues that faults that are easily identified by 
test suites should not be considered as representative. 
 
Defect type Examples of code mistake 
MFC Missing Function Call 
MVIV Missing Variable Initialization using a Value 
MVAV Missing Variable Assignment using a Value 
MVAE Missing Variable Assignment using a an Expression 
MIA Missing IF construct Around statements 
MIFS Missing IF construct plus Statements 
MIEB Missing IF construct plus statements plus Else Before statements 
MLC Missing AND/OR clause in branch condition 
MLPA Missing small and Localized part of the algorithm 
WVAV Wrong Value Assigned to Variable 
WPFV Wrong variable used in Parameter of Function call 
WAEP Wrong Arithmetic Expression in Parameter of function call 
Table 3-7 – Most frequent software fault types analyzed in [Natella et al. 2013]. 
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This work uses a fault injection tool called SAFE [SAFE] to inject the 
most common software fault types found in field in three real world 
software systems widely used in business and safety-critical contexts, for 
which real test suites are available: the MySQL [MySQL] and PostgreSQL 
[PostgreSQL] DBMS engines, and the kernel of the RTEMS Real-Time 
Operating System [RTEMS, Rufino et al. 2007]. It is worth noting that the 
software faults are injected in the source code, instead of the binary code, 
through the production of a set of different faulty source code files, each 
containing a specific software fault, as summarized in Figure 3-4. The fault 
injection tool starts to statically analyze the target program and builds an 
abstract representation of the source code, called an Abstract Syntax Tree, 
responsible for guiding the identification of locations where a specific 
software fault type can be introduced, according to the software fault 
operators defined in [Durães et al. 2006].  Thereafter, the tool creates a set of 
patch files, each one containing a different faulty, but syntactically correct, 
version of the code, which is then compiled. 
 
Figure 3-4 – Process for generating faulty versions of the target system  
[Natella et al. 2013]. 
The experimental setup used in this study is presented in Figure 3-5. 
In each experiment the system under test is replaced with a faulty version, 
in which the Test Manager executes a test case and collects the test result. 
In order to analyze which faults can be considered representative, i.e. 
software faults that escape to test suites, each one of the generated faulty 
versions of the code was run against 50 test cases, randomly chosen for 
each software system. 
C pre-
processor
C/C++ 
frontend
C/C++
Source Files
+
6 3
2
+
Abstract
Syntax Tree
Fault 
Injector
Patch Files
(one fault per patch)
int main() {
   if (a && b)
   { c++; }
}
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Figure 3-5 – Experimental setup used in [Natella et al. 2013]. 
The conducted experiments show that a significant part of the 
injected faults is detected by most of the test cases and, consequently, the 
study argues that they should not be considered as representative: 14.57% 
and 23.13% for the MySQL and PostgreSQL DBMSs, respectively, and 
72.23% for the RTEMS. 
This work also states that there is a relationship between fault 
representativeness and fault locations, and shows that fault 
representativeness can be improved with the use of classification 
algorithms and software metrics for the selection of a subset of components 
suitable for the injection of representative software faults. Both a 
supervised (decision trees) and an unsupervised algorithm (Lloyd k-means 
clustering) were evaluated for the improvement of the faultload 
representativeness and a set of software metrics commonly used by 
Test Controller System Under Test
Test Manager
Test case Test result
(pass/fail)
1. The system 
is replaced with 
a faulty version
3. Result is recorded
2. A test case 
is executed
4. The experiments are 
iterated over all the test 
cases and faulty versions
Fault
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researchers and practitioners was used for analyzing software complexity: 
Lines of Code, McCabe’s Cyclomatic complexity and FanIn/FanOut6.  
This study concludes that the faultload can be improved, by 
including a greater number of representative faults, using either the 
supervised or the unsupervised algorithms (with an increase of 4.10% to 
26.08% and of 2.16% to 16.24%, respectively). At the same time, the 
proposed approach can reduce the faultload size of 30.30% to 69.43% for 
the supervised algorithm, and of 22.16% to 59.13% for the unsupervised 
one. 
It should be noticed that the supervised classifier requires a training 
set in order to classify unknown elements, which, in practice, reveals to be 
a strong limitation, since it involves an extensive and time consuming 
experimental analysis. In order to overcome this need (the main limitation 
of the supervised algorithm), this study also presents an unsupervised 
classifier, relying on the observation that suitable components have lowest 
FanIn and FanOut values, as those components are less exposed to testing. 
                                                     
 
 
6 FanIn/FanOut are software complexity metrics based on system structure and information 
flow, derived from the concept presented in [Henry et al. 1981]. FanIn represents the count 
of unique components (functions or files) that call (or are called by, in the case of FanOut) a 
given component, either directly, or indirectly (via other components).  
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3.5 Summary 
This chapter presented a conceptual framework for dependability 
benchmarking. It also discussed the challenges and difficulties faced with 
the dependability benchmarking of software systems, namely, concerning 
the experimentation issues and the representativeness of software faults. 
Relevant works in the area are also described in detail. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Software Fault Injector 
Previous chapters introduced the basic concepts of dependability and 
presented the fault injection as a method for its evaluation. Special emphasis was 
given to software fault injection and to dependability benchmarks, given its 
remarkable importance to industry and end users. 
This chapter is dedicated to the presentation of an innovative fault injector, 
called DBench-FI, specially designed for dependability benchmarks and whose 
unique characteristics make it the most flexible fault injector available. DBench-FI 
constitutes a central tool in the present study. 
4.1 Introduction 
s mentioned in Chapter 3, reproducibility and the generalization 
are two main properties of dependability benchmarks, which 
support its indispensable acceptability, among other demanding 
requirements. However, in practice, those two properties are very difficult 
to attain, mainly due to the inexistence of especially adequate tools which 
support the experiments. One of those crucial tools is the fault injector. 
Dependability benchmarks must include fault injectors with very specific 
A 
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features: (i) they should be very easy to install and use, without the need 
for any complex setup or installation procedure; (ii) have high level of 
portability;  (iii) have very low intrusiveness; (iv) be capable of injecting 
faults in both user and system spaces; (v) and in code and data segments of 
any process, irrespective of their complexity; (vi) be independent of the 
availability of any source code of any system component or user process; 
(vii) be dynamically linked into a target system; and (viii) be compatible 
with the latest and most advanced software fault models. 
Despite all the developments, none of the existing fault injection tools 
(presented in section 2.4.3) satisfied these requirements, mostly because of 
one or more of the following reasons: 
 The overhead caused by the fault injector is too high; 
 Only user space could be targeted; 
 The fault injector requires the availability of any system 
component or user process (usually, the source code of the target 
application); 
 A special debug mode imposing a particularly launch mode is 
required; 
 Complex installation procedures are required. 
In order to fulfill the mentioned requirements, a new version of the 
DBench-FI fault injector, primarily presented in [Costa et al. 2003], was 
developed. In addition to all the other characteristics that makes this SWIFI 
tool special adequate for dependability benchmarking, DBench-FI is now 
fully compatible with the Generic Software Fault Injection Technique 
(G-SWFIT), the state-of-the-art in software faults model [Durães et al. 2006]. 
Despite this new capability, this new version of DBench-FI still maintains 
its initial characteristics. Namely, it still does not require any special 
installation procedure, contrasting with the majority of the existing SWIFI 
tools, like for instance Xception [Carreira et al. 1998b] (which requires some 
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changes to kernel that have to be done offline). With DBench-FI everything 
is done on-the-fly. 
It is worth noting that the main idea that supports the initial 
development of this fault injector was the creation of a conceptual model 
and an experimental environment for dependability benchmarks (the main 
goal of Project DBench [DBENCH], project in which it was developed), and 
the observation of the inexistence of a fault injector compatible with its 
integration. Therefore, the first version of the DBench-FI fault injector, 
presented in [Costa et al. 2003], uses a very simple error model - it just 
changes the value of memory locations (data segment) of user applications. 
This simple error model was deemed sufficient to demonstrate its ability to 
inject faults, and appropriate for the first versions of the benchmarks, 
particularly if the target areas for injection are carefully chosen, as was 
done in the experiments reported in the mentioned study.  
The new version of DBench-FI, supporting more complex fault 
models like G-SWFIT, was already tested and used in the research work 
presented in [Costa et al. 2009]. The current version targets the Linux OS on 
32 bit Intel processors, and uses a flexible runtime kernel upgrading 
algorithm to allow access to the target process memory space, that can be in 
either user or system space, enabling in this way the injection of faults. 
Presently DBench-FI is, to the best of our knowledge, one of the most 
versatile fault injectors available.  
The next section presents the architecture of the current version of 
DBench-FI, showing the modules that constitute it and the way they 
interact with each other and with the user. The implementation details are 
also presented, as well as some characteristics of operating systems in 
which relies the fault injector tool. 
The methodology used, which forms the basis of the fault injector, 
constitutes the main innovation comparing to the existing SWIFI tools, 
being responsible for the unique characteristics presented by the fault 
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injector. The DBench-FI enables a breakthrough in the areas of fault 
injection and dependability benchmarking, opening new perspectives 
hardly achievable with existing methods. 
4.2 Fault Injector Architecture 
The current version of DBench-FI consists of two modules, as shown 
in Figure 4-1: a fault injector core module and a fault injector controller module. 
 
Figure 4-1 – The DBench-FI fault injector architecture. 
The core module, dynamically linked with the kernel, is responsible for 
implementing the runtime kernel upgrading algorithm in order to add the 
fault injection functionality to the system, independently of any debug 
mode. The new kernel, incorporating this module, provides the user the 
capability of injecting faults into any process (in either data or code 
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segments) running on the target system, including those that are part of the 
operating system itself. The user interface is given by the fault injector 
controller module. It is worth noting that the integration of the fault injector 
core module with the OS kernel enables the injection of faults in the system 
space, in addition to the user space. 
All the information necessary for the fault injection process, such as 
the identification of the target process (through the process pid), the desired 
fault model, the type of faults to be injected (for example, stuck-at-0, 
stuck-at-1, bit-fip, etc.), the target address range, among others, are sent to 
the core module through the fault injector controller module.  
When integrated in a dependability benchmarking, the fault injector 
controller module is responsible for providing the API to the Benchmark 
Management System (BMS), becoming the faultload generator of the 
system. The target system with these two modules (the fault injector core 
module is integrated in the kernel) provides the user the ability to inject 
faults in whatever process that is already in execution, including those that 
are part of the OS itself. 
It should be noticed that there is no restriction on the fact that both 
modules have to reside on the same machine. They may be placed in 
different machines, if necessary for a particular experiment. 
4.3 Fault Injection Design and 
Implementation 
The fault injector has been implemented on an Intel Pentium IV 
system running the Linux RedHat 7.3 (kernel version 2.4.18-3). It has also 
been tested with Linux RedHat 9 (kernel version 2.4.20-8) and Ubuntu 10.04 
(kernel version 2.6.32-31). The dynamic algorithm responsible for the 
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linking of the fault injector with the OS kernel was implemented using 
Linux Loadable kernel Modules (LKMs)7. 
The DBench-FI fault injector is based on common characteristics and 
concepts of modern preemptive multitasking operating systems, which 
explains its high level of portability, not found in other SWIFI tools. For 
reasons that are explained below, two mechanisms of modern operating 
systems are of particular importance in the methodology used by 
DBench-FI: the memory management mechanism, where any process 
running on the system is viewed as having its own memory address space, 
and the process management mechanism, responsible for the 
implementation of the abstraction which consists on the existence of 
multiple processes seemingly running simultaneously, even on systems 
with a single processor. A thorough description of the components and 
mechanisms of the Linux kernel are described in [Mauerer 2008, Kerrisk 
2010, Love 2010]. 
                                                     
 
 
7 Loadable Kernel Modules allow a running operating system kernel to be 
dynamically extended, increasing its flexibility concerning the addition of new hardware 
support or functionality. They are usually used by device drivers and filesystems. Currently, 
most modern Unix-like operating systems, such as Solaris, Linux and FreeBSD use or support 
LKMs. 
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It is worth pointing out that, in Linux, like in all monolithic 
architectures, the operating system functionality is concentrated within the 
kernel. Regarding the architecture of the OS kernel, it should be noticed 
that Linux is considered essentially monolithic8, as it is packed in a single, 
large, binary image, which includes all its subsystems such as process 
management, memory management, file systems, etc., and runs in a single 
address space9. However, at the same time, the Linux kernel is also 
modular, as it supports the dynamic insertion and removal of code from 
itself at runtime, and thus compensating some of the known disadvantages 
of the monolithic kernels10. As a consequence, Linux kernel is not 
                                                     
 
 
8 Despite the Linux kernel incorporates both monolithic and microkernel ideas, it was 
originally developed according the monolithic paradigm in order to avoid the need to 
develop a message passing mechanism and a module loading architecture, and accelerating 
the achievement of a ready-to-run and fully operational OS [Maxwell 2002]. 
9 The great majority of commercial Unix variants are monolithic. Most notable 
exceptions are the Carnegie-Mellon's Mach 3.0, as well as other Unix-like systems based on 
this microkernel, such as the MAC OS X and the GNU Hurd operating systems, which follow 
a microkernel approach [Bovet et al. 2005]. 
10 The supporters of monolithic kernels argue a greater efficiency and performance in 
module communication, made through the direct call of functions (in kernel mode, in same 
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considered a pure monolithic kernel, as it incorporates both monolithic and 
microkernel ideas. 
The kernel function responsible for deciding the next executable task 
that will be dispatched to the CPU, known as schedule, assumes a special 
role in the design of DBench-FI. The schedule function is called in the 
following circumstances: (i) a task yields the processor; (ii) a task blocks in 
an I/O operation; (iii) a task uses up its time slice (quantum); or (iv) a task is 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
address space), when comparing to the overhead caused by the necessary message-passing 
mechanisms that must exist between the various processes of a microkernel. On the other 
hand, microkernel supporters claim that they force system programmers to use “clean” and 
modularized programming approaches, which leads to an improved ease of development of 
new system modules. Other benefits of the microkernel architecture are the dynamic 
extensibility of the kernel and the ability to swap kernel components at runtime, and, 
consequently, a more efficient use of the system memory, since the modules are only loaded 
when they are actually required. These characteristics support the increased flexibility, 
portability and maintainability of microkernels design when compared to the monolithic 
variants. 
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preempted by another task (with higher priority11). Figure 4-2 gives a 
common view of the Linux kernel architecture, focusing on the interaction 
between applications, scheduler and hardware. 
Concerning the design and implementation of DBench-FI, another 
important characteristic is the Linux memory management system, which 
is made-up to be architecture independent. As any modern multitasking 
operating system, the Linux kernel provides memory protection 
mechanisms (vital to the system stability), which prevent any attempt, on 
behalf of a user process, of illegitimate access to a memory area that 
belongs to another user process or to the kernel itself. Moreover, any user 
process running on the target system is regarded as having its own virtual 
                                                     
 
 
11 Although the Linux kernel is preemptive (user mode processes may always be 
interrupted), there are some kernel critical regions which cannot be preempted by the 
scheduler until its execution ends. For this reason the Linux kernel is said to provide soft 
real-time behavior (its kernel tries to schedule applications within timing deadlines, 
although it may not always get it). Usually, fully preemptive kernels are associated with 
hard real-time operating systems, since they ensure the compliance with very stringent 
timing requirements for scheduling. 
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memory address space12, which includes its code, data and stack areas. A 
representation of a user process address space in Linux is shown in Figure 
4-3. It is worth noting that the kernel is mapped in the address space of 
every process, in the top area of its memory address space (from 
TASK_SIZE13 to 232 or 264, in IA-32 systems or IA-64 systems, respectively). 
                                                     
 
 
12 Virtual memory is referred as the practice of lying to processes about the real 
(physical) addresses at which they reside. To each user process is given the illusion that its 
address space always starts at 0 and extends from there. It is worth noting that some purists 
differentiate the concept of virtual memory from the notion of “disk-as-memory”. In fact, 
although the virtual memory is usually associated with swapping and paging techniques, it 
can be, in sensu stricto, differentiated from them (the latest techniques refer the OS ability of 
blending primary and secondary storage, providing to processes the use all of its memory as 
if it were always available): an OS can give each process a logical address space without 
making any association between primary and secondary storage [Maxwell 2002].  
13 In Linux, every user process has its own virtual address space ranging from 0 to 
TASK_SIZE (an architecture specific constant defined as a kernel symbol, which represents 
the maximum size that a user process can access in bytes, i.e., since the space address always 
starts at 0, it assumes the  maximum address that a user process can access+1). On IA-32 
systems, for instance, the TASK_SIZE assumes the value of 3 GiB (i.e., 3 × 230 bytes). 
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Figure 4-2 – The Linux operating system architecture. 
Concerning the mapped regions, for a correct understanding of the 
interconnection of the fault injector and the memory management functions 
of the OS kernel, it is important to point out the most significant differences 
that they have with each other. The code segment, referred as Process Code 
in Figure 4-3, is write-protected and shared by all processes that execute the 
code it contains. This represents a significant difference when compared to 
the remaining areas (data and stack), which are private to each process and 
where writing is allowed. Another fundamental distinction between the 
code area and the data and stack areas relates to the fact that the first 
cannot be dynamically reserved. In fact, a Linux user process can 
dynamically allocate three types of memory: stack, heap and mmaped
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memory14. A thorough description of the components and mechanisms of 
the Linux kernel are described in [Mauerer 2008, Kerrisk 2010, Love 2010]. 
As already mentioned, the DBench-FI was initially developed for the 
purpose of injecting faults in the memory address space of a given process. 
In its first version, presented in [Costa et al. 2003], it is possible to inject 
stuck-at-0, stuck-at-1, and bit-flip type of faults in the data segment of any 
user process (as well as on its stack area). Thereafter, it was added the 
ability to inject faults in the code segment of any process, as well as the 
possibility of the injected faults that assume a user defined value through a 
fault information file, as depicted in Figure 4-1 – The DBench-FI fault 
injector architecture. In the context of the software fault emulation, the 
                                                     
 
 
14 The range of valid virtual addresses of a process can change throughout its 
lifetime, as the kernel allocates and deallocates memory according to its needs. A process 
can allocate memory by increasing the size of the heap - raising the program break (the 
current limit of the heap), through the use of the brk() and sbrk() system calls (upon which 
the well-known malloc functions are based). A process can also create and free memory 
mappings into its virtual address space, using the mmap() and munmap() system calls, 
respectively. The process stack dynamically grows and shrinks as functions are called and 
returned. Special process registers are used for this purpose, as explained later on this 
chapter. 
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possibility of using this new type of faults, together with the possibility of 
targeting the code segment of any process, enables the use of more 
representative fault models. In fact, these improvements provided the 
compatibility of DBench-FI with the state-of-the-art in software faults 
model – the mentioned G-SWFIT, presented in [Durães et al. 2006]. 
 
Figure 4-3 – The process virtual address space in IA-32 systems. 
It is worth noting that, as expected, these latest enhancements did not 
involve any change in the methodology or in the model of the fault injector. 
It should be also emphasized that, in consequence of the possible share of 
the code segment across multiple processes, the faults injected in that area 
may affect the behavior of all processes which share that region. 
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Concerning the design and implementation of DBench-FI, as one of 
the goals of DBench-FI consists on injecting faults in the address space of 
any process, including the operating system kernel itself, two different 
solutions were initially considered, both based in a new process running in 
kernel mode: 
 The interception of the OS scheduler and the detection of the 
target process in order to access its virtual address space. It is 
worth noting that the virtual address space of a process is only 
available when that same process is chosen by the schedule 
function to use the CPU; 
 Access the memory area of the target process through the lookup 
of the corresponding page table entries used by the memory 
management system of the OS. It is worth pointing out that the 
OS kernel maintains a page table for each process, in order to map 
the virtual addresses of a process to the corresponding physical 
addresses. 
Reasons of clarity, elegance and portability, justified the choice for the 
interception of the OS scheduler (the first solution considered). In order to 
detect the time when the target process was chosen to use the CPU, and its 
virtual memory address space is available for the injection of faults, the 
DBench-FI dynamically intercepts and changes the OS schedule function. 
The required fault can then be injected. 
In a first step, the address of the kernel schedule function is found, and 
then redirected to a new function called new_schedule, responsible for both 
the target process detection and the fault injection. The memory address 
where the schedule function resides is determined through a search in the
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Linux file /proc/ksyms15, which contains a list of every symbol that is 
exported by the OS kernel (known as kernel symbol table)16. This 
methodology presents a higher degree of portability across different 
versions and distributions of the Linux OS, when compared, for example, 
with the memory pattern search algorithm used in the first version of the 
fault injector [Costa et al. 2003]. However, this approach requires that the 
used kernel supports LKMs, which are, however, also required for the 
dynamic installation of the Fault Injector Core Module. Moreover, 
considering the benefits of the dynamic extensibility of the kernel, typical 
of the microkernel architectures, most of the current Linux kernels and 
distributions are compiled with this option enabled, which is indeed 
considered as default. It is important to mention that the used methodology 
requires supervisor privileges, since both the accesses to the LKMs features 
and to the /dev/ksyms file demands it for security reasons. 
                                                     
 
 
15 The Linux file /proc/ksyms is created on-the-fly when the kernel boots up. For Linux 
kernels version 2.6, and above, the /proc/ksyms file was replaced by /proc/kallsyms.  
16 The file /boot/system.map could also be used for this purpose, since it contains all 
symbols used by the kernel. However, this file is usually used for debugging purposes and, 
sometimes, it is not available (as it is not required for the OS booting process). 
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The procedure used by DBench-FI is illustrated in Figure 4-4 and 
consists of the following steps: 
1) Determine the runtime address of the schedule kernel function on 
the OS kernel symbols table; 
2) Copy the first nine bytes of the kernel schedule function 
(represented by instructions A, B and C in Figure 4-4) to a new 
function called saved_instructions; 
3) Generate a jump instruction with the runtime address of the 
new_schedule function (where the target process detection and the 
fault injection will take place) and overwrite the first bytes of 
schedule code with the generated jump instruction;  
4) Create a jump instruction in order to execute the saved nine bytes 
of the kernel schedule function (saved in step (2) to 
saved_instructions) after the execution of new_schedule; 
5) Create a jump instruction in order to execute the rest of the 
original schedule function code (from the 10th byte forward of the 
original schedule function). 
It should be noticed that, considering the methodology used by the 
fault injector, as well as the implementation of the new_schedule function in 
a high level language (C language), it is fundamental to restore the stack 
after the identification of the target process and before the jump (step 4) to 
the original schedule instructions (saved in saved_instructions). Such need is 
justified for the following two reasons: 
1. The compiler, according to the calling conventions, automatically 
creates a prologue and an epilogue, which allows the use of the 
stack for passing data between the caller code and the called 
subprogram; 
Software Fault Injector  101 
 
 
2. The function new_schedule is finished with a jump to 
saved_instructions (step 4) instead of using the conventional 
epilogue17. 
It should also be noticed that when the fault injector kernel module is 
loaded, the policy and the main algorithm of the original operating system 
scheduler remains the same. Additionally, when it is unloaded or removed, 
the redirections that were made are undone and the scheduler becomes 
exactly the original. 
Concerning the intrusiveness, it is important to enhance that when 
the fault injector is loaded but no faults are injected, the performance 
penalty corresponds to ten machine assembly instructions that were added 
in order to intercept and redirect the scheduler. This fact guarantees a very 
low and totally negligible intrusiveness, considering the current processors. 
 
                                                     
 
 
17 The x86 family processors have two general-purpose registers in order to 
manipulate data on the stack: the ESP and the EBP. While the first register points to the top 
of the stack, the second is used to reference data on the stack. At the end of a subprogram, 
the original values of the registers are restored (they are previously saved at the start of the 
subprogram). Detailed information about the stack and the calling conventions are 
presented in [Carter 2006] 
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Figure 4-4 – The DBench-FI fault injector methodology. 
 
4.4 Using the DBench-FI 
The DBench-FI fault injector consists of two main files: dbfi_drv.o and 
dbfi_controller, corresponding to the Fault Injector Core Module and to the 
Fault Injection Controller, respectively. The use of the Dbench-FI fault 
injector involves two steps: 
1. Loading the Fault Injector Core Module using the facilities provided 
by the LKMs; 
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2. Executing the Fault Injection Controller, providing the required 
parameters for the fault injection campaign through a command 
line with the following syntax: 
dbfi_controller [{target_pid start_addr end_addr 
nbytes init_t reg_t maxfi type | –f filename 
| -gswfit filename fi_num}] 
The command dbfi_controller can be executed by itself, without any 
argument. Thereby, all the fault injection parameters will be provided in an 
interactive way.  
Though, the fault injection parameters can also be specified in the 
command line, through arguments, using the syntax: 
dbfi_controller target_pid start_addr end_addr 
nbytes init_t reg_t maxfi type 
The command arguments are explained below: 
 target_pid: Identifier (pid) of the target process. Zero indicates that 
the fault will be injected in the kernel address space – one of the 
mentioned requirements; 
 start_addr: Initial address (virtual) of a contiguous memory block 
that will be a potential target of fault injection. It should belong to 
the set of virtual addresses actually used by the target process 
(indicated in target_pid). Otherwise, in the case of any of these 
memory addresses actually be the target of fault injection (see the 
explanation of nbytes bellow), an appropriate error message will 
be sent to the user, referring that the address is not in use by the 
specified process; 
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 end_addr: End address (virtual) of a contiguous memory block 
that will be a potentially target of fault injection.  As in the 
previous case, it should belong to the set of virtual addresses 
actually used by the target process (indicated in target_pid). 
Otherwise, an appropriate message will be sent to the user, as 
explained for start_addr; 
 nbytes: Number of bytes, within the specified memory block (from 
start_addr to end_addr), that will be actually targeted by the fault 
injection campaign. Zero indicates that the entire block will be 
actually targeted, i.e., from start_addr to end_addr. If the value 
specified is less that the number of bytes of the memory block 
defined by start_addr and end_addr, a random location of 
contiguous nbytes within that memory block will be used as the 
actual target; 
 init_t: Time, in seconds, that will elapse before the first fault 
injection take place; 
 reg_t: The frequency of fault injection, in seconds. Zero indicates 
the use of temporal random fault injection triggers. A value of 𝑛, 
other than zero, indicates an interval of 𝑛 seconds between fault 
injections; 
 maxfi: Maximum number of fault injections; 
 type: Type of faults that will be injected in the virtual address 
space of the target process. Values of 0, 1 or bf, indicate stuck-at-0, 
stuck-at-1, and bit-flip, respectively. 
Concerning the fault triggers used by the DBench-FI, considering the 
options provided by the Fault Injection Controller, and more specifically, 
thought its init_t and reg_t arguments, the activation of the fault injection is 
based on temporal trigger conditions. This fact ensures the independence of 
the injected faults with respect to any specific activity of the target 
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application. Related to temporal fault triggers, two options are available in 
this implementation: a fault is injected once after a given time is elapsed 
since the application starts (using the init_t parameter), or a fault is 
repeatedly injected with a certain frequency (using the reg_t parameter 
with nonzero value). Temporal triggers that are randomly chosen (enabled 
with reg_t equal to zero) are particularly adequate to benchmarking, as they 
enable statistically significant results to be obtained. This way, regarding 
trigger conditions, two options are available: 
1. The fault is injected only once (with maxfi equal to one), after a 
certain time, in seconds, set by the user thorugh the argument 
init_t; 
2. The fault is injected repeatedly, after a given initial time (in init_t), 
in a certain frequency, random or user specified (with reg_t equal 
to zero or given it a nonzero value, respectively). 
The parameters used for the definition of the fault injection campaign 
can also be specified in a text file (as showed in Figure 4-1) with the 
following format (all the parameters must be in the order shown, separated 
by space characters): 
target_pid start_addr end_addr nbytes init_t reg_t maxfi type 
In this case, the syntax should be 
dbfi_controller –f filename 
where filename is the name of the mentioned text file. 
As explained, the current version of DBench-FI is also compatible 
with the state-of-the-art G-SWFIT software faults model [Durães et al. 2006]. 
In order to use this feature, the following syntax should be used: 
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dbfi_controller –gswfit filename fi_num 
where filename is the name of a G-SWFIT format file containing the full set 
of software faults that can be injected in a system and fi-num is the number 
of the software fault that will actually be injected in the target system. 
The identified file consists of a text file with one software fault per 
line. The specification of each software fault consists on an asterisk 
terminated string, with the corresponding fault injection parameters 
separated by commas, according to the following format: 
Type, Level, Arg3, Inj_Method, Addr, Nr_Bytes, Orig_Bytes, New_Bytes, 
# Comment1 # # Comment2 # … # Comment n #,* 
The listed parameters have the following meaning: 
 Type: Identifies the type of the software fault according the 
G-SWFIT model [Durães et al. 2006]. It can assume values like 
MIFS, MFC, MIA, etc.; 
 Level: Concerning the level of depth of the G-SWFIT pattern 
search in each target software component or module. Level zero 
indicates that the pattern will only be performed directly on the 
target code. Level one indicates that the pattern search will be 
performed on the target code and on functions that are called by 
them. And so on. It is worth pointing out that level zero was used 
for the purposes of the current work. Greater values would lead 
to the repetition of some fault injection experiments and, 
consequently, to a non-homogenous distribution of faults, which 
will be inadequate in the context of this study; 
 Arg3: Used for compatibility with the G-SWFIT faultload output 
file format. It represents the number of contiguous blocks of bytes 
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that would be changed by fault injection. According to the 
G-SWFIT methodology it should be equal to one; 
 Inj_Method: Used for compatibility with the G-SWFIT faultload 
file format. Regarding the G-SWFIT model it should be set to 
SUBS (indicating that a block of bytes will be substituted by 
another, according to the low-level code mutations defined by the 
set of operators of the G-SWFIT methodology); 
 Addr: The start address (hexadecimal) of the block of bytes that 
will be the target of the low-level code mutation for the emulation 
of the software fault according to the G-SWFIT methodology; 
 Nr_Bytes: The number of bytes of the block that will be the target 
of the low-level code mutation for the emulation of the software 
fault, according to the G-SWFIT methodology; 
 Orig_Bytes: The original bytes (hexadecimal) of the target that will 
mutated using the set of low-level operators for software fault 
emulation, according to the G-SWFIT methodology; 
 New_Bytes: The new bytes (hexadecimal) that will be injected in 
the block defined by Addr and Nr_Bytes, according to the 
low-level operators of the G-SWFIT methodology. 
The last section of the line, between the last pair of commas, is 
intended for posting comments, which are useful to increase human 
readability. In that section, each comment should be inserted between a 
pair of hash characters. The following line shows an example of a real 
G-SWFIT software fault specification: 
MIFS,0,1,SUBS,c0106ed0,2,7402,EB02,# je c0106ed4 # # MIFS c0106e60 
<machine_real_restart_R3da1b07a>) #,* 
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In this case, a MIFS (missing if statement) is emulated at address 
0xc0106ed0, substituting the bytes 7402 by EB02. The comments indicate 
that the original machine code instruction is je c0106ed4 located at function 
machine_real_restart, whose start address lies on 0xc0106e60. 
However, for an additional simplification of the process of installing 
and using the fault injector, it was created a script called DBenchFI. It is 
responsible for the loading and removal of the Fault Injector Core Module 
and the execution of the Fault Injection Controller, plus offering the 
possibility of identification of the target process by name and user to which 
it belongs. The syntax used is as follows: 
DBenchFI [{-n|-p}] target_proc [-u user_id] 
start_addr end_addr nbytes init_t reg_t maxfi 
type  
DBenchFI –f filename  
DBenchFI -gswfit filename fi_num 
DBenchFI -e 
The options and arguments of the script DBenchFI have the following 
meaning: 
-n The identification of the target process is done through the 
process name. That is, target_proc indicates the name of the target 
process. 
-p The identification of the target process is done through the 
process pid, given in target_proc (default option). 
-u Indicates that the target process belongs to the user 
mentioned in user_id. It is useful for resolving the ambiguity caused by 
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the existence of multiple users running the same process target. In the 
case that there is no univocal correspondence between target_proc and a 
particular target process, even after the specification of the user through 
user_id, the oldest process will be chosen (using the process creation date 
to resolve the ambiguity). 
-e Used for removing the Fault Injector Core Module. 
All the remaining arguments have direct correspondence with their 
homonymous for the Fault Injector Core Module, dbfi_controller, and have the 
same mentioned meaning. 
4.5 Advantages 
The methodology used in the design of DBench-FI confers it a 
number of important advantages (compared to the other existing fault 
injectors) regarding its inclusion in a dependability benchmark. Since the 
methodology it relies on is based on the interception the OS kernel 
scheduler and its redirection to a function that is within the kernel itself, 
DBench-FI is appropriate for the injection of faults into any system memory 
address, including the kernel memory segment. This capability makes this 
fault injector suitable to analyze the kernel robustness under faults, and 
represents a huge advantage comparatively to the ptrace-based SWIFI tools. 
Another important benefit relatively to the fault injectors based on the 
ptrace mechanism is that DBench-FI can inject faults into any running target 
application without having to load it explicitly or using any special 
procedure to execute it. It is worth noting that the fault injectors based on 
this function, like in any other debug tool, only allows the injection of faults 
in the user segment of target processes that they can explicitly launch. That 
is, DBench-FI allows the fault injection in processes that are already 
running when the fault injector is installed, regardless of the complexity of 
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the application they are part of. This is an essential requirement to analyze 
the dependability of complex systems like DBMSs and web-servers.  
An important issue with SWIFI tools is their portability to other 
systems and processors. The proposed methodology can be, with some 
minor changes, adapted to almost any operating system and processor. A 
further advantage is the simplicity and ease of use of DBench-FI, since it 
does not require any special procedure. In particular, there is no need to 
recompile the kernel or the target application, nor the knowledge of the 
source code of any of them. Concerning intrusiveness, the presented 
methodology provides the fault injector a negligible disturbance factor on 
the target system. 
The compatibility of DBench-FI with the G-SWFIT technique [Durães 
et al. 2006] is an important characteristic of this fault injector. This fact 
represents a major advantage when compared to other existing SWIFI tools, 
as, like stated in [Madeira et al. 2000, Jarboui et al. 2002], this kind of tools are 
not an obvious choice for the emulation of software faults. 
4.6 Limitations 
The main limitation of DBench-FI, besides the general SWIFI 
limitations described in section 2.4.2, is the limited set of fault models 
supported. This is not a limitation of the technique itself, but just of the 
current implementation, as the compatibility with the G-SWFIT model was 
considered more important for dependability benchmarking. However, if 
necessary, DBench-FI can easily be extended with the majority of the 
existing fault models of Xception [Carreira et al. 1998b], such as spatial fault 
triggers and the capability to inject faults in processor resources. 
Another obvious limitation of the presented technique is the fact that 
supervisor level privileges are required to install and use the fault injection 
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tool, as operating system security rules understandably prevent user level 
processes from modifying the kernel. 
It is worth to pointing out that, beyond the intrinsic restrictions that 
applies to the SWIFI tools, no other limitation is related to the used 
methodology, but rather with the current implementation of the fault 
injector. 
4.7 Summary 
Despite all the developments in the area of software fault injection, 
none of the existing SWIFI tools has characteristics compatible with the 
creation of a dependability benchmark. 
This chapter presented a pioneering SWIFI tool, named DBench-FI, 
whose innovative features allow its use in dependably benchmarks. Its 
architecture and implementation details are also described, as happens to 
some features of operating systems and processors in which its 
development is based. Their unique characteristics make it one of the most 
versatile fault injectors available and a central tool for the study presented 
in this thesis. 
The current version of DBench-FI is adequate for the injection of 
hardware faults (intermittent and transient faults) into the systems 
memory, as well as for software faults, according to the G-SWFIT model.  
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Chapter 5  
5 Software Faultload for Large and 
Complex Systems 
This chapter describes the problem of injecting realistic software faults in large and 
complex systems and puts into perspective the still open problem of the faultload 
size. It surveys the existing approaches that address this issue, discussing their 
strengths and limitations. Finally, it presents and provides and early assessment of 
an innovative experimental framework to define and evaluate different strategies 
for the definition of compact and representative faultloads. In this context, different 
hypothesis for the reduction of the number of software fault injection experiments 
are defined and an evaluation method of the error induced by the corresponding 
reduction is also presented. The proposed methodology is especially useful in large 
and complex systems, where dependability benchmarks usually take several months 
or even years due to its large faultload size. 
5.1 Introduction 
ne of the main goals of dependability benchmarks is to offer 
practical and efficient methods to characterize the behavior of 
components and systems and quantify dependability measures, O 
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considering the computing effort, the number of experiments and the time 
to run the benchmark. 
Concerning software systems, most recent techniques such as 
G-SWFIT, firstly presented in [Durães et al. 2003b], and later in [Durães et al. 
2006], use a set of operators for software fault emulation through low-level 
code mutations derived from an extensive collection of real software faults 
found in field. Although this innovative proposal emulates and represents 
real programming errors and application bugs, the sets of faults they 
generate tends to have a huge size, as it obviously happens with the 
resulting software faultload. This imposes a strong limitation to the 
execution of dependability benchmarks in software systems, especially in 
large and complex systems, where, in order to assure the necessary 
representativeness, the execution time of those benchmarks can take 
months or years due the mentioned faultload size. In fact, the great 
majority of studies on representativeness of software faults, mentioned in 
the previous chapter, just addressed the problem of finding realistic 
software fault models and ignored the important problem of the faultload 
size. 
5.2 Fault distribution models 
Despite some recent studies on software fault injection addressed the 
problem of finding realistic fault models, the problem of how to distribute 
the faults among different components in target systems have barely been 
discussed. Some recent studies on software fault injection use exhaustive 
fault coverage for small software components, injecting all the possible 
software faults, yet the most representative types, [Durães et al. 2004a, 
Durães et al. 2004b, Costa et al. 2009, Natella et al. 2013]. However, more 
sophisticated fault distribution models are needed when dealing with large 
components and systems, such as operating systems.  
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Large components and systems induce huge size faultloads, due to 
the vast number of possible software fault types and target locations, which 
could make impractical the fault injection campaign. For example, the 
software fault injection campaign carried out in the present work, 
presented in chapter 6 (Experimental Evaluation of Faultload Reduction 
Strategies), encompasses tens of thousands of software faults and resulted 
in more than two years of fault injection experiments. That problem, one of 
the currently most important issues in fault injection, and particularly in 
the area of software faults, has been largely neglected in the literature. 
Some exceptions are presented below. 
A similar problem arose earlier in mutation testing, where the large 
number of experiments, induced by the large number of mutants that need 
to be compiled and executed against test cases, especially in large and 
complex systems, soon became a barrier to the practical use of this 
technique in identifying adequate test data. It is worth noting that, 
although there is evidence on the use of the mutation testing technique in 
increasingly larger programs, those empirical studies applied only a few 
mutations operators [Jia et al. 2011]. In fact, in order to turn the mutation 
testing into a practical testing technique, and reduce the high 
computational cost of executing the huge number of mutants against a test 
set, several studies only use a subset of the potential mutants for a given 
program, representing a subset of all the possible faults, expecting that 
these will be sufficient to simulate all faults. 
Several approaches on the selection of a sufficient set of mutation 
operators were presented. Traditional approaches target only a few simple 
faults, constructed from several simple syntactical changes, which are close 
to the correct version of the program. This theory is based on two empirical 
principles first introduced by [DeMillo et al. 1978]: the Competent 
Programmer Hypothesis, and the Coupling Effect. The first principle states 
that programmers are competent and, consequently, they develop 
programs that tend to be close to the correct versions, as a result of their 
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multiple iterations through the software development process. On the other 
hand, the Coupling Effect states that test cases able to detect mutated 
programs differing from a correct one only by a simple error (fault), are so 
sensitive that they also implicitly detect more complex errors. In other 
words, it assumes a principle observed in real world programs, which 
states that complex errors are coupled to simple errors.  
Another simple technique for the reduction of the number of mutants 
is the mutant sampling. It consists in the selection of randomly chosen 
mutants from the entire set. Many empirical studies addressed this 
approach, analyzing the appropriate random selection rate, and minimal 
sample size, that should be used in order to maintain its usefulness 
[DeMillo et al. 1988, Sahinoglu et al. 1990, King et al. 1991]. 
The reduction in the number of mutants through the reduction of the 
applied number of mutation operators was firstly proposed as Constrained 
Mutation, by [Mathur 1991]. The methodology consists in the reduction of 
the mutation operators set by omitting those that generate most of the 
mutants, since many of which may turn out to be redundant [Offutt et al. 
1993, Offutt et al.  1996]18. Another type of selection strategy, based on test 
effectiveness, is presented in [Wong et al. 1995]. 
                                                     
 
 
18 In [Offutt et al. 1993, Offutt et al. 1996] the method was called Selective Mutation. 
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In [Mresa et al. 1999] is used a heuristic based on scores and costs 
assigned to each mutation operators to choose a subset of operators for use 
in efficient selective mutation testing. This study takes into account both 
the costs of the test set generation and of the detection of equivalent 
mutants. The experiments carried out show that it is possible to reduce the 
number of equivalent mutants while maintaining the effectiveness. 
A guideline for the determination of a sufficient set of mutation 
operators for C programs is presented in [Barbosa et al. 2001]. The results 
show that set of operators can be reduced by about 65%, while maintaining 
a mean mutation score of 99.6%. 
The studies presented in [Namin et al. 2006, Namin et al. 2007, Namin 
et al. 2008] use a statistical analysis procedure together with an associated 
linear model that predicts mutation adequacy with high accuracy, to 
address the problem of finding an adequate small set of mutation 
operators. The results presented in [Namin et al. 2008] indicated the 
identification of a subset of mutation operators that generates less than 8% 
of the mutants generated by the full set, consisting in the highest rate of 
reduction when compared to the other approaches. 
A different approach to improve the testing effectiveness is proposed 
in [Sridharan et al. 2010]. This work presents a Bayesian approach that 
prioritizes mutation operators whose mutants are likely to remain “hard-
to-kill” by the existing test suites. 
Regarding software fault injection, the use of a dependence analysis 
approach to reduce the number of experiments necessary to test the 
robustness of COTS is presented in [Moraes et al. 2005a]. This work extends 
the one presented in [Moraes et al. 2004], where the idea of architecture 
relevance for testing a COTS-based system was firstly presented. The 
proposed strategy is based on chaining [Stafford et al. 1997] - a software 
architecture dependence analysis technique aimed to reduce the portions of 
a system architecture that must be analyzed for some purpose, such as 
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testing or debugging. The approach is applied for testing a COTS database 
component called Ozone [Ozone], an Object-Oriented Database 
Management System (OODMS), executing the OO7 Benchmark Wisconsin 
[Carey et al. 1993, Zyl et al. 2006], a well-known benchmark used to evaluate 
OODBMS performance. This work concludes that the dependency analysis 
was effective in helping the selection of the target classes. 
The use of stratified sampling to reduce the amount of fault injections 
needed to test the robustness of the system without losing the confidence in 
the results is presented in [Moraes et al. 2005b]. Stratified sampling consists 
of a sample technique for partitioning a population into subpopulations 
called strata, by grouping elements with similar values for one or more 
characteristics [Podgurski et al. 1993]. This work uses the Weighted Methods 
per Class19 (WMC) [Chidamdber et al. 1991], to determine the strata. For the 
mentioned purposes two different strata are considered in this study: one 
for components with a WMC value greater than a pre-specified threshold 
value, obtained in an experimental study with several real world classes 
[Rosenberg et al. 2000], and the other for lower WMC values than the same 
                                                     
 
 
19 Weighted Methods per Class is an object oriented software complexity metric that consists on 
the sum of the complexities of all methods defined in a class. It represents the complexity of 
a class as a whole and can be used to indicate the level of time and effort required to 
develop and maintain a particular class. 
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threshold. Results show that the exclusive use of the WMC metric is 
insufficient to choose the strata and other stratification criteria should be 
used for robustness testing purposes. 
A field data study on the use of software metrics to define 
representative fault distributions for software fault injection experiments is 
presented in [Moraes et al. 2006a]. The proposed methodology uses software 
complexity metrics and logistic regression [Hosmer et al. 1989] to estimate 
fault densities for each one of the modules of the target system and to 
distribute the injected faults. Seven software complexity metrics are used in 
this work: Lines of Code (LOC)20 (comment lines were not considered for 
the current purposes), Cyclomatic Complexity21 [McCabe 1976], number of 
function parameters, number of function return statements, Maximum 
Nesting Depth22, Program Length23 and Vocabulary Size24 (the last two 
                                                     
 
 
20 Lines of Code is one of the earliest and easiest (and also controversial) measures of software 
complexity. It consists on the count of the lines of the software’s source code.  
21 Cyclomatic Complexity is a measure of module’s independent control paths based on the 
mathematical graph theory. It is one of the most widely-accepted software complexity 
metrics.  
22 Maximum Nesting Depth measures the maximum indentation depth of module’s source 
code (e.g., in C language measures how deep is the maximum { } nesting in the module) 
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metrics are part of a broader suite of metrics known as Halstead’s Software 
Science Metrics or Halstead Metrics [Halstead 1977], and more precisely, 
represent two of the four equations needed to compute the Halstead’s 
Programming Effort complexity measure). This study uses the G-SWFIT 
technique [Durães et al. 2006] in order to scan the target system code and 
identify all possible locations for the injection of each type of software 
faults, identified as being representative of real software bugs found in 
field. Table 5-1 shows the software fault types considered in the study 
presented in [Moraes et al. 2006a]. The accuracy of the fault distribution 
generated by proposed methodology was compared with real fault 
distributions observed in field, which includes over more than 350 bug 
reports available from open source software projects. The study concludes 
that the used approach is consistent with field observations, for small and 
medium size software modules. Regarding large and complex software 
modules, the fault density observed in field data showed to be lower than 
the estimated by the proposed methodology. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
23 Program Length is the count of total number of operators and operands in a module. 
24 Vocabulary Size is the count of total number of distinct operators and distinct operands in a 
module. 
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Defect type Examples of code mistake 
Missing 
variable initialization (MVIV) 
variable assignment using a value (MVAV) 
variable assignment using an expression (MVAE) 
“if (cond)” surrounding statements (MIA) 
“AND expr” in expression used as a branch condition (MLAC) 
function call (MFC) 
“if (cond) { statement(s) }” (MIFS) 
“if (cond) statement(s) else” before statement(s) (MIEB) 
small and localized part on the algorithm (MLPC) 
functionality (MFCT) 
Wrong 
value assigned to variable (WVAV) 
logical expression used as a branch condition (WLEC) 
arithmetic expression in parameter of function call (WAEP) 
variable used in parameter of function call (WPFV) 
algorithm – large modification (WALL) 
data types or conversion used (WSUT) 
Extraneous variable assignment using another variable (EVAV) 
Table 5-1 – Software fault types considered in [Moraes et al. 2006a]. 
Despite having a different purpose (to improve the 
representativeness of the faultload generated by the G-SWFIT approach), 
the research work presented in [Natella et al. 2013], as already mentioned, 
also proposes a methodology to generate a smaller and refined faultload by 
removing the faults that are not representative of residual faults. 
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5.3 Experimental framework 
A representative faultload must be one that contains faults that 
represent the common programming bugs that escape the traditional 
software testing phases and still persist in existent software products. 
Although the faultload definition of that kind of faults had already been 
proposed, based on fault operators derived from the most frequent 
software fault types found in the field [Durães et al. 2006], the fault 
locations aspects have been completely neglected and the choice of 
adequate fault injection targets (i.e., actual software components where the 
faults are injected) is still an open and crucial issue.  
Given a particular software fault type, existing techniques, like 
G-SWFIT, allow the injection of faults in every software module or routine 
with a specific code pattern, emulating a particular type of software fault. 
However, the common large number of possible target components for 
fault injection leads to a huge number of possible software faults to be 
injected. Additionally, considering the time of each experiment (typically, 
the system should be restarted before injecting a new fault), one can easily 
observe that, in practice, it is impossible to run and test all the fault 
injection possibilities. This problem is even more obvious in large and 
complex systems, where the execution time of those dependability 
benchmarks can take several months or even years due the mentioned 
faultload size. 
One of the main goals of this work is to define a method to reduce the 
number of software fault injection target locations and thus the number of 
experiments needed to execute a dependability benchmark, without 
restricting or limiting the accuracy and the representativeness of its results.  
This methodology provides a way to perform accurate dependability 
benchmarks for large and complex systems, including COTS, which 
currently does not exist. 
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The proposed experimental framework is based on the definition of a 
strategy to guide the fault injection target selection and to reduce the 
number of software faults required for a dependability benchmark, or for 
an experimental evaluation using software fault injection. It consists of the 
following steps, based on two complete software fault injection 
experiments with two completely different systems, considering their 
complexity and the required computer resources of each one: 
 Define different hypothesis for the reduction of the number of 
software faults to inject (for example, select a subset of faults at 
random and inject only those faults, inject faults only in the code 
of functions with greater lines of code, etc.). 
 Evaluate each hypothesis in order to determine the best strategy 
to reduce the number of faults to inject with the minimum error 
possible, comparing the results obtained with the total fault set. 
 Propose practical guidelines for the definition of faultloads with a 
number of faults that can be used in practice (instead of faultloads 
with thousands of faults that would take months to be injected). 
A fundamental aspect of this approach is the clear separation 
between the fault injection target component and the system under 
observation, avoiding the problem of changing the system that is under 
evaluation. That is, the faults are injected in the FIT, with the goal of 
evaluating their impact on the rest of the system, the BT. Both the FIT and 
the BT are part of the SUB, a larger system that, from the benchmark point 
of view, consists in a set of processing units needed to run the workload. 
Another key element of the proposed framework is the Benchmark 
Management System (BMS), which includes a component, called the 
Benchmark Controller (BC), responsible for the control of all the aspects of 
the benchmark experiments: workload submission, software fault injection, 
coordination and synchronization of the several components involved in 
the experiments and collecting the information needed to process the 
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benchmark measures. Another component of the BMS is the Benchmark 
Client through which the BC sends and controls the workload execution on 
the BT (Figure 5-1). 
 
Figure 5-1 – Experimental Architecture. 
5.3.1 Preliminary assessment study 
In order to validate the proposed framework, an initial experimental study 
was carried out using the G-SWFIT fault model [Durães et al. 2006] and an 
early version of DBench-FI fault injector tool, especially designed and 
developed for dependability benchmarking (the current version of this tool 
was presented in chapter 4). This exploratory study on the guide of the 
fault injection target selection to reduce the number of faults required for 
the execution of dependability benchmarks is presented in [Costa et al. 
2009]. It consists in the injection of software faults in the kernel code of the 
OS system calls used by two different benchmark target systems: (i) a 
web-server benchmark based on the SPECweb99 industry standard 
performance benchmark for web-servers [SPEC], extended with faultload 
and dependability measures (failure modes); and (ii) a client-server 
application to sort large-scale integer vectors, based on a Multithreaded 
Quicksort algorithm, extended with performance and quality metrics. This 
last system mainly serves as a control application and as a comparison 
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system, as it has some completely different requirements concerning to 
computer resources. 
Four each BT system, there were analyzed four different hypotheses 
for the reduction of the number of faults to inject: 
 Lines of code (LOC) of each targeted system call. It is worth 
noting that the analyzed LOCs were in machine code and thus 
some well-known restrictions, that are generally applied to this 
size oriented metric, like language and programmer dependence, 
no longer make sense in this context; 
 The CPU time (CPUt) spent running in the kernel for each system 
call, relative to the SUB operating system, obtained during a 
normal execution, i.e. without any fault injection; 
 The number of calls (NrCalls) made by the OS to each one of the 
system calls considered, during a normal execution of the system 
workload; 
 A random selection of the software faults from the full set of 
faults, forming a subset of faults according to a uniform 
distribution. 
The used approach consists of two phases as depicted in Figure 5-2:  
 A Pre-Injection Phase, in which the benchmark is executed in 
order to identify the OS system calls used by the BT. The 
G-SWFIT faultload generator (software tool provided by the 
author of the study [Durães et al. 2006]) uses this list of OS system 
calls to identify all possible locations in the system calls code (it is 
worth noting that this code is part of the kernel) where it is 
possible to inject realistic software faults, according to the rules 
established by the G-SWFIT fault model. 
 A Fault Injection Phase, in which, firstly, is injected the 
exhaustive set of software faults to obtain reference results, and 
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then are performed experiments to evaluate the error observed in 
the results for the different hypothesis of reduction of the number 
of faults. 
 
Figure 5-2 – Experimental methodology of the preliminary assessment study. 
Regarding the Pre-Injection Phase, 50 OS system calls were used by 
the web-server system (see Table 5-2), whereas for the multithreaded 
quicksort algorithm, 27 OS system calls were found in use (see Table 5-3)25. 
For each BT system, Tables 5-2 and 5-3 also show the considered measures 
(LOC, CPUt and NrCalls) for the used system calls. As expected, 
                                                     
 
 
25 All the OS system calls used by both BT systems were previously profiled and 
analyzed. 
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considering the computer resources used by each one of the BT systems, 
the web-server system revealed to be much more OS intensive than the 
multithreaded quicksort algorithm. 
The results used in the experiments, also used to assess the error 
incurred by the reduction of the number of faults according to the different 
hypothesis, consist of the failure modes observed in each execution, from 
the external point-of-view of the Benchmark Controller. We consider the 
following well-known failure modes: 
 OK – Representing the cases where the injected faults do not 
cause any kind of incorrect behavior in the SUB, neither in the 
benchmark measures, nor in the dependability ones. This failure 
mode is considered in most of the fault injection studies reported 
in the last decades; 
 CRASH – Representing the cases where abrupt shut-down of the 
BT (process crash) is observed; 
 HANG – representing the cases where the SUB is frozen, either 
the BT or the OS itself, and the experiment running time exceeded 
a predefined time limit; 
 ERRORS – representing the cases where there is no hang or 
crash, but some incorrect results were observed by the BMS. More 
precisely, the Benchmark Client of the BMS detects errors in some 
of its requests. 
In order to evaluate the error in the results, incurred by each different 
hypothesis on the reduction of the number of faults to inject, and determine 
the best strategy to reduce the faultload size without restricting the 
benchmark results, a deviation is calculated relatively to the values 
obtained for each failure mode with the injection of the complete set of 
software faults. 
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Web-Server Experiments 
System Call 
LOC 
(#) 
CPUt 
(secs) 
NrCalls 
(#)  
System Call 
LOC 
(#) 
CPUt 
(secs) 
NrCalls 
(#) 
read 94 10.689682 1,020,296 
 
time 35 0.073008 10,332 
lseek 50 4.513927 788,945 
 
accept 80 0.393356 6,665 
brk 92 4.836866 507,793 
 
getsockname 43 0.085677 6,648 
mremap 44 0.288144 204,735 
 
shutdown 27 0.088628 6,648 
close 29 2.173133 194,735 
 
wait4 266 0.084326 5,530 
open 54 1.711256 115,988 
 
geteuid32 5 0.076937 5,271 
old_mmap 99 1.299173 103,516 
 
fork 11 0.291810 5,228 
fstat64 21 0.813122 99,138 
 
uname 41 0.068011 5,221 
stat64 21 1.192313 91,806 
 
execve 37 2.911191 5,169 
fcntl64 62 0.410780 59,998 
 
chdir 95 0.105711 5,169 
poll 283 14.219557 53,543 
 
lstat64 21 0.037768 5,168 
munmap 31 0.612648 47,057 
 
getuid32 5 0.038894 5,167 
setsockopt 51 0.347240 46,860 
 
getgid32 5 0.034692 5,167 
rt_sigprocmask 142 0.325903 46,503 
 
getegid32 5 0.033765 5,167 
mmap2 56 0.347523 42,763 
 
flock 58 0.035934 1,604 
mprotect 193 0.447871 36,227 
 
select 395 0.032389 361 
getpid 5 0.311780 32,996 
 
_llseek 77 0.009457 52 
write 94 1.036779 27,883 
 
setgroups32 39 0.013868 52 
rt_sigaction 88 0.335088 25,999 
 
setuid32 105 0.011012 52 
gettimeofday 57 0.143740 22,855 
 
setgid32 34 0.012440 52 
writev 35 0.510542 20,212 
 
socket 31 0.000943 45 
sendfile 163 1.058075 16,988 
 
connect 44 0.005816 45 
pipe 37 0.183040 15,506 
 
getsockopt 49 0.002144 45 
dup2 62 0.187953 15,501 
 
kill 24 0.000135 28 
getrlimit 31 0.159430 10,386 
 
unlink 94 0.000119 3 
    
 
Total (#50) 3,520 52.603596 3,733,118 
Table 5-2 - System calls used by the web-server target system. 
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Multithreaded Quicksort Experiments 
System Call LOC (#) CPUt (secs) NrCalls (#) 
mmap2 56 5.165528 330,894 
write 94 0.968005 21,351 
getppid 6 0.047278 4,476 
poll 283 0.099038 4,476 
read 94 0.720567 4,468 
rt_sigprocmask 142 0.325585 3,738 
sigreturn 79 0.035028 3,703 
wait4 266 0.253500 3,369 
kill 24 2.490447 3,079 
modify_ldt 43 0.223864 2,971 
munmap 31 0.041457 2,021 
mprotect 193 0.029026 2,021 
clone 17 0.953065 2,020 
rt_sigsuspend 85 0.178594 1,683 
getpid 5 0.009962 951 
old_mmap 99 0.000018 7 
open 54 0.010015 5 
brk 92 0.000014 5 
rt_sigaction 88 0.000007 5 
fstat64 21 0.000010 5 
close 29 0.000012 4 
time 35 0.000002 1 
pipe 37 0.000022 1 
uname 41 0.000003 1 
_sysctl 54 0.000005 1 
nanosleep 138 0.000001 1 
getrlimit 31 0.000005 1 
Total (#27) 2,137 11.551058 391,258 
Table 5-3 - System calls used by the multithreaded quicksort target system. 
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The deviation 𝑑𝑓𝑖  of each specific failure mode, relative to the failure 
mode rate value  𝑓𝑖
̅ , obtained considering the complete set of targets, is 
calculated using  
𝑑𝑓𝑖 = √(𝑥 − 𝑓?̅?)2 
where 𝑓𝑖 , for 𝑖 = 1, … 4, represents each one of the failure modes 
considered in this study (OK, CRASH, HANG and ERRORS), and 𝑥 
denotes the rate value obtained for that failure mode considering a subset 
of initial fault injection targets. 
A global metric 𝑑𝑔 is also used to measure the overall deviation from 
the failure mode values obtained with a subset of the software fault targets, 
relative to the initial failure mode values calculated with the overall set: 
𝑑𝑔 = ∑ 𝑓?̅?
𝑛
𝑖=1
∙ 𝑑𝑓𝑖 
where 𝑛 is the total number of failure modes considered in the 
dependability benchmark. 
The metric used in this study is based in the user point-of-view of the 
system, through the use of well-known failure modes (OK, HANG, CRASH 
and ERRORS), as can be observed in the mathematical expression of 𝑑𝑔. 
Other metrics could be used, such as the ones related to specific 
mechanisms available in the target system, such as the coverage and 
latency of error detection mechanisms. However, the failure mode analysis 
is more general (i.e., it does not depends on specific features of the target 
system) and is more complete, as it captures the user’s perception of the 
system. 
This initial experimental study used the most frequent software fault 
types according to the G-SWFIT model, as shown in Table 5-4. An 
exception was the MLPC fault type, corresponding to the “Missing small 
and localized part of the algorithm”, which was not considered for this 
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preliminary study, as those kind of faults are not related to any specific 
statements in the code and its correction involves non trivial modifications 
[Durães et al. 2006]. The description of the considered software fault types, as 
well as the corresponding coverage, concerning the most frequent types of 
software faults found in field [Durães et al. 2006], and the respective ODC 
classes, are also indicated in Table 5-4.  
 
Fault 
type 
Description Coverage 
ODC 
Classes 
MIFS Missing "If (cond) { statement(s) }" 9.96 % Algorithm 
MFC Missing function call 8.64 % Algorithm 
MLAC 
Missing "AND EXPR" in expression 
used as branch condition 
7.89 % Checking 
MIA 
Missing "if (cond)" surrounding 
statement(s)  
4.32 % Checking 
MVAE 
Missing variable assignment using an 
expression 
3.00 % Algorithm 
WLEC 
Wrong logical expression used as 
branch condition 
3.00 % Assignment 
WVAV Wrong value assigned to a value  2.44 % Checking 
MVI M Missing variable initialization  2.25 % Assignment 
MVAV 
Missing variable assignment using a 
value 
2.25 % Assignment 
WAEP 
Wrong arithmetic expression used in 
parameter of function call 
2.25 % Assignment 
WPFV 
Wrong variable used in parameter of 
function call 
1.50 % Interface 
Total faults coverage 47.50 %  
Table 5-4 - Representativeness of the fault types considered in [Costa et al. 2009], 
according to the G-SWFIT methodology [Durães et al. 2006]. 
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It is worth noting that for this small set of fault types, which 
represents 47.50% of the complete set of software faults and four different 
ODC types, a total of 781 faults were defined for the web-server benchmark 
and 459 faults for the quicksort system. It is relevant to mention that in 
some system calls, 5 in the web-server system and 2 in quicksort system 
experiments, it was not injected any fault, as G-SWFIT model did not 
indicate any code mutation on that function targets. Moreover, that system 
calls are the smallest, in terms of LOC, of all of the considered set (getpid, 
getppid, geteuid32, getuid32, getgid32 and getegid32).  
Considering all the G-SWFIT software faults indicated, 1,240 
experiments have been executed, corresponding to the same number of 
injected software faults defined according to the G-SWFIT model (one 
single software fault injection was considered in each experiment). 
Results showed that in most of the experiments (82% for the 
web-server system and 80% for multithreaded quicksort system) the 
injected software faults did not cause any failure or visible impact on the 
system. This means that either the fault was not activated or the 
correspondent error remained latent until the end of the experiment. It may 
also happen that these errors have been corrected or canceled by the 
normal execution of the program (e.g., error overwritten by a fresh value). 
This initial experimental study concludes that none of the strategies 
provide a dramatic reduction of the number of faults if the goal is to keep a 
very small error in the results (e.g., less than 1%). This seems to be related 
to the fact that the total number of faults used to establish the reference 
results is relatively small (781 and 459 for each system). Nonetheless, for 
the web-server system, starting the fault injection experiments with the 
functions with greater LOCs allow achieving faster convergence to the 
results obtained with the complete set of faults. With this strategy, after the 
injection of only 51.47% of the total software faults, the induced error is 
about 3.8%, when comparing with the results obtained with the full set of 
software faults. This way, the fault injection experiments can be reduced by 
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almost 50%, representing an enormous saving of time in carrying out the 
experiments. Considering the total of time needed to inject the 781 faults in 
the web-server experiments, the reduction of time of the total 
experimentation can be estimated in, approximately, 208h. Moreover, the 
LOC, in machine code, is an accessible and fairly easy measure to obtain. 
Depending on the operating system of the target system, it can even be the 
easiest one, when compared to CPUt and NrCalls (however, not as simple 
as the random selection). 
It could also be observed that for complex and large workloads such 
as the web-server benchmark, the number of injected faults should be 
around 500 or higher in order to keep the error in the results lower than 
3%. Despite more experiments with other complex benchmarks/workloads 
are necessary to confirm this insight, this is an important practical 
indication for designers of future dependability benchmarks. On the other 
hand, smaller and simpler workloads, such as the existing in the 
multithreaded quicksort system, seem to allow a clearly smaller number of 
faults, no matter the strategy used to select the subset of faults. 
The work presented in [Costa et al. 2009] provides a first actual 
contribution to solve the problem of reducing the size of the faultload, 
which is essential to use practical dependability benchmarks in large and 
complex systems. But, more important than that, this study provided an 
early assessment of the proposed methodology that was subsequently 
developed and constitutes one of the key contributions of the study 
presented in this thesis. 
5.3.2 Proposed metodology 
The proposed methodology is an extension and refinement of the 
aforementioned framework assessment study, presented in [Costa et al. 
2009], and incorporates the results of a three-year research effort focused on 
134 Software Faultload for Large and Complex Systems 
 
 
showing that it is possible to obtain accurate fault injection using a 
faultload that contains only a small fraction of all the possible software 
faults that can be injected in the target system. It consists of using the 
results obtained with a comprehensive faultload that includes all possible 
fault locations (i.e., total coverage faultload) to evaluate the accuracy of the 
results obtained with the different strategies used to reduce the size of the 
faultload. The experiments include the use of different target systems 
resulting in one of the most extensive fault injection studies ever reported. 
In order to inject representative software faults, like in the validation 
study, the G-SWFIT fault model [Durães et al. 2006] was used. G-SWFIT is 
based on a set of operators for software fault emulation through low-level 
code changes in the target executable code, mimicking the most common 
types of real software faults. It is worth noting that these operators resulted 
from a field study based on the analysis and classification of more than 600 
software faults found in real software applications. Table 5-5 shows the 
software fault types selected for inclusion in the used faultload, 
corresponding to the 12 most frequent types of software faults found in 
[Durães et al. 2006]. It is worth pointing out that this small set of fault types 
represents 50.69% of the complete set of software faults and four different 
ODC types (adding the MLPC fault “Missing small and localized part of 
the algorithm” to the set of software fault types used in the experimental 
validation study [Costa et al. 2009]).  
As shown in [Durães et al. 2006], the long tail that characterizes the 
complete fault type distribution (Table 5-5 shows only the most frequent 
types; the tail is quite long with many fault types that are rare) makes very 
difficult to include more fault types in the faultload. For example, the last 
type of fault considered in the list shown in Table 5-5 (WPFV - Wrong 
variable used in parameter of function call) corresponds to 1.5% of the 
faults found in the mentioned field study [Durães et al. 2006]. That is, it is 
already a relatively infrequent type of software fault. For this reason, the 
set of fault types proposed in [Durães et al. 2006] has been used in many 
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studies in recent years and is considered as a good approximation for a 
difficult problem that is the definition of fault models for software faults.  
The problem of trying to inject fault types that correspond to faults 
that are relatively rare is that even very large pieces of software may have 
just a few code locations (or even none) where such fault types can be 
injected. In other words, according to mentioned field study, nearly 50% of 
the software faults found in field falls in 12 types of software faults shown 
in Table 5-5, while the remaining 50% of the faults represent a very large 
number of specific types that are rather infrequent26.  
 
                                                     
 
 
26 The software fault injection technique used in this work consists in the scanning of 
the target code application (ready-to-run binary code) for specific low-level instruction 
patterns (sequence of machine code instructions) and in applying a mutation to emulate an 
intended software fault. Each fault type is associated to a given code pattern and a given set 
of preconditions that make the faults (bugs) plausible. For example, the fault type MFC 
(Missing Function Call) means that the programmer has forgotten to call a given function 
(and such bug has escaped to all the testing procedures). The field study presented in 
[Durães et al. 2006] show the typical circumstances (related to code) where such kind of fault 
appears in the field making it possible to reproduce such fault type, provided that the target 
program has the code pattern and circumstances that allow the injection of the fault. 
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Fault 
type 
Description Coverage 
ODC 
Classes 
MIFS Missing "If (cond) { statement(s) }" 9.96 % Algorithm 
MFC Missing function call 8.64 % Algorithm 
MLAC 
Missing "AND EXPR" in expression 
used as branch condition 
7.89 % Checking 
MIA 
Missing "if (cond)" surrounding 
statement(s)  
4.32 % Checking 
MLPC 
Missing small and localized part of the 
algorithm 
3.19% Algorithm 
MVAE 
Missing variable assignment using an 
expression 
3.00 % Algorithm 
WLEC 
Wrong logical expression used as 
branch condition 
3.00 % Assignment 
WVAV Wrong value assigned to a value  2.44 % Checking 
MVI M Missing variable initialization  2.25 % Assignment 
MVAV 
Missing variable assignment using a 
value 
2.25 % Assignment 
WAEP 
Wrong arithmetic expression used in 
parameter of function call 
2.25 % Assignment 
WPFV 
Wrong variable used in parameter of 
function call 
1.50 % Interface 
Total faults coverage 50.69 %  
Table 5-5 - Representativeness of the most common software fault types 
used in the present methodology, according to [Durães et al. 2006]. 
As software fault injection target locations we consider the operating 
system kernel of the SUB, as shown in Figure 5-3. More precisely, we 
consider as possible targets the complete set of the OS functions, referred in 
the kernel symbols table. The exact identification of the fault (code target 
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addresses and fault type) is thus obtained applying the G-SWFIT 
methodology to each of the functions of that set. 
Given the G-SWFIT faultload, the software faults are injected using 
the DBench-FI fault injector (an innovative SWIFI tool specially developed 
for this purpose, presented in detail in chapter 4), as its unique set of 
features make it especially adequate for dependability benchmarks: (i) it 
provides a very low intrusiveness, since it is essentially undetectable and 
presents no noticeable performance degradation of the FIT; (ii) it is capable 
of runtime fault injection (on the fly) in both user and kernel spaces and in 
both data and code segments; (iii) it does not require any application source 
code to be available; (iv) it can be dynamically loaded into a system; and (v) 
it can inject faults even on applications that are already running in the 
system when it is installed. 
The used approach consists of four main phases as indicated in 
Figure 5-3: (i) Pre-Injection Phase; (ii) Kernel Analysis Phase; (iii) Fault 
Injection Phase; and (iv) Strategy Analysis Phase. 
In the Pre-Injection Phase are identified all the locations in the OS 
kernel where it is possible to inject realistic software faults, according to the 
rules established in [Durães et al. 2006]. It is worth noting that, in this 
approach, the G-SWFIT faultload generator (software tool provided by the 
author of the study [Durães et al. 2006]) uses the exported kernel symbols 
table of the OS in order to detect all the possible targets in the OS kernel 
functions. The result of the Pre-Injection Phase is the complete set of 
software faults that it is possible to inject in such set of targets (i.e., the set 
of the OS functions). 
In the Fault Injection Phase the exhaustive set of software faults is 
injected to obtain the reference results necessary for the Strategy Analysis 
Phase, in which are performed the experiments to evaluate the error 
observed in the results for the different hypothesis on the reduction of the 
number of faults to inject. 
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The Strategy Analysis Phase consists in the comparison of the results 
obtained when considering a subset of the initial targets with the results 
obtained in the initial experiments (the reference results). This final step 
analyzes how one can choose a subset of the targeted OS kernel functions 
and fault locations without hampering the initial benchmark results 
obtained with the total set of faults. 
 
Figure 5-3 – Phases of the proposal experimental methodology. 
In order to guide that faultload subset selection, some software 
metrics have previously been obtained from the OS kernel source code in 
the Kernel Analysis Phase. For that purpose, several characteristics and 
related metrics of each of the targeted kernel functions were considered: 
 Lines of code (LOC), which consists in the count of the lines of 
the software source code. It is worth noting that the analyzed 
LOCs were in machine code and thus some well-known 
restrictions generally applied to this size oriented metric, like 
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language and programmer dependence, no longer make sense in 
this context; 
 The Extended Cyclomatic Complexity (Vg), based on the 
McCabe’s software metric [McCabe 1976], describe the control 
flow complexity of each of the mentioned kernel functions. A 
higher Vg number corresponds to a function with greater number 
of execution paths and, consequently, a function harder to 
understand and implement; 
 Halstead’s Delivered Bugs (B), directly correlated with the 
complexity of code, estimates the number of errors (bugs) in the 
implementation. This measure is included in a broader set of 
measures developed by M. Halstead, to determine the 
quantitative measure of complexity based on operators and 
operands in a module [Halstead 1977]; 
 Maintainability Index (Mi), a composite measure based on 
lines-of-code, McCabe’s and Halstead’s measures, which strives 
to express the relative maintainability of the code. It is worth 
noting that the used formula (the forms and rationale of which 
were developed by P. Oman [Oman et al. 1992]), widely accepted in 
the software industry, does not consider the amount of line 
comments, as some comments consist just of some standard 
blocks; 
 Functional Complexity (Fc) is obtained by the sum of the number 
of input parameters, the number of return points and the Vg 
(Extended Cyclomatic Complexity) of each function. 
Additionally, this study also considers a Random selection of 
software faults (RandSF), according to a uniform distribution, in order to 
obtain a subset of faults from the initial full set of faults initially considered. 
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The mentioned software metrics, with the exception of the LOC that 
was specifically calculated, were obtained with the RSM (Resource 
Standard Metrics) [RSM] and the CMT++ (Complexity Measures Tools for 
C/C++) Tools [CMT]. 
As already explained in the preliminary assessment study (section 
5.3.1), the evaluation of the error incurred by the reduction of the number 
of faults according to each different hypothesis is based on well-known 
failure modes observed from the user point-of-view of the system (OK, 
CRASH, HANG, and ERRORS), and on the deviation relatively to the 
values obtained for each failure mode with the injection of the complete set 
of software faults (see the definition of the mathematical expression of 𝑑𝑔). 
Chapter 6 (Experimental Evaluation of Faultload Reduction 
Strategies) presents and discusses the experimental results of this 
methodology with two real and different applications: a web-server 
dependability benchmark and a large-scale integer vector sort application 
extended with performance and quality measures. A proposal strategy for 
the reduction of the faultload can be found in section 6.4. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter described the problem of the faultload dimension which 
arises from the adoption of realistic software fault models in dependability 
benchmarks of large and complex software systems. The execution of such 
benchmarks usually take several months or even years due to its large 
faultload size, which means that, in practice, it is not possible to execute 
them. 
The chapter surveyed and discussed the strengths and limitations of 
the existing studies that address the issue of the distribution of faults 
among different components in target systems, and presented an 
experimental methodology that allows the definition of compact and 
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representative faultloads based on software faults. The presented 
methodology allows a significant decreasing on the execution time of 
dependability benchmarks, maintaining, simultaneously, its usefulness and 
representativeness. It is especially useful to open the possibility to extend 
dependability benchmarks to large and complex systems, where the 
experimentation time can significantly be reduced, making the benchmarks 
feasible and useful in such class of systems. 
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Chapter 6  
6 Experimental Evaluation of 
Faultload Reduction Strategies 
This chapter describes the experimental setup used to evaluate the different 
strategies for the reduction of the number of software fault injection experiments 
(presented in section 5.3 - Experimental framework) with two real and different 
applications: a web-server dependability benchmark and a large-scale integer vector 
sort application extended with performance and quality measures. It presents and 
analyzes the results of more than two years of comprehensive fault injection 
experiments, encompassing more than 41 thousand software faults, and proposes a 
strategy to choose adequate fault injection targets without restricting the 
benchmark scope and keeping accurate dependability benchmark results.  
The proposed strategy will open the possibility to extend the use of 
dependability benchmarks to large and complex systems, which otherwise would be, 
in practice, impossible to run due to its large faultload size (such benchmarks 
usually take several months or even years to execute). 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
ore than 41 thousand continuous fault injection experiments 
have been carried out in more than two years27, in order to 
evaluate different strategies to guide the fault injection target 
selection and to reduce the number of software fault injection experiments 
for a dependability benchmark, or for an experimental evaluation using 
software fault injection. The main goal is to find a strategy to reduce the 
fault injection target set and thus decrease the execution time of the 
dependability benchmark experiments, while maintaining the 
dependability benchmark usefulness and representativeness. This method 
will open the possibility to extend the dependability benchmarks to large 
and complex systems, making them feasible and practicably applied (such 
benchmarks usually take several months or even years due to its large 
faultload size). 
                                                     
 
 
27 It is worth noting that the time needed to complete each fault injection experiment 
largely depends on the chosen BT system. For large and complex systems, such as the 
web-server benchmark used in this study, the injection of each software fault takes about 20 
minutes (average value), as showed later in this chapter.  
M 
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6.2 Experimental setup 
The experimental setup used in this work is composed of two 
systems: 
 A server machine (Intel Pentium IV 2.66GHz, 512MB), which 
corresponds to the SUB, including the BT and the DBench-FI fault 
injector; 
 A client machine (Intel Pentium IV 2.0GHz, 512MB), which 
corresponds to the BMS, running the benchmark client. 
Both machines are connected via a 100Mbps Ethernet connection and 
run the Linux RedHat operating system (kernel 2.4.18-3). 
The dependability benchmark used is a web-server benchmark (WS) 
based on the SPECweb99 industry standard performance benchmark for 
web-servers [SPEC], extended with faultload and dependability measures 
(failure modes). In the specific setup used in the experiments, the Apache 
web-server was used. 
In order to evaluate the different strategies to reduce the number of 
injected faults, a second workload was used, running in the same 
environment as the dependability benchmark mentioned above. This 
second workload (quite different from the WS benchmark, in terms of 
required computer resources) consists of a client-server application to sort 
large-scale integer vectors, based on a Multithreaded Quicksort algorithm 
(MtQs), extended with performance and quality metrics. 
The experiments were chosen and designed to show that, even 
considering two totally different applications, it is possible to consider a 
subset of all the possible fault injection targets maintaining, at the same 
time, the usefulness of the benchmark results. This method will open the 
possibility to extend the dependability benchmarks to large and complex 
systems, making them feasible and practicably applied. As mentioned in 
previous chapters, that is exactly one of the main goals of dependability 
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benchmarks: to offer practicable and efficient methods, considering the 
computing effort, the number of experiments and the time to run the 
benchmark, in order to analyze a set of measures and charactering a 
system. 
The web-server dependability benchmark is a very realistic 
benchmarking scenario already used as a case study in [Durães et al. 2004a]. 
In those experiments, the BT consists of the Apache web-server and the BC 
is the SPECWEB99. 
The used SPECweb99 performance benchmark can be briefly 
described by its components: 
 Benchmark setup – SPECweb99 uses a previously defined number 
of clients in order to submit requests to the web-server under 
evaluation. One of those clients, known as the prime client, 
coordinates all the actions of all the others. In these experiments, 
all the clients run in the same machine (the BMS) and are referred 
as the Benchmark Client in Figure 5-1 – Experimental 
Architecture. In fact, running in physical different machines or 
operating systems is not really a requirement of SPECweb99. 
 Workload – the workload used by SPECweb99 and submitted to 
the server is representative of the most common web-server 
operations and is composed of typical POST and GET requests, 
including both static and dynamic operation types [SPEC]. The 
defined workload also emulates common actions such online 
registration requests and advertising services. 
 SPECweb performance measures – the measures are obtained 
through the SPECweb prime client and for this specific work the 
following were considered relevant: (A) SPEC, the main 
SPECweb99 metric, measures the number of simultaneous 
connections that a server can support. Known as conforming 
connections, they are defined as those that have an average bit 
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rate of at least 320kbps and less than 1% of reported errors; 
(B) Throughput (Thr), considered as the number of operations 
(e.g., POSTs and GETs) per second; (C) Operation Count Errors 
(Err), considered as the number of errors found by the client in 
the requested operations. 
 SPECweb99 benchmark rules – this performance benchmark require 
very specific rules for experiment conduction in order to the 
acceptance of the final reporting results by the SPEC organization. 
Concerning those rules, we recommend the reading of [SPEC] for 
more detailed information. In the conducted experiments, in 
order to reduce their total time, not all of those impositions were 
accomplished, as the respective final benchmark reporting results 
is completely out of the scope of this paper. Specifically, in this 
benchmark there were requested 40 simultaneous connections to 
the server, using three batches or iterations of 300 seconds each 
and a Warmup Time, Rampup Time and Rampdown Time28 of 30 
                                                     
 
 
28 Warmup, Rampup and Rampdown times are changeable SPECWeb99 benchmark 
parameters. The Warmup time is the time, in seconds, intended to warm up any caches 
before taking any measurement. The Rampup time is the warmup time, in seconds, before the 
2nd and following iterations of the test. The Rampdown time represents the time, at the end 
of each iteration, required for the end of SPECWeb99 workload. 
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seconds each. These parameters represent SPECweb99 benchmark 
constants, as defined in [SPEC]. 
Each web-server experiment consists of running the workload on the 
Apache web-server and on the injection of one software fault few seconds 
after the experiments start (see Figure 6-1 - Web-server benchmark 
execution profile.). In this way, the software fault is injected after the 
web-server reaches the Steady State Condition29 (the warmup time was set to 
30 seconds). The DBench-FI fault injector, as mentioned, takes the faultload 
and injects each software fault directly in the code of the running target - a 
predefined function located in the OS kernel. It is worth noting that, 
concerning the HANG failure mode, the BMS defines for this group of 
experiments a maximum of 30 minutes each. This maximum time is 
sufficient considering that the normal execution time to complete each 
experiment of three iterations is about 20 minutes (as referred later in the 
section 6.3 - Results and discussion). After that time is elapsed, the SUB is 
considered hanged and is remotely restarted by the BMS, via software or 
hardware. 
                                                     
 
 
29 The system achieves the Steady State Condition after a given warmup time. This 
state guarantees that the system is able to maintain its maximum transaction processing 
throughput. 
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Figure 6-1 - Web-server benchmark execution profile. 
After each experiment run, the BMS gather the measures related to 
performance degradation, mainly given through SPECweb99 performance 
benchmark, as well as some other metrics related to dependability, namely, 
the information about the resulting failure mode. In addition to the 
mentioned performance metrics, the total time to complete each one of the 
experiments (ExpT) it is also collected by the BMS. 
Relatively to the Multithreaded Quicksort application it is important 
to note that it mainly serves as a control application and as a good 
comparison system, as it has some completely different requirements 
concerning to computer resources. It consists of an application responsible 
for the sort of a 10,000,000 integer randomly generated vector and a client 
that requests the resulting sorted file. In those experiments, the BT consists 
of the Multithreaded Quicksort application and the Benchmark Client is the 
application client that asks for that ordered vector file. Each of those 
experiments consists in generating the 10,000,000 integer random vector, 
executing the Multithreaded Quicksort on that vector and, finally, writing 
the resulting vector to a file that will be read and tested by the client that 
has made the request. In each experiment (see Figure 6-2 - Multithreaded 
quicksort benchmark execution profile.), one single software fault is 
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injected when the application starts. Thus, the software fault is injected at 
the start of the random vector generation phase, just before the execution of 
the sorting algorithm. 
 
Figure 6-2 - Multithreaded quicksort benchmark execution profile. 
Like the WS experiments, the DBench-FI fault injector takes the 
faultload and injects each software fault directly in the OS kernel code of 
the SUB, on top of which is running the sorting algorithm. For this group of 
fault injection tests, the BMS defines a maximum time of 15 minutes for 
each experiment to run. This maximum time is sufficient considering the 
normal execution time to complete each experiment (as mentioned later in 
section 6.3 - Results and discussion). Similarly to what we mentioned for 
the WS experiments, after that maximum time is elapsed the SUB is 
considered hanged and is remotely restarted by the BMS, via software or 
hardware. 
After each run of this MtQs experiments, the BMS provides measures 
related to performance degradation, based on the execution time to 
complete all the process of generating, sorting and writing the vector 
(ExpT), as well as some other metrics related to dependability, namely the 
information about the resulting failure mode. For this purpose we consider 
Quicksort workload
Random 
Vector Ready
OS start OS reboot
Quicksort
Start
Quicksort
End
Software Fault 
Injecttion
Collect 
measures
File Analysis
Random vector 
construction
Ordering Vector Writing File
Multithreaded 
Quicksort
Experimental Evaluation of Faultload Reduction Strategies 151 
 
that an error exists (Err) if the vector is not correctly ordered. In that case, a 
metric based in the number of wrong placed integers in the vector is 
calculated as an indicator of the quality of the obtained result. 
All the executed experiments, either related to the WS or to the MtQs, 
required no human intervention as their execution were completely 
automated through the use of a set of appropriate tools incorporated in the 
BMS. 
6.3 Results and discussion 
For each kind of experiments, concerning both the WS and the MtQs 
benchmark experiments, some previous performance tests, 100 for each of 
the following types, were made in order to obtain a measure of the 
intrusiveness of the DBench-FI fault injector in the benchmark systems: 
 Without DBench-FI fault injector. That is, without the respective 
fault injector module inserted in the OS kernel; 
 With the DBench-FI fault injector in profile mode. That is, using 
software fault injection but without really changing any target. 
The Table 6-1 shows the average values for every performance 
measure considered in each type of experiment. 
The comparison of these performance results and the degradation 
value obtained give us a measure of the DBench-FI fault injector overhead 
and intrusiveness in all of the experiments presented throughout this 
section. As can be observed, it is not detected any intrusiveness or 
performance degradation imposed by the used fault injector. Moreover, as 
no errors were observed in any of those experiments, we can conclude that 
the intrusion factor of the fault injector either in the WS or in the MtQs 
calculations is non-existent. 
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WS 
Experiments 
Without 
DBench-FI 
With 
DBench-FI 
Intrusion 
Factor 
SPEC (#) 40 40 0 
Thr (Ops/sec) 126.5 126.5 0 
ErrR (# Ops) 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ExpT (hh:mm:ss) 00:19:00 00:19:00 - 
    
MtQs 
Experiments 
Without 
DBench-FI 
With 
DBench-FI 
Intrusion 
Factor 
ExpT (hh:mm:ss) 00:00:26 00:00:26 - 
Err (#) 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Table 6-1 – Average performance results (no faults injected). 
As some strategies to reduce the number of injected faults rely on the 
characteristics of the kernel functions, the entire OS kernel functions were 
analyzed and the related metrics obtained - Kernel Analysis Phase (Figure 
5-3 - Phases of the proposal experimental methodology). Recall that the 
considered metrics are, as defined in section 5.3 - Experimental framework: 
Lines of code (LOC), Extended Cyclomatic Complexity (Vg), Halstead’s 
Delivered Bugs (B), Maintainability Index (Mi), and Functional Complexity 
(Fc). 
Considering all the G-SWFIT software faults indicated in Table 5-5 
(Representativeness of the most common software fault types 
used in the present methodology, according to [Durães et al. 2006]), 41,750 
fault injection experiments have been executed in 1,153 kernel 
functions - 20,875 for each type of workload (WS and MtQs). These faults 
corresponds to the total number of software faults that can be injected in 
the code of the OS kernel (considering the entire exported kernel symbols 
table), according to the rules proposed in [Durães et al. 2006] for the 
realistic emulation of software faults. It is worth mentioning that in some 
very small OS functions (with very few lines of assembly code) referred by 
Experimental Evaluation of Faultload Reduction Strategies 153 
 
the exported kernel symbol table it was not injected any fault, as the 
G-SWFIT fault model did not indicate any suitable code locations on those 
target functions. It is also important to note that for 21 targeted functions, 
originally programmed in assembly language, only the ASM LOC measure 
was collected. This is due to restrictions of both of the used tools to extract 
the software metrics [RSM], [CMT]. 
Concerning the performance in the presence of injected faults, the 
final experimental results obtained are shown in Table 6-2. 
 
 
WS Experiments* MtQs Experiments 
 
SPEC 
(#) 
Thr 
(Ops/sec) 
ErrR 
(# Ops) 
ExpT 
(hh:mm:ss) 
Err 
(#) 
ExpT 
(hh:mm:ss) 
Min 0.00 2.2 0.0 00:00:43 0.0 00:00:05 
Max 40.00 171.2 65,239.3 00:30:07 9,990,571.0 00:15:00 
Avr 37.8 126.5 23.7 00:19:15 3,172.7 00:00:40 
StdDev 9.1 3.6 865.6 00:03:10 174,255.7 00:01:46 
* Experimental results considering the average value of all the 3 SPECweb iterations. 
Table 6-2 – Performance results in the presence of faults. 
Concerning the WS experiments, as result of the mentioned execution 
profile, there were observed that some injected software faults caused 
several non-conforming connections (SPEC) and/or some lower values of 
throughput (Thr) and also several error operations (Err) detected by the 
SPECweb99 benchmark. It is worth noting that for this type of experiments, 
the presented values are the average of all iterations executed (3 SPECweb 
iterations in each one of the 20,875 experiments). The resulting charts are 
shown in Figures 6-3 to 6-6. 
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Figure 6-3 - WS Experimental results: Conforming connections. 
 
Figure 6-4 - WS Experimental results: Errors. 
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Figure 6-5 - WS Experimental results: Throughput. 
 
Figure 6-6 - WS Experimental results: Experiments duration. 
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With respect to the MtQs experimental results (see Figure 6-7 and 
Figure 6-8), some experiences have also led to errors in the results. Such 
situations occurred when either the result vector was completely 
unavailable by the client (considering that there is no HANG or CRASH of 
the BT) or the result corresponds to an existent but incorrect ordered 
vector. It is worth noting that this last case was only observed in 16 
experiments. This means that, in most of the times, when the resulted 
sorted vector was written to disk, no errors had been detected by the client 
in the ordered integer vector. This is explained by the specific 
characteristics of the MtQs application, namely, by the file based result to 
the client’s request. We also observed that, like in the WS, some 
experiments present different execution times due to the induced kernel 
code disturbance. 
 
Figure 6-7 - MtQs Experimental results: Experiments duration. 
Regarding the mentioned failure modes, it can be observed that, in 
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software faults injected in the OS kernel did not cause any failure or visible 
impact on the application (see Figure 6-9 - Failure modes of WS 
experiments, and Figure 6-10 - Failure modes of MtQs experiments). It is 
worth noting that these results are consistent with the results of fault 
injection experiments reported in the literature. Moreover, this rarefaction 
(i.e., only a few faults cause a visible impact on the BT) is one of the reasons 
for the difficulty in reducing the faultload size. 
 
Figure 6-8 - WS Experimental results: Errors. 
Many factors may contribute to this behavior. Since we need the 
failure modes obtained with the total set of faults (i.e., all the possible faults 
that G-SWFIT can inject in the Linux kernel) to be used as a reference result 
for the evaluation of the different strategies proposed to reduce the number 
of faults to be considered in the faultload, we consider the whole Linux 
kernel code (memory management, scheduler, file system, I/O 
management, etc.) as the fault injection target. This suggests that many 
faults have not been activated, which per se explains a large fraction of the 
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faults (injected in the OS) that caused no visible effects on the applications. 
Other factors such as errors that remained latent until the end of the 
experiment or have been corrected or canceled by the normal execution of 
the program (e.g., error overwritten by a fresh value) are plausible causes 
as well. Obviously, even when the injected fault damages the OS, it may 
happen that the components affected by the fault had no effect on the 
applications (WS and MtQs). 
 
Figure 6-9 – Failure modes of WS experiments. 
It is worth noting that we excluded the use of well-known techniques 
such as monitoring (to detect when the fault is activated) or code profiling 
(to previously identify the OS code areas that are used more intensively by 
the application) because the goals of our research require reference results 
obtained by a non-intrusive faultload that include all the possible faults. 
The similarity between the values obtained for the OK failure mode 
for both systems, despite the great difference between their computational 
characteristics, suggests a similarity behavior of the systems in the presence 
of a faulty OS (considering the occurrence of problems), independently of 
the used applications (BT). 
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Figure 6-10 – Failure modes of MtQs experiments. 
Concerning the strategy analysis phase of the approach and in order 
to choose a subset of software fault targets, and, consequently, decrease the 
number of injected faults and the resulting total experimentation time, 
without restricting the benchmark usefulness, we analyzed, as mentioned, 
6 different approaches: LOC, Vg, B, Mi, and Fc metrics, and RandSF, a 
random selection of software faults, following a uniform distribution. Still 
for the random selection, it is important to notice that for each group of 
randomly chosen OS kernel functions (from 1 to 1,153), there were executed 
2,000 experiments, and analyzed the resulting maximum, minimum, 
average and standard deviation values. That is, 2,000 experiments for each 
one of the combinations of 𝑛 functions among 1,153, for 𝑛 between 1 and 
1,153 (in other words, 2,000 experiments of 1 randomly chosen function 
among the 1,153 target functions; 2,000 experiments of 2 randomly chosen 
functions among the 1,153 target functions; etc.). This selection method 
mainly serves as a control strategy. 
For each one of the 6 mentioned approaches, Table 6-3 shows the 
percentage of total fault injections needed to obtain a given global 
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deviation error limit in the WS experiments, considering the full set of 
targets (the two best strategies of each global deviation error limit are 
presented in a shaded background). Correspondent data for the MtQs 
experiments can be found in Table 6-4. These tables shows, for each one of 
approaches based on software metrics (LOC, Vg, B, Mi and Fc), two 
different ways of choosing the kernel target functions: based on the 
ascending (Asc) and descending (Desc) orders of the correspondent metric. 
For example, for the LOC approach, it is possible to start the software fault 
injection in functions with greater LOC values (LOC approach in 
descending order – LOC Desc) or in functions with smaller LOC values 
(LOC approach in ascending order - LOC Asc). Thus, we consider 11 
different strategies to choose the adequate fault injection targets: two sort 
orders for each one of the 5 software metrics based approaches plus a 
random approach, as explained above. The presented values show that, for 
example, for the WS experiments, using LOC Asc (i.e., choosing as injection 
order the OS functions with smallest LOC), it is necessary to inject 29.56% 
of the faults (6,170 faults) to achieve a global deviation error in the failure 
modes less than or equal to 2%. 
It is very important to note that the values indicated in Tables 6-3 and 
6-4 represents the worst-case scenarios. That is, possible smaller sets of 
faults that incidentally could produce results with a smaller error are not 
being considered. Instead, it is found the worst combination of faults (i.e., 
the largest set) needed to assure a given error limit. In other words, any 
form of casuistic occurrence along the experiments is eliminated, by 
ensuring that the indicated values are such that, for each approach, none of 
the remaining experiments inflict a higher global deviation value. I.e., being 
𝑑𝑔𝑖  a global deviation value for a given number of faults 𝑖, 
𝑑𝑔𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {𝑑𝑔𝑗 , ∀𝑗 ≤ 𝑖: 𝑑𝑔𝑗 > 𝑑𝑔𝑘 , ∀𝑘 > 𝑗} 
𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ {𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠}. 
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WS Experiments 
  
Error (𝑑𝑔 - global deviation values) 
  
0 <=0.5% <=1% <=2% <=3% <=4% 
LOC 
Asc 
100.0% 53.84% 45.03% 29.56% 19.29% 12.19% 
20,875 11,239 9,399 6,170 4,027 2,544 
Desc 
100.0% 90.17% 21.95% 14.81% 12.59% 9.00% 
20,875 18,822 4,582 3,091 2,628 1,879 
Vg 
Asc 
100.0% 59.16% 44.73% 28.42% 19.41% 16.44% 
20,875 12,349 9,338 5,933 4,051 3,431 
Desc 
100.0% 87.39% 25.05% 18.72% 1.61% 0.80% 
20,875 18,242 5,230 3,908 337 168 
B 
Asc 
100.0% 62.65% 41.82% 33.94% 19.40% 12.16% 
20,875 13,078 8,730 7,085 4,049 2,538 
Desc 
100.0% 90.10% 70.16% 10.09% 1.61% 1.61% 
20,875 18,809 14,646 2,106 337 337 
Mi 
Asc 
100.0% 91.32% 32.92% 16.74% 10.87% 9.77% 
20,875 19,063 6,872 3,494 2,269 2,040 
Desc 
100.0% 69.97% 39.73% 24.47% 17.30% 13.15% 
20,875 14,607 8,293 5,109 3,611 2,746 
Fc 
Asc 
100.0% 63.99% 53.69% 40.74% 29.71% 25.71% 
20,875 13,357 11,207 8,504 6,202 5,366 
Desc 
100.0% 82.63% 76.77% 10.05% 5.01% 1.62% 
20,875 17,250 16,025 2,097 1,046 338 
RandSF Max 
100.0% 97.05% 85.93% 58.23% 41.89% 26.35% 
20,875 20,260 17,938 12,155 8,745 5,500 
Table 6-3 - Percentage of fault injections needed to achieve a given global 
deviation error limit in the WS Experiments. 
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MtQs Experiments 
  
Error (𝑑𝑔 - global deviation values) 
  
0 <=0.5% <=1% <=2% <=3% <=4% 
LOC 
Asc 
100.0% 61.55% 47.69% 33.49% 22.62% 18.18% 
20,875 12,848 9,955 6,992 4,721 3,796 
Desc 
100.0% 93.34% 70.84% 13.04% 7.87% 1.68% 
20,875 19,485 14,788 2,722 1,643 351 
Vg 
Asc 
100.0% 63.31% 50.69% 30.29% 21.69% 17.92% 
20,875 13,215 10,581 6,322 4,528 3,741 
Desc 
100.0% 87.39% 43.67% 3.91% 3.03% 0.80% 
20,875 18,242 9,116 816 632 168 
B 
Asc 
100.0% 67.31% 46.36% 34.73% 21.56% 17.85% 
20,875 14,050 9,678 7,249 4,501 3,727 
Desc 
100.0% 90.81% 70.92% 6.06% 0.80% 0.80% 
20,875 18,957 14,805 1,264 168 168 
Mi 
Asc 
100.0% 91.75% 14.79% 10.59% 9.77% 1.46% 
20,875 19,152 3,088 2,211 2,040 304 
Desc 
100.0% 43.95% 39.51% 26.12% 19.33% 16.62% 
20,875 9,174 8,248 5,452 4,036 3.469 
Fc 
Asc 
100.0% 53.28% 47.30% 28.27% 17.61% 2.32% 
20,875 11,122 9,873 5,901 3,677 485 
Desc 
100.0% 82.34% 14.51% 9.84% 1.62% 1.62% 
20,875 17,189 3,028 2,055 338 338 
RandSF Max 
100.0% 95.95% 81.35% 61.79% 38.70% 22.75% 
20,875 20,030 16,982 12,900 8,078 4,748 
Table 6-4 - Percentage of fault injections needed to achieve a given global 
deviation error limit in the MtQs Experiments. 
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In other words, for a fixed sort strategy, the mathematical expression 
of 𝑑𝑔𝑖   assures that for a certain subset 𝑖 of injected faults, no other subset of 
software faults that includes 𝑖 produces a greater global deviation (in the 
limit, it would be possible that, luckily, the injection of faults in one single 
function, the first in a certain sort strategy, could produce a null deviation). 
Analogous definitions hold for individual failure modes. 
Looking at the reduction of the number of faults, in both relative 
(percentage) and absolute terms, the following observations can be drawn 
based on the obtained results:  
 Some of the strategies provide a good reduction of the number of 
faults (lower than 50%), keeping the error in the results very small 
(e.g., less than or equal to 1%).  
 Smaller and simpler workloads, such as MtQs, seem to allow 
identical number to what would be necessary for more complex 
workloads. Particularly, it can be observed that, in order to obtain 
smaller errors in the results (less than or equal to 0.5%), the 
number of injected faults is identical to what would be needed in 
complex and large workloads. 
 Concerning the WS experiments (that represent relatively large 
and complex workloads), the best strategies to select a subset of 
faults to inject, for errors between 3% and 4%, are Vg Desc and 
B Desc. However, we can state that the approach Fc Desc is very 
close to those ones, also showing a good convergence for that 
error range. For that kind of workloads, and for errors in the 
range between 1% and 2%, we can mention LOC Desc ad Vg Desc 
as the two best strategies. For small errors (lower than or equal to 
0.5%), the LOC Asc and the Vg Asc showed to be the best 
strategies (with 53.84% and 59.16%, respectively, of the total 
injected faults). 
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 Concerning smaller and simpler systems, represented by the 
MtQs experiments, the best strategy to decrease the number of 
faults, for errors between 2% and 4% are B Desc and Vg Desc, 
closely followed by the Fc Desc. However if we consider errors in 
the range from 1% to 2%, we can mention the Fc Desc and the Mi 
Asc as the best strategies. For smaller errors, lower than or equal 
to 0.5%, the Mi Desc and the Fc Asc revealed to be the best ones. 
 In general, we can state that the best strategies for errors in the 
range 1% to 4% are not the best ones for smaller errors (lower 
than or equal to 0.5%), and vice-versa. More precisely, both WS 
and MtQs experiments seem to show that, regardless of the 
strategy used, the Asc order is the best one for very low errors 
(lower than or equal to 0.5%). On the other hand, we can state that 
the Desc orders are the best ones for errors between 1% and 4%. 
This situation can be explained by the function-based choice used 
in this study. More complex functions, those with higher software 
complexity measures, and potentially best represented in 
faultload (which includes all the possible software fault 
locations), induces a one-step block analysis of a greater set of 
software fault injections. On the contrary, less complex functions 
(typically represented in the faultload only by a few software 
faults) induce a more fine and step-by-step analysis. 
Consequently, the former type of functions provides a faster, but 
rough, convergence, in opposition to the latter type, with a 
slower, but accurate, convergence. The criteria Mi Desc is an 
exception to this rule, and will be explained later. 
 The random selection (RandSF) of a subset of faults is the worst 
strategy of all to reduce the number of software fault injections. It 
is worth noting that this selection strategy is, by far, the easiest 
fault reduction strategy concerning implementation, as all others 
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require some sort of previous target analysis, which is obviously 
not the case of the RandSF strategy. 
In addition to the analysis provided by the Tables 6-3 and 6-4, it is 
also important to analyze the error evolution in a less discrete way. The 
following charts (from Figure 6-11 to Figure 6-15, for the WS; and from 
Figure 6-16 to Figure 6-20, for the MtQs) show the error evolution 𝑑𝑓𝑖  for 
each failure mode (represented by its name) and the global error 𝑑𝑔 
(represented as Global Dev), as well as their relationship. Each individual 
chart represents each strategy for the definition of subsets of faults. The 
vertical blue line indicates the percentage of injected faults needed to 
achieve 1% of error (global deviation) in each of the considered strategies 
(that value seems to be a turning value, as explained below). It is important 
to notice that, as described for the table values analysis, one should not 
consider smaller incidental errors produced by smaller sets of faults. On the 
other hand, besides the global deviation, it is also important to analyze the 
individual deviation values for each one of the failure modes considered 
(OK, CRASH, HANG and ERRORS), as, depending on the SUB 
characteristics and on some specificities of the target system, a certain 
failure mode can be more important and relevant than others. 
Regarding the LOC approach in the WS experiments (from Figure 
6-11 to Figure 6-15), for example, we can observe in the charts of Figure 
6-11 that if the experiments were made starting with the functions with 
greater LOC values (descending order - LOC Desc), from a certain order, 
the global deviation value remains near zero and with minor changes. The 
same behavior is noticed in the LOC Asc (in ascending order). However, 
the convergence in LOC Desc is clearly quicker: 20% of the total injected 
faults induce a global error near 1.3% (it is worth to recall that we are using 
the worst-case scenarios). As already mentioned, this observation is 
explained by the function-based analysis used in this study. Despite the 
differences in the convergence speed, an analogous behavior holds for all 
the other failure mode deviations. This behavior was not so evident in the 
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discrete values presented in previous tables. The charts also show that, 
considering the LOC Asc approach, injecting about 45% of the total 
software fault injection considered, we can obtain a global deviation of 
about 1%. Moreover, that value remains with minor changes in the 
experiments immediately following and converges to zero as we inject the 
remaining software faults. 
One can also observe that, regardless of the metrics used to select the 
targets, the convergence lines of the Asc approaches present similar 
behaviors and the same holds for Desc orders (except for the Mi metric, as 
explained below). This similarity seems to induce the definition of two 
groups: one for each sorting option, Asc and Desc. In fact, the charts seem 
to confirm that, regardless of the strategy used, the Asc order is the best for 
very low errors (lower than or equal to 0.5%). We can state that the Desc 
orders are the best ones for errors between 1% and 4%. An exception to this 
rule is related to the Mi approach, in which an exchange of the charts can 
be observed. This variation is justified by the definition of the 
Maintainability index, Mi, which, as developed by P. Oman [Oman et al. 
1992], is greater for smaller and less complex functions, in opposition to all 
the other metrics. This observation seems to indicate 1% as a turning value, 
where the Desc strategies start to be less efficient then the Asc ones 
(reversed for the Mi strategy). 
Despite the referred similarity of the presented charts, a more 
detailed look shows that the Vg, B, and Fc approaches, in Desc order, reveal 
a higher convergence of global deviation values up to about 2%. On the 
other hand, for very low deviation values, in the order of magnitude of 
0.5%, the LOC, Vg and B approaches, in Asc order, show a greater 
efficiency. This confirms our observations from Table 6-3 - Percentage of 
fault injections needed to achieve a given global deviation error limit in the 
WS Experiments. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6-11 - Deviations for each failure mode in the WS experiments, 
considering the LOC strategy. (a) LOC Asc. (b) LOC Desc. The vertical blue line 
indicates the percentage of injected faults needed to achieve a global deviation of 
1%. 
168 Experimental Evaluation of Faultload Reduction Strategies 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6-12 - Deviations for each failure mode in the WS experiments, 
considering the Vg strategy. (a) Vg Asc. (b) Vg Desc. The vertical blue line 
indicates the percentage of injected faults needed to achieve a global deviation of 
1%. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6-13 - Deviations for each failure mode in the WS experiments, 
considering the B strategy. (a) B Asc. (b) B Desc. The vertical blue line indicates 
the percentage of injected faults needed to achieve a global deviation of 1%. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6-14 - Deviations for each failure mode in the WS experiments, 
considering the Mi strategy. (a) Mi Asc. (b) Mi Desc. The vertical blue line 
indicates the percentage of injected faults needed to achieve a global deviation of 
1%. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6-15 – Deviations for each failure mode in the WS experiments, 
considering the Fc strategy. (a) Fc Asc. (b) Fc Desc. The vertical blue line indicates 
the percentage of injected faults needed to achieve a global deviation of 1%. 
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Concerning the MtQs experiments, like in the WS, we can observe 
from the charts from Figure 6-16 to Figure 6-20, that all approaches lead to 
convergence lines with similar behavior, considering their respective orders 
(Asc or Desc), except for the Mi approach (justified by the definition of the 
Maintainability index, Mi, as explained above). In these experiments, a 
more detailed analysis of the charts confirms that the best strategy is still 
the Vg Desc, for errors up to 2%. For errors less than 0.5%, the Mi Desc 
criterion is the best choice to select the subset of faults. 
Considering both benchmark systems, these charts confirm that the 
best strategies for higher errors (greater than 2%) are those that have a 
worse performance considering lower errors (around 0.5%), and vice-versa. 
On the other hand, considering the behavior similarities of all the 
approaches, even with different types of SUBs (the WS, representing 
relative large and complex systems, and MtQs, representing a much 
smaller benchmark system) the charts and the data suggest that the Vg 
criteria (Asc, for errors lower than 0.5%, and Desc for greater errors) is a 
good global choice to answer our initial question: how to choose an 
adequate fault injection target, and thus reduce the total software fault 
injection experiments, without restricting the benchmark scope. 
Despite the better performance of the Vg strategy, the LOC approach 
(in machine code) still shows to be a good strategy (in Asc order, for errors 
lower than 0.5%, and Desc for greater errors). The LOC approach is of 
particular importance because it is easier to obtain than all the other 
software measures (though always more complex than the random 
selection) and it does not require the availability of the target source code. 
Furthermore, unlike the other software metrics, the LOC strategy does not 
require the use of any complementary tool in order to analyze the code, as 
it can be obtained directly from the analysis of the OS kernel binary. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6-16 - Deviations for each failure mode in the MtQs experiments, 
considering the LOC strategy. (a) LOC Asc. (b) LOC Desc. The vertical blue line 
indicates the percentage of injected faults needed to achieve a global deviation of 
1%. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6-17 - Deviations for each failure mode in the MtQs experiments, 
considering the Vg strategy. (a) Vg Asc. (b) Vg Desc. The vertical blue line 
indicates the percentage of injected faults needed to achieve a global deviation of 
1%. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6-18 - Deviations for each failure mode in the MtQs experiments, 
considering the B strategy. (a) B Asc. (b) B Desc. The vertical blue line indicates 
the percentage of injected faults needed to achieve a global deviation of 1%. 
176 Experimental Evaluation of Faultload Reduction Strategies 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6-19 - Deviations for each failure mode in the MtQs experiments, 
considering the Mi strategy. (a) Mi Asc. (b) Mi Desc. The vertical blue line 
indicates the percentage of injected faults needed to achieve a global deviation of 
1%. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6-20 - Deviations for each failure mode in the MtQs experiments, 
considering the Fc strategy. (a) Fc Asc. (b) Fc Desc. The vertical blue line indicates 
the percentage of injected faults needed to achieve a global deviation of 1%. 
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The results show that if we choose to start the WS experiments by the 
OS kernel functions with lower Vg (Vg Desc approach), after the injection 
of 25.05% of the total faults (5,230 fault injections), we obtain a 𝑑𝑔 (Global 
Dev) value less or equal than 1%. The same happens for each one of the 𝑑𝑓𝑖 
(deviations of individual failure modes). In this way, we can reduce the 
fault injection experiments by approximately 75%, representing an 
enormous save of time in carrying out the benchmark experiments. 
Considering the total time needed to inject all the 20,875 faults in the WS 
experiments, we can estimate the reduction time of the total experiments in, 
approximately, 5,020 hours. 
6.4 Proposal strategy for faultload 
reduction 
Considering the results of the experimental evaluation carried out 
(presented in previous sections), a generic approach can be followed in 
order to solve the problem of the large size of the faultload, which arises in 
benchmarking the dependability of large and complex systems.  
The proposed approach consists in the generation of an accurate 
faultload, specifically created for a given target system, and encompasses 
the following steps: 
1. Obtain the complete list of target functions that should be 
considered as targets of the software fault injection (the OS kernel 
functions were considered in the conducted experimentation 
study). 
2. Analyze all the functions listed in the previous step in order to 
obtain the correspondent software metrics (Vg or LOC, according 
to the results obtained in the experimental evaluation study). It is 
worth pointing out that, despite the better global performance of 
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the Vg strategy, the LOC approach also proved to be a good 
strategy. Moreover, the LOC software metrics is a lot easier to 
obtain than the Vg (even when compared with the other software 
metrics), and it is does not require the availability of the source 
code. The LOC metric can be directly obtained from the target 
functions binary code, which make this software metric especially 
adequate for COTS and COTS-based systems. 
3. Sort the list of functions based on the selected software metric and 
in the intended order. According to the results obtained in the 
experimental study, for a greatest reduction on the size of the 
faultload, the descending order should be used. On the other 
hand, if it is accepted to have a faultload with a greater number of 
faults, the ascending order should be chosen instead. 
4. Generate the faultload using the G-SWFIT (Generic Software 
Fault Injection) methodology [Durães et al. 2006] to determine the 
set of software faults that can be injected in each of the functions 
listed in the previous step (the presented research work used a 
tool provided by the author of the G-SWFIT methodology). The 
G-SWFIT technique consists in the scanning of the target code for 
specific low-level instruction patterns (sequence of machine code 
instructions) in order to emulate high-level software faults 
through the modification of the ready-to-run binary code of the 
target software component. It uses a set of operators for software 
fault emulation through low-level code mutations based on an 
extensive collection of real software faults, found in field. 
5. Tailor the whole set of faults generated in order to obtain a 
reduced size faultload containing a given number of faults. The 
error imposed by the reduction of the number of faults can be 
estimated, according to our research. In other words, the faultload 
is calibrated for a given error bound. According to the conducted 
experimental study, using the Vg Desc or the LOC Desc 
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approaches, the complete faultload can be reduced to merely 
4,000 software faults in order to obtain an expected maximum 
error of 2% (which seems to be a reasonable error for 
dependability benchmarks). Moreover, this faultload is adequate 
for dependability benchmarks, regardless of the complexity of the 
BT system (as evidenced by the values presented in Tables 6-3 
and 6-4). 
It should be noticed that the faultload generated using the proposed 
approach is specifically generated for the selected target system. Different 
targets systems should originate different faultloads. 
As a result of the presented study, two ready-to-use calibrated 
faultloads are made available in http://eden.dei.uc.pt/~pncosta/. They 
were specifically generated for the target system used in the fault injection 
campaign carried out on this research work – the Linux RedHat 7.3 
operating system (kernel version 2.4.18-3). The faultloads were generated 
according to the mentioned approach, using the Vg Desc and the LOC Asc 
strategies and contain 4,000 and 13,000 software faults, respectively. 
Concerning the errors induced by the use of the provided faultloads, our 
research study suggests that it is lower than 2% for the faultload based on 
the Vg Desc (the smaller faultload) and lower than 0.5% for the faultload 
based on LOC Asc (the larger faultload). 
The faultloads generated with the proposed approach are especially 
useful for dependability benchmarks, as the error induced by the reduction 
of the number of faults was estimated on the presented experimental 
evaluation and measured against the results obtained with the complete 
faultload.  
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6.5 Summary 
This chapter described the testbed used to evaluate different 
strategies to guide the fault injection target selection of dependability 
benchmarks and reduce the required fault injection experiments, without 
restricting the benchmark scope and keeping accurate results. It presents 
and analyzes the results obtained with an exhaustive set of fault injection 
experiments using a comprehensive faultload, which includes all possible 
software target locations of an operating system kernel (the complete set of 
the kernel OS functions, referred in kernel symbols table), resulting in one 
of the most extensive fault injection studies ever reported. More than 41 
thousand of continuous fault injection experiments, carried out in more 
than 2 years, show that the fault injection experiments of a dependability 
benchmark can be reduced by more than 75%, maintaining the induced 
error below 1%. The effectiveness of the innovative approach is 
demonstrated with two real and different systems: a web-server 
dependability benchmark and a large-scale integer vector sort application 
extended with performance and quality measures. 
The proposed methodology allows answering the problem of 
extending the use of dependability benchmarks to large and complex 
systems, making them feasible and practicably applied. It is worth pointing 
out that such benchmarks usually take several months or even years due to 
its large faultload size, which means that, in practice, it is not possible to 
execute them. 
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Chapter 7  
7 Conclusion 
This is the last chapter of this thesis and it provides an overview of the 
research work carried out in recent years, in the field of dependability 
benchmarking, at the Software and Systems Engineering Group of the Center for 
Informatics and Systems of the University of Coimbra. 
7.1 Overview and future work 
ependability benchmarks should provide generic, cost-effective 
and reproducible ways for characterizing the behavior of 
components and computer systems in the presence of faults, 
allowing the quantification of dependability attributes or the 
characterization of system into well-defined dependability classes.  
A key element in dependability benchmarks is the existence of a 
suitable fault injection tool to support the experiments. Dependability 
benchmarks must include fault injectors with very specific features: (i) they 
should be very easy to install and use, without the need for any complex 
setup or installation procedure; (ii) have high level of portability; (iii) have 
very low intrusiveness; (iv) be capable of injecting faults in both user and 
D 
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system spaces; (v) and in code and data segments of any process, 
irrespective of their complexity; (vi) be independent of the availability of 
any source code of any system component or user process, (vii) be 
dynamically linked into a target system; and (viii) be compatible with the 
latest and most advanced software fault models. 
Despite all the developments, none of the existing fault injection tools 
(presented in section 2.4.3) satisfied these requirements. In order to fulfill 
this gap, this work presents a pioneering SWIFI tool, named DBench-FI 
(Dependability Benchmarking Fault Injector), specially developed for 
dependability benchmarking. It has a unique set of features, required by 
that type of application: very low intrusiveness, capable of injecting both in 
user and system space, does not require application source code to be 
available, can be dynamically loaded into a system, and can inject even on 
applications that are already running when it is installed. 
The methodology used in its design, based on the OS kernel schedule 
upgrading algorithm, together with a carefully crafted integration with the 
scheduler and memory management functions, constitutes the main 
innovation of this SWIFI tool, and is responsible for the unique 
characteristics presented by the fault injector. The DBench-FI enables a 
breakthrough in the areas of fault injection and dependability 
benchmarking, opening new perspectives hardly achievable with existing 
methods and making it one of the most versatile fault injectors available. 
The current version of DBench-FI is adequate for the injection of 
hardware faults (intermittent and transient faults) in the systems memory, 
as well as for software faults, according to the G-SWFIT model - the 
state-of-the-art in software faults model. It is a central tool for the 
experimental evaluation presented in this thesis (chapter 6). Future 
versions of DBench-FI can be easily extended to include the majority of the 
existing fault models of Xception fault injector [Carreira et al. 1998b], such 
as spatial fault triggers and the capability to inject faults in processor 
resources. 
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Another major challenge in the design of dependability benchmarks 
is the definition of the faultload. Concerning software faultloads, that 
difficulty is further increased because of the known difficulties in assuring 
fault representativeness and the need of complex fault emulation methods.  
Faultloads based on software faults had already been proposed. 
However, in order to assure the necessary representativeness, they require 
a large number of fault injection locations and, consequently, a huge 
number of experiments. That problem is even more dramatic in large and 
complex systems, where the execution time of those dependability 
benchmarks can take months or years due the mentioned faultload size. 
This thesis presents the results of comprehensive fault injection 
experiments performed during more than two years of continuous fault 
injection runs in two completely different applications: a real web-server 
dependability benchmark and a large-scale integer vector sort client-server 
application extended with performance and quality metrics. The goal was 
to define the best strategy to reduce the number of faults while keeping 
accurate dependability benchmark results. 
The reduction of the number of faults is achieved by an approach to 
guide the fault injection target selection in the code of the target systems. 
The goal is to identify the software fault target locations that assure good 
accuracy in the dependability benchmarks experiments while reducing 
dramatically the time needed to run the benchmark (because the number of 
faults is highly reduced).  
The fault reduction strategy is based on measures of the target code, 
namely, Lines Of Code (LOC), the Extended Cyclomatic Complexity (Vg), 
Halstead’s Delivery Bugs (B), Maintainability Index (Mi) and Functional 
Complexity (Fc). A randomly chosen subset of targets among the full set of 
injection targets, following a uniform distribution, is also studied (RandSF). 
In this case, for each subset, percentage of the full set, 2000 experiences 
have been carried out. 
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The results presented in this thesis extends our initial experimental 
study [Costa et al. 2009] (presented in section 5.3.1- Preliminary assessment 
study), as we consider the whole operating system kernel of the SUB 
(referred by the exported kernel symbols table) as the set of targets to 
establish the benchmark reference results instead of just the OS system calls 
used by the benchmark. 
A study of the quality and usefulness of the dependability 
benchmark results for each approach is presented, and we can conclude 
that, in what concerns software fault injection, using the Vg criteria to 
choose the target functions for fault injection, allow a faster achieving of 
identically results, with respect to failure modes, globally and individually 
considered. The results show that we can reduce the fault injection 
experiments by approximately 75%, maintaining the induced error (global 
deviation) below 1%. This represents an enormous save of time in carrying 
out the benchmark experiments, especially in large and complex systems. 
Despite this choice, the LOC approach (in machine code) also proved 
to be a valid and interesting strategy, especially if we consider that it is 
easier to obtain than all the other measures. Moreover, it is highly suitable 
for systems where the source code is not available for analysis or whether 
the tool for the software metrics analysis is unavailable. Furthermore, 
without being the best approach, random subsets of the software fault 
injection targets have also showed to be a valid strategy. 
Besides these conclusions, some other relevant observations should 
be taken into account: 
 In order to guide the target selection and reduce the number of 
faults, the best strategies for higher errors (within the range of 1% 
to 4%) are the worst ones when errors are intended to be smaller 
(lower than 0.5%), and vice- versa. 
 The experiments performed with either a complex and large 
workload or a smaller and simpler one show that, regardless of 
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the strategy used, the ascending order (Asc) is the best one for 
very low errors (lower or equal to 0.5%). It can be stated that the 
descending orders (Desc) are the best for errors between 1% and 
4%. The Mi criteria is an exception to this rule, since, contrariwise 
to what happens with the other metrics, Mi is greater for smaller 
and less complex functions. 
 In order to keep the error lower than 0.5%, the number of injected 
faults is identical in both benchmark systems, despite the great 
differences in their workloads. This reveals independence 
between the number of faults and the complexity of the 
benchmark target, for very low errors. 
It should be noticed that the complete workload-faultload space is in 
fact huge and testing the complete space is truly impossible. Thus, as 
performing a large set of experiments covering many points in the space 
workload-faultload is unfeasible, this study uses a worst case example, 
which is a completely different workload, concerning the workload 
complexity and the required computer resources. In fact, the integer vector 
sort application is very different from the real web-server dependability 
benchmark. The similarity of the obtained results in these two completely 
different systems seems to indicate that is reasonable to assume that the 
reduced fault set is a good approximation of the comprehensive fault set. It 
is worth mentioning that the faults are applied to the operating system and 
the different workloads represent different points in the workload space. 
Future implementations of dependability benchmarks may 
encompass compact and representative faultloads generated according the 
approach presented in this research study. The presented methodology can 
be used in the future with new fault injection targets in order to generate 
accurate and specific faultloads. New applications can also be used as 
benchmark targets in order to evaluate the impact of the injected faults. 
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7.2 Contributions 
Taken as a whole, the main contributions of this work can be 
summed up in the following items: 
 To provide a software fault injector compatible with the 
demanding requirements of dependability benchmarks. Namely, 
it should be very easy to install and use, have very low 
intrusiveness, be capable of injecting faults in both user and 
system spaces, and in code and data segments of any process, 
irrespective of their complexity, be independent of the availability 
of any source code of any system component or user process, be 
dynamically linked into a target system and be compatible with 
the latest and most advanced software fault models. Concerning 
this last requirement, it was considered essential the compatibility 
of the fault injector with the Generic Software Fault Injection 
Technique (G-SWFIT) [Durães et al. 2006] – the state-of-the-art in 
software faults model. G-SWFIT is based on a set of operators for 
software fault emulation through low-level code changes in the 
target executable code, mimicking the most common types of real 
software faults. These operators resulted from a field study based 
on the analysis and classification of more than 600 software faults 
found in real software applications. The developed tool consists 
in one of the most versatile software fault injectors currently 
available. 
 To define and evaluate different hypothesis for the reduction of 
the number of software fault injection experiments. The 
evaluation is based on the analysis of the error obtained in 
consequence of the reduction of the fault injection experiments. 
This study uses the results obtained with a comprehensive 
faultload that includes all possible software target locations (the 
complete set of the kernel OS functions, referred in kernel 
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symbols table), resulting in one of the most extensive fault 
injection studies ever reported. 
 To present a strategy to guide the fault injection target selection of 
dependability benchmarks and to reduce the required number of 
software faults, thus decreasing the execution time of the 
benchmark, maintaining, simultaneously, their usefulness and 
representativeness. The proposed methodology is especially 
useful in large and complex systems, where the experimentation 
time can be severely reduced without compromising the 
dependability benchmark results. Conducted experiments 
showed that the fault injection experiments can be reduced by 
more than 75%, maintaining the induced error below 1%. This 
method will open the possibility to extend the dependability 
benchmarks to large and complex systems, making them feasible 
and practicably applied (such benchmarks usually take several 
months or even years due to its large faultload size). 
 To provide accurate and ready-to-use faultloads, compatible with 
a given target system. These faultloads can be used as the 
faultload component of dependability benchmarks, as the error 
introduced by the reduction of the number of faults was 
measured against the results obtained with the complete 
faultload. This strategy allows us to provide reduced sized 
faultloads that assure an error lower than a given limit. 
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